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„Change has become a constant; managing it has become an expanding discipline.
The way we embrace it defines our future.” This statement was made by Queen Elisa-
beth II in her speech at Westminster Hall on Tuesday 30th April, 2002, related to the 50
years of her regency. But could this declaration not be adopted justly with good reason
as the motto for the SCAR meeting as well?
With these short remarks, I would like to welcome you on behalf of the Bavarian Aca-
demy of Sciences and as the Chairman of the Commission for Glaciology. I am glad
that you have chosen Munich for your first workshop. In these premises we are the
guests of an Academy who looks back on a long tradition. The foundation of the Bava-
rian Academy by Kurfürst Maximilian II Joseph took place in 1759. In the memorandum
of the association is written that the aims and activities of the Academy should be to
promote scientific work and research. This is realised by the Academy in different
ways. The Academy is responsible for many research institutions, organises symposia
and workshops and has a library, which has an exchange of publications with more
than 800 national and international institutions. The Academy is also responsible for
the “Leibniz Rechenzentrum”, one of the few high-speed computer centres in Europe
with nearly 100 collaborators. The Academy is organised in two classes, a philosophic
–historic one and a class for mathematics and natural sciences. Today the Academy
houses 19 scientific commissions with more than 300 scientists and collaborators.
One of these commissions is the Commission for Glaciology, which was founded in
1962 on the initiative of several members of the Bavarian Academy to investigate the
link between glacier behaviour and climatic conditions. Therefore the commission’s
research work has mainly been aimed at alpine glaciers, but also polar glaciology has
been an important scientific subject. In this connection I take pride in all those results
that have been achieved in the Antarctic glaciology by our former scientific leader of
the commission, Dr. Oskar Reinwarth, who was a member of the German Antarctic
Expedition „Ross-Ice-Shelf-Survey II (RISS II)“ in 1965/1966 and who is involved in the
Antarctic Research until today.
I believe that the current efforts in Antarctic research can profit very much from the
historical roots that will be discussed here. Only when we understand the historical
surroundings, we can appreciate the efforts of the scientists who prepared the way to
the physical understanding of these remote places and the role they play in the current
Global Change debate.
You have chosen Munich for this workshop. Munich is well known in Germany, in
whole Europe and allover the world as the capital of breweries. Here you can find one
of the most famous places in Germany, where water, that comes partly from the “alpine
glaciers”, is turned - together with malt and hops - into beer. I hope you will have time
enough to prove this transformed melted snow and ice!
I wish you a fruitful workshop and time enough to taste Munich’s hospitality and “Mün-
chener Bier”!
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Horst Hagedorn
Chairman of the Commission for Glaciology
Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities
XParticipants of the 1st SCAR workshop on history of Antarctic research at the
Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Munich (3 June 2005). From
left to right: John Behrendt, Horst Hagedorn, Peter Abbink, Ludwig Braun, Cor-
nelia Lüdecke, Johan van Bennekom, Christoph Mayer, Jorge Berguño, Aant
Elzinga, Adrian Howkins, Jason Davis, Erich Heucke, Heidi Escher-Vetter, Bal-





The 50th anniversary of the International Geophysical Year is in 2007-2008. On
this occasion an Action Group on the “History of the institutionalisation of Ant-
arctic Research within SCAR” was established under the Delegate Committee
on Standing Committees and Outreach of SCAR during the SCAR XXXIII Dele-
gates Meeting at Bremerhaven in October 2004. It is the first international and
interdisciplinary group devoted to the history of polar research.
The Aim of the Action Group
The aim of this working group is to obtain insight into the evolution of Antarctic
research and the emergence and development of institutions to co-ordinate
what was first called the Special Committee, and then Scientific Committee on
Antarctic Research (SCAR). We plan to study to what degree research in the
Antarctic has been driven by scientific criteria, and to what extent compromises
were made in the light of political barriers, levels of technological development,
logistical limitations, and physical hazards.
In historical perspective, a review will be made of essential background factors,
both scientific and non-scientific, at work when nations were moved to partici-
pate in the International Geophysical Year (IGY, 1957-1958) at the time of the
Cold War. Pertinent in this respect are the different roles played by non-govern-
mental scientific organisations as distinct from intergovernmental organisations
or modes of international organisation. Additional socio-cultural and political
background factors will be considered with regard to major nations that chose
not to contribute to the IGY.
Our Plans
We plan to discuss several aspects of the phase prior to the International Geo-
physical Year and the initial attempts to institutionalise polar research. Tradition-
ally, field science practised in remote geographical regions was either a bypro-
duct of exploration or an activity exploited by economical interests or territorial
claimants. An important aspect of the early international polar year initiatives in
the past has been the requirement that expeditions and projects be driven by
scientific research instead of exploration. This principle was reiterated in Bel-
gium by a number of internationally minded scientists (Henryk Arctowski, Otto
Nordenskjöld, Jean Charcot, William Speirs Bruce, and others). This was when
efforts were afoot to establish an international polar commission, a hybrid com-
bination of inter-governmental and non-governmental scientific and other or-
ganizations. Although such a commission was actually founded, it had a very
marginal influence on events and was soon eclipsed by the First World War.
Our questions to the history of Antarctic Research
Engagement: What motivated an individual person or a given country to engage
in Antarctic research? Did the motivation differ during different histo-
rical time periods? Is it possible to identify different types of role-
2Realisation: How were Antarctic research agendas set up and implemented?
What kind of arguments were used to promote Antarctic research?
What sort of funding was available, and did different modes of fund-
ingaffect the character of an expedition and the way it was con-
ducted?
Co-operation: When did co-operation for research pertaining to Antarctica
occur, and what was the general orientation and scope? What were
some of the obstacles associated with multi-lateral or international
co-operation?
Leading figures: In the context of different national settings and perspectives,
who were the persons that came to be recognised as leading figures
in Antarctic research, and for what reasons? To what extent did
some scientists emerge as diplomats within science, or beyond it in
the international political arena?
How were they regarded by their scientific colleagues, by politicians,
media, etc.?
The answers may be found in our workshop.
Cornelia Lüdecke and Aant Elzinga
J. Berguño: Dawn of Antarctic Consciousness
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1 The Dawn of Antarctic Consciousness
Jorge Berguño, Chilean Antarctic Institute, Santiago, Chile
Email: jberguno@inach.cl
1.1  Introduction
The roots of the gigantic effort in international cooperation concerning the
Southern Continent can be associated to the late eighteenth century expedi-
tions of La Pérouse, Malaspina, James Cook and, at the start of the nineteenth
century, Bellingshausen and Foster. Authorities in the ports of call were re-
spectful and keen to cooperate with the scientific goals of these maritime ex-
peditions. One must remember that the Terra Australis was also a scientific
endeavour, even before its official discovery in 1819, and States exercised
restraint with regard to any eventual claims to these unexplored territories. The
eighteenth century Anglo-Spanish treaties consolidated a statu quo in the
northern and southern extremities of the Western Hemisphere (San Lorenzo or
Nootka Sound Treaty in 1790) whose effects extended to the polar areas.
The intellectual construction of Antarctica is nevertheless an accomplishment of
the nineteenth century. This paper explores the motivations of the main actors,
governments and their agencies, learned and scientific societies, explorers and
scientists, international congresses, in the creation of an atmosphere conducive
to a type of international cooperation which does not exclude rivalries or com-
petitions as substitutes for international conflict. The world that prepared itself to
receive the 1874 Transit of Venus, and the subsequent Transit in 1882, which
would overlap with the First Polar Year (1882-1883) had witnessed an extra-
ordinary expansion, comparable in some sense with the great changes of the
Age of Renaissance.
One can distinguish two stages in this process: the commonly designated “mag-
netic crusade”, whose remote origins can be found in Halley’s observations of
magnetic variations in the Paramour, Hansteen´s treatise on the “Magnetism of
the Earth”, Baron von Humboldt´s suggestion that the origin of magnetic pertur-
bations was cosmic, and Gauss´s extraordinary prediction that a South Magne-
tic Pole would be found near latitude 66° S and long itude 146° E. The second
stage is marked by the trend towards international scientific cooperation and
technological developments in the fields of communications, transportation and
agreements on international standards and aspirations in the field of global
cartography.
Without prejudice to the necessary linkages between the two periods, the focus
is on events within the span of time starting in 1874 and finishing in 1916
(Shackleton’s Endurance Expedition being considered as the end of the “Heroic
Age of Exploration”). The parameters mentioned at the First Workshop on
History of Antarctic Research are applied to individuals, learned and scientific
societies and congresses; the funding, organization, composition and aims of
expeditions, including logistic and other support provided at departure ports in
the Southern Hemisphere. It is argued that the support afforded by countries in
Steps of Foundation – Proceedings of the 1st Workshop of the SCAR History Action Group
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the south flowed not only from hopes for economic return but equally from the
promise of prestige and symbolic reward associated with science and explora-
tion, thence contributing to a growing “Antarctic consciousness”, spiritually as
well as in visible terms, not least in Argentina and Chile.
1.2 Preliminary Remarks on the History of Antarctic Science
George Sarton, a recognized specialist in the history of sciences considered, at
an early stage of his own thought, that Auguste Comte should be considered
the founder of this discipline, since he was endowed with a clear and concise
view of its objectives. Sarton would seem to privilege the French tradition of
Comte, Tannery, Duhem, Boutroux. However, at the end of his treatise, Sarton
departs from the positivist tradition and advances the blueprint of a “new scien-
tific humanism” admitting that the fundamental question of human values, in-
cluding scientific values, remains beyond the scope of science, but we must not
“subordinate humanities to technicalities”1. Philosophers have a more radical
answer to these questions by reminding us that “Scientific knowledge of things
is not a knowledge of their being”2; or calling for the “marriage of exact research
with a wide and profound philosophical scanning of the horizon”3; or the com-
ment on Einstein´s system by a Spanish philospher: “a scientific doctrine is not
born, however obvious the facts upon which it is based may appear, without a
well defined spiritual orientation”4 .
We would like to draw away from this dispute and take a different approach,
retaining Alexander von Humboldt´s assertion that every great intellectual
change is preceded by a long-term preparation5. The development of a parti-
cular discipline must be referred to a global epistemological situation. If this is
the case, the pace of Antarctic exploration does not dictate or rule on the ad-
vance of Antarctic science. On the contrary, particular developments in the
history of science enhance the importance of Antarctic scientific research, as is
the case of plate tectonics which, once recognized as the dominant theoretical
interpretation of the earth´s geology, makes Antarctica its focus and provides a
central role for Antarctic research in the earth sciences6.
The author of a history of Antarctic science7 believes that the domain of Antarc-
tic research is certainly not independent, or even diverse, from the common
scientific tree of knowledge. He does find in both the origin and the aims of
Antarctic science a holistic approach, which reminds us quite obviously of
Humboldt and Ritter, but also of some of the prominent figures in the period of
early Antarctic science, as Neumayer, Drygalski, and particularly of his teacher,
Ferdinand von Richthofen, who sought to revive the concept of the unity of
earth´ s surface and to bring the analytical approach into a closer relationship
                                                
1
 Sarton 1948: 28.
2
 Jaspers 1960: 12.
3
 Szilasi 1951: 166.
4




 Pyne 1986: 268-278.
7
 Fogg 1992: 396-397.
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with chorological studies which Ritter had undertaken without a tangible re-
search method. Fogg is not particularly stimulated by these geographic issues,
but visualizes the trend towards global change and ecosystemic change as
representative of this holistic approach which is not unique to Antarctica but is
particularly relevant to ecosystemic changes and evolutionary biology 8.
In the case of Antarctic science, its history, in practical terms, is not only char-
acterized by a chain of outstanding personalities and their respective disco-
veries, but more specifically by the communication, in a vital form, of a previous
experience, knowledge or thought. This is particularly true for the explorer, but it
is also of enormous significance for the scientist. In addition, the history of ideas
can better explain the two concepts advanced in the abstract: the “intellectual
construction” of Antarctica and the “Dawn of Antarctic Consciousness”. The first
one implies that Antarctica is a special place for Antarctic research. The second
one reflects a broader approach in which Antarctica is appreciated as a theme
in literature and human thinking more generally, signifying a widening in the
scope and greater complexity of awareness on the part of humankind and her
action in the world as a whole.
We now know many of the assets of the first concept, thanks to the efforts of
several generations of Antarctic explorers and scientists, as both exploration
and scientific inquiry contribute to the intellectual construction of Antarctica.
These contributory elements flow from Resolution 3, approved by the Sixth
International Geographic Congress, Antarctica is both “the greatest piece of
exploration still to be undertaken” and a site from where can be drawn “addi-
tions to knowledge in almost every branch of science”. Robert K. Headland
considers this formulation as the theoretical beginning of the “Continental
Penetration” stage of Antarctic History9. However, at the start of the “Heroic Age
of Exploration” different approaches towards the scientific exploration of the
Antarctic Continent arose and the fact that continental penetration prevailed
over maritime coastal exploration, and the race towards the South Pole became
a symbol of individual and national prestige was not predetermined by the
above mentioned theoretical framework.
Georg von Neumayer (1826-1909) had advocated an international Antarctic
expedition at the First International Geographic Congress (Antwerp, 1871) in
connection with the forthcoming Transit of Venus in 1874, and is currently
remembered for encapsulating his demand in a famous sentence: “Auf zum
Südpol!”; John Murray (1841-1914), President of the Royal Scottish Geogra-
phical Society, had conceived a British Antarctic Expedition in 1886 and plead-
ed in 1894 for a maritime reconnaissance of Antarctica. They are certainly not
the precursors of “Continental Penetration”, although Neumayer´s proposals for
an indispensable “gravitation survey” and other geophysical research in Antarc-
tica enhanced the importance of latitudinal observations in high polar latitudes;
and Murray´s vision of Antarctic research influencing “the whole complex of
natural philosophy and natural science” had the same effect. On February 24th
1898, John Murray read a paper at the Royal Society in London on the advan-
tages of an Antarctic expedition and various specialists, including Neumayer
                                                
8
 Fogg 1992: 397.
9
 Headland 2004: 18.
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who had been specially invited to this event, responded from the perspective of
their own research. With a single exception, scientists participating in the Royal
Society Antarctic symposium (1898) did not consider Antarctic continental pene-
tration a worthy scientific endeavour.
But it is suprising that several of them considered the area below 60° S as the
specific field for Antarctic research and concluded that a selected group of
scientists, installed at a modest base on Cape Adare could perform appropriate
scientific work. Shortly after this symposium was held, Carsten Egeberg Borch-
grevink and the Southern Cross Expedition (1898-1900) landed on Cape Adare
on 2 April 1899 and carried out geological, meteorological and terrestrial mag-
netic observations. A man who did not appreciate the intrusion of a Norwegian,
resident in Australia supported by private patronage, saw his descent at Cape
Adare in an altogether different light. Sir Clements Robert Markham (1830-
1916), President of the Royal Geographical Society probably noted that Borch-
grevink had also sledged from Cape Adare into the unknown Antarctic lands
and his very brief comments on the merits of geographic exploration of Antarc-
tica seemed to anticipate his struggle to wrestle from the Royal Society the
leadership of the future Antarctic expedition.
Going one step further to the assumption that there is an intellectual construc-
tion of Antarctica, the issue of “Engagement” or “Commitment” presupposes the
existence of “Consciousness”. Such conciousness is a part of the “spirit of the
times”. When Goethe mocks the concept by defining the “Geist der Zeiten” as
the historians’ “own spirit in which the times are reflected”10, he is at once right
and wrong. In a seminal essay on the major needs of intellectual history, one
writer has pointed to “detailed studies of the relationship of thought in relatively
brief periods of time”11. Such studies may contribute to detect when cross over
from one domain to another takes place, what “beliefs”12 most of the intellec-
tuals, including the scientists, agree on at a specific time and circumstances,
and, on the other hand, what are the most significant variations within a com-
mon intellectual framework. Our particular study is focused on the ways and
means that an Antarctic awareness, conciousness and engagement develops.
1.3 The Diverse Impact of some Key Disciplines on Antarctic Conscious-
ness
Disciplines early on central to the Antarctic endeavor were astronomy, meteo-
rology and oceanography. Of these, astronomy had an intellectual cross-over
function, while the impact of the other two to a greater extent hinged on the
personal initiative and networks of enterprising individuals. Let us consider the
disciplines in the reverse order, beginning with the influence of John Murray and
Mathew Maury respectively. In all three cases we shall be concerned with the
emergence of a notion of parallel comparative observations across large por-
tions of the globe guided by agreed-upon standards of measurement. Our claim
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is that such principles of standardization had a bearing on the development of
an “Antarctic consciousness” in the sense referred to in the previous section.
The Voyage of the Challenger has been highlighted as a turning point both in
the field of oceanography and in the initial steps of Antarctic exploration. We
can probably discard now the generally accepted view that the ship in question
was the first to cross the Antarctic Circle. But it did carry on research at sub-
Antarctic islands and the wealth of samples, experiments, observations and
knowledge about the data gathered by this scientific expedition was indeed
remarkable. Nevertheless, the concern for marine research in the Antarctic seas
was not immediately heightened by this expedition and other naval expeditions
which followed its path. A quite different picture arises from John Murray´s
campaign for exploration of the Antarctic Continent. Sir Clements Markham
called him “outspoken”13. Murray happened to be on board of the Challenger,
and the circumstances and achievements of the voyage had some effect on his
own intellectual development, but his individual capacity to influence people and
institutions, rather than any particular contribution from the marine sciences, is
at the root of the new Antarctic consciousness. The role played by the Royal
Scottish Geographical Society in Antarctic affairs and William Speirs Bruce´s
Scottish National Antarctic Expedition to the Antarctic Peninsula (1902-04) are a
significant reference point in this respect.
Quite a different question is the importance of weather phenomena and the
need for sailing ships and other vessels to know as much as feasible about the
ways to prevent or anticipate the adverse effects of severe weather. Mathew
Fontaine Maury, Director of the U.S. Naval Observatory, made a proposal “On
the establishment of a Universal System of Meteorological Observations by Sea
and Land” in 1851. His impetus provided the favourable climate for the adoption
by the First International Maritime Meteorological Congress held at Brussels in
1853 of a standardized regime of nautical meteorological observations. All the
representatives to that Conference were naval officers with only two exceptions,
a British military engineer and a Belgian statistician14. In 1860 he lectured at the
Royal Geographical Society on the geographic nature of the seas surrounding
Antarctica. In April 1861 he delivered in Washington a proposal to the diplomat-
ic representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
Russia and Spain on the scientific objectives which could best be served by
Antarctic exploration. No reply was received from any of the maritime powers
concerned by the proposal15.
Let us now move to a very different field, requiring a more comprehensive re-
view: the overlapping of astronomic research and the start of international polar
cooperation. Edmond Halley (1656-1742) had observed the transit of Mercury
from the island of St Helena in 1677. He had been the Secretary of the Royal
Society and then turned to calculating comet orbits and designing the “Halley-
an” method for the observation of the Venus Transit. It may be useful to recall
that his main contender in this field, Joseph-Nicholas Delisle (1688-1768) came
from a family of geographers and cartographers intensely associated with the
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question of a Southern Continent. Halley´s broad interests impressed the British
Admiralty that took the decision to place the sloop Paramour at his disposal for
the first sea voyage ever undertaken by a naval vessel for strictly scientific rea-
sons. The scientific work included navigation, atmospheric circulation, and the
Earth´s magnetic field. In that domain, Halley can be considered as the founder
of geophysics and his chart of magnetic variations in the Atlantic represented a
major contribution to future research in the Southern Ocean16.
Halley had come close to facing a mutiny in Barbados and when a new Transit
was envisaged in 1769, the Admiralty again agreed to furnish a ship to the
Royal Society but refused to entrust the command of such expedition to the
hydrographer Alexander Dalrymple, even though he was the recognized grand
scholar on issues concerning the Terra Australis, which was the complementary
objective of the naval expedition being planned. The outcome was the designa-
tion of Captain James Cook by both the Navy and the Transit Committee. He
was accompanied by the astronomer Charles Green, the naturalist Joseph
Banks and the Swedish botanist Solander. After observations in Tierra del Fue-
go, Cook crossed the Pacific to Tahiti where Green carried on his observations
at Pointe Venus, and the exploration of the Southern Ocean initiated a cycle
which included the circumnavigation of New Zealand, landing on Botany Bay
and the observation of the transit of Mercury. As is well known, the next expe-
dition was the great Antarctic voyage, promoted by the Board of Longitude, the
Royal Society and the British Admiralty, where a complete scientific programme
was implemented17.
When we reflect on these maritime voyages (Halley´s and Cooks’s) and their
place in Antarctic exploration, the relevance of astronomic observations carried
on a routine basis by naval officers and civilians on board of vessels to Antarctic
research is provided only by their geographic location providing a casual bridge
which sometimes may be crossed over. The issue of place and time is never-
theless not superfluous. Neumayer´s proposal for a polar expedition put to the
First International Geographic Congress (Antwerp 1871)18 is connected with a
survey for finding a good site for the observations of the Transits of Venus in
1874 and 188219. In his Antwerp paper and a subsequent essay he refers to the
well known British Astronomer Royal Sir George Bidell Airy (1801-92). How-
ever, the first proposal for a web of Antarctic or sub-Antarctic stations was made
in connection with the forthcoming 1874 Transit by a Fellow of the Royal Astro-
nomical Society, who was also an influential scientific journalist, Richard Antony
Proctor (1837-1888). Unfortunately, his proposals were rejected precisely by
Airy and by the British Admiralty, among other reasons because some of the
locations included non-existent sub-Antarctic islands20. Although none of them
could anticipate how these ideas would coalesce, and irrespective of their very
different roles and backgrounds, both Neumayer and Proctor could be consid-
ered as pioneers in a process which leads, through the overlapping of the 1882
                                                
16
 Fogg 1992: 8-17.
17
 Rubin 1982: 33-47.
18
 Dautert 1957: 43-44.
19
 Krause 1998: 58-59.
20
 Sheehan and Westfall 2004: 232-234.
J. Berguño: Dawn of Antarctic Consciousness
9
Transit with the 1882-83 Polar Year, to consider the establishment of stations
and observation posts close to Antarctica.
A pattern develops (Halley, Cook, Maury, Murray, Neumayer, Proctor), under-
lining the importance of physical connections across the Southern Ocean;  but
do ideas readily cross over from one intellectual cluster to another? In fact,
parallel observations on various scientific fields are being performed but the
unifying factor of location lacks a defined conceptual expression unless  these
observations develop into comparative measurements which gradually integrate
into the framework which seeks comparisons between physical phenomena in
the sub-Polar and Polar Regions21. There is one outstanding example of cross-
fertilization: the elaboration made by Karl Weyprecht of Maury´s ideas of syn-
chronous meteorological and magnetic observations by submitting the idea of a
network of stations for synoptic observations in the north polar areas to various
scientific societies. However, before its formal adoption by the International
Meteorogical Congress (Rome, 1879) the influence of Dr. Heinrich Dove, Direc-
tor of the Prussian Meteorological Service had to be exerted at various instan-
ces. Baker has traced the idea from Halley and Maury to Weyprecht, recalling
that K.F. Gauss and W. Weber through the auspices of the Göttingen Magnetic
Union had united 44 stations in observations of the Earth´s magnetism22. We
would like to present three other cases where the concept of comparative
observations had an indirect or direct effect on the course of scientific research
related to Antarctica and the rise of an Antarctic consciousness in Chile.
1.4 Three Types of Comparative Observations
The three examples of comparative observations taken up in this section were
all predicated on an interest in comparisons of natural phenomena in northern
and southern hemispheres. In each case an initiative taken in Europe prompted
greater awareness in Chile of the scientific significance of territories ultimately
extending to the polar south. Such awareness did not remain only in the minds
of select circles of people but it also to greater or lesser degrees translated into
institutional responses to the requests coming from abroad, thereby drawing
Chile more firmly into international networks and regimes for monitoring and
standardization. The first example concerns astronomy, the second geography
and geology, and the third concerns far-reaching standardization of efforts in
meteorology and earth magnetism.
The results of the eighteenth century efforts to time and measure the Venus
Transits of 1761 and 1789 lacked precision. An important attempt to rectify this
shortcoming was made as early as 1824 by the German astronomer Franz
Encke, a disciple of Carl Friedrich Gauss. Another disciple of Gauss, the mathe-
matician Christian L. Gerling of Marburg wrote in April 1841 a letter to Lieuten-
ant J.M. Gillis from the U.S. Naval Observatory, in which he maintained that
new and more accurate measurements of the solar parallax or a confirmation of
the existing figures established by Encke could be obtained by a series of ob-
servations of Venus carried out during approximately the same period in both
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the Northern and the Southern Hemispheres23. When Gillis selected Washing-
ton D.C.  and a spot near Santiago, Chile, for his simultaneous and opposite
observations, the project for a Chilean National Astronomical Observatory was
born with the strong support of Andrés Bello, Rector of the University of Chile
and Adviser to the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
A pupil of Christian Gerling at Marburg, Carlos Moesta, became the first Direc-
tor of the Observatory and Chile participated actively in the International Obser-
vatory Transit of Venus Conference (Paris, October 5-13, 1881) becoming also
a privileged venue for both the Transit and the Polar Year Missions of 1882-
188324. Mention also must be made of the Oceanographic Service, the Natural
History Museum and the birth of the “Société Scientifique du Chili” whose first
Chairman and Director of the Astronomical Observatory, French-born Jean-
Marie Obrecht, became an influential member of the first Chilean Antarctic
Commission set up in 1906 to prepare an expedition which failed to materialize
due to the disastrous earthquake that took place that same year. Such se-
quence of events is not casual but the initial step (“comparative astronomical
observations in both hemispheres”) does not explain by itself the end product
which is mostly the institutional build-up and the gradual emergence of an
intellectual elite committed to scientific exploration of the polar lands adjacent to
Chilean continental territory.
“The interest that has manifested itself of late in exploration in Antarctic regions
was the impulse that gave rise to the Swedish expedition to the Magellan terri-
tories in 1885. At a time when the eyes of the whole geographical world were
turned towards that portion of the earth, it seemed only fitting that Sweden´s
sons and explorers, who have had so important and extensive a share in
opening up the north polar territories, should be prepared to participate in
similar labours in the south, for we may confidently expect results obtained
there to elucidate many of those already established for the north, placing them
in their right light and showing their true value and application”25. Dr. Otto Nor-
denskjöld initiates his preliminary report of the origin, plan, and general pro-
gress of the Swedish expedition by these introductory words. Nordenskjöld´s
attention was directed towards the geology and historical evolution of this sub-
Antarctic territory, and to its fauna and flora, with special reference to forms
identical with or analogous to those of the northern hemisphere, and to its
interesting and almost extinct aboriginal population. “We desired further to
arrive at a characterization of Tierra del Fuego as a geographical unit distin-
guished from and compared with its neighbours, the Antarctic polar lands lying
to the south and Patagonia and the South American continent north of it”.
The Chilean Government was seized with a request from the Swedish Govern-
ment, on behalf of  Nordenskjöld, for support to an expedition intended to “ex-
plain some of the scientific questions, the solution of which is only possible by
comparative studies both in the northern and the southern polar regions”. The
request was for “the same facilities and advantages as at a previous occasion
have been allowed a German expedition undertaken in this country some years
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ago under the guidance of Dr. W. Michelsen from the Natural History Museum
in Hamburg free passage on Government transport ships, permission to
execute drags from the ships, provisions, the necessary porters, and special
support for the inner part of the Fireland /.../ luggage duty free across the
frontiers between Chile and Argentina /.../ and protection from the respective
Governments”26. As Nordenskjöld mentions in his preliminary report, his uncle
Baron A.E. Nordenskiold had suggested to him that the Fireland Expedition
could be an adequate preparation for a subsequent polar exploration and,
previous to his voyage he had visited the specialists: Professor Steinmann at
Freiburg, M. Rousson of Paris and Dr. Michelsen in Hamburg whose expedition
had set the standards in international cooperation which Nordenskjöld would
demand and obtain from the Government of Chile. The importance of the
expedition to the Fireland was, in addition to the objective of comparative
observations, its spillover into the Antarctic, manifested in the failed attempt to
organize an Antarctic expedition from Punta Arenas in 1897, in the precedent it
established for future international scientific cooperation, and the influence it
had in shaping the aims and objectives of Nordenskjöld’s 1901 Antarctic
Expedition.
The last example of comparative observations to be examined here has been
analyzed and documented thoroughly27. It covers the coordination of meteo-
rological and magnetic measurements using the same kind of instrumentation at
various locations as well as establishing an agreed regime for simultaneity in
the periodic intervals of time when observations would be carried out. The lea-
dership of Drygalski and previously of Richthofen, under whose presidency the
Berlin Geographic Congress approved a format for meteorological and mag-
netic observations, and of both Richthofen and Markham, prompting Argentina
to upgrade its Observatory at Año Nuevo Island, was strongly deployed during
the so-called “Grand Antarctic Expedition”. The same type of cooperation led to
the enhancement, upgrading or establishment of new stations in the north and
south hemispheres, and prepared the way for the creation of new magnetic
stations during the Second Polar Year (1932-1933) in Punta Arenas, Cape
Town and Elisabethville, and enhancement of Christchurch28. At the time of the
Gauss expedition, the Government of Chile was approached by the German
Imperial Government, with a sample of the joint programme of magnetic and
meteorological observations agreed by the Anglo-German Committee, and
requested to provide such observations in the indicated format. Some assump-
tion was made by the German diplomatic representative and the Chilean
Foreign Minister in 1901 that the Gauss could visit Punta Arenas sometime in
the spring of 1903 or 190429. This is an intriguing issue since the Gauss
expedition was shortened at the end but the fact remains that the records of all
meteorological observations made at the Salesian Colegio de San José at
Punta Arenas were provided to the German authorities, as well as all the
observations collected by the Navy’s Meteorological Office existent under its
Maritime Territory Division. In the medium-term, the request of the German
Imperial Government had two consequences in Chile: the Navy´s Meteoro-
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logical Office was reorganized and obtained new instruments and, previous to
the Second Polar Year, the Salesian Observatory at Punta Arenas was supple-
mented with the means to carry out magnetic observations.
1.5  Implementation of Antarctic Expeditions
The national frameworks in which Antarctic research was able to move from the
planning stage to actual realization depended on a large number of factors,
chief among which counted economic and political support. An examination of
several expeditions that failed to make it is especially interesting at this point for
the light it can throw on the various kinds of adversities that had to be faced and
insurmountable hinders that might block the way. It becomes evident that na-
tional as well as private entrepreneurial patronage was important, but these did
not come without the prospects of a return in terms of real or symbolic capital
gains. The symbolic-instrumental value of lending a hand to expeditions coming
from Europe should not be underestimated in order to appropriately understand
the function of generating recognition of the importance of science in Argentina
and Chile, as well as “Antarctic consciousness” more generally in those two
countries, as well as other countries of the Southern Hemisphere.
During the 1901-1916 period thirteen national expeditions were sent to Antarc-
tica. Most of them had some assistance from their national governments, al-
though contributions from scientific societies and wealthy donors were impor-
tant. Many other expeditions were crippled by lack of funds, antagonisms or
indifference from their own midst or external intervention. Funding not only
determined the expedition´s viability and success but also influenced its sci-
entific productivity. Dr. Lewander has raised the issue of whaling in connection
with Nordenskjöld´s first expedition, as well as his efforts to a successful come-
back as the Palander-Nordenskjöld expedition in the period 1912-191930 and a
specialized historian of whaling31 has explored some useful perspectives on the
role of the Antarctic whaling industry. It may be convenient to add that at the
time of the 1901 Expedition, the Swedish Government transmitted Norden-
skjöld´s interest in cooperating with Argentina, Chile and the Falkland Islands
authorities, considering “that investigation on such prominent places may be
accompanied by many practical results, for instance that of facilitating the
fishery of whales and seals ”32.
Consider now some specific cases of expeditions that did not take place, and
start with one where too many actors with mutually conflicting goals and inten-
tions were involved. At the start of his personal narrative of the origins of the
British National Antarctic Expedition, 1901-04, Sir Clements Markham mentions
“The first abortive campaign (1885-89)”. This initiative was not his “campaign”
since the merit belongs to the Melbourne Antarctic Committee, chaired by
Baron Mueller and the announcement of the Government of Victoria that it
would contribute five thousand sterling pounds for an Australian Antarctic Expe-
dition, to be headed by Baron A.E. Nordenskiöld, provided the British Govern-
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ment would make an equal contribution. The British Treasury refused to grant
any money and the generous offer by the Swedish philantropist Baron Dickson
to donate a similar sum was insufficient to warrant the success of any expedi-
tion. At this particular time, a young German scientist who had heard in the
Spring of 1897 the South polar plans of Baron Nordenskiöld felt : “..I would like
to join him as well..”33 Sir Clements Markham’s comment was that the Govern-
ment of Victoria had acted in bad faith. The final comment he makes, which is
that Sir Allen Young would have commanded the expedition if it had got beyond
the “talking stage” points to the nature of the problem. It was too early to con-
ceive an Australian Expedition led by a Scandinavian explorer, pursuant to a
local initiative led by a German scientist (Mueller but perhaps also Neumayer,
who became vice-chairman of the Melbourne Antarctic Committee, and was
already in the wings).
Our second case points to difficulties deriving from a mismatch between natio-
nal ambitions and individual personal ones. The Argentine-Italian Expedition of
1881-82, initially led by Giacomo Bove and subsequently by Luis Piedrabuena,
intended to visit the Antarctic Peninsula and proceed to the Ross Sea. The
Italian Government provided no funds for this endeavour but Bove found some
support among Argentinian public figures such as Estanislao Zeballos and the
Argentinian Navy. The expedition ended in Tierra del Fuego, rented a cutter
from the Punta Arenas entrepreneur José Nogueira, the San José, captain
Pritchard, wrecked at Bahía Slogget while the personnel was saved by the Allen
Gardiner from the Protestant Mission. Not a glorious end, but useful geodetic,
geologic, botanic and zoological research was performed mainly for the Mu-
seum of La Plata, Bove is a tragic figure, he wanted to go to Antarctica at a time
when Italian colonial ambitions aimed at Africa. When he was assigned to an
African post he committed suicide.
The next two cases involve the negative impact of unforeseen events, e.g., the
death of a possible patron and a natural catastrophe. The 1896 expedition
planned by the Chilean Scientific Society, chaired by Federico Puga Borne,
having as its leader Otto Nordenskjöld, with the logistic support of the Chilean
naval ship Magallanes. Funds could not be raised in Chile or Sweden, Baron
Dickson offered this time no money but support for the participation of two
Swedish scientists. The main difficulty was the unsuitable vessel, the costs
involved and the untimely death of Baron Dickson when discussions were still
going on. Ten years latter the 1906 abortive Chilean National Antarctic Expedi-
tion also fell through, but still there was some impact. A National Committee
was established, funds were requested and approved by the National Congress
to the amount of 150.000 pesos, a vessel would be bought in England and the
Commander of the Expedition would be General Jorge Boonen, a charismatic
figure in the Army. The 1906 earthquake shifted the appropriation but the Uni-
versity of Chile was granted money to develop vulcanological and seismic
studies. The first head of this Department, Count Montessus de Ballore, was a
friend of Jean Charcot and scientists at the University of Chile cooperated with
the analysis of observations made by Lieutenant Bongrain of the Pourquoi-Pas?
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Some of the preliminary results were presented jointly at International Geogra-
phic Congresses34.
Well-planned expeditions with a strong and serious scientific thrust may also
run afoul of great power politics and national chauvinism. A case in point is the
Palander-Nordenskjöld Expedition. The minutes of the Swedish Committeee,
deposited at the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences in Stockholm contain
some correspondence which shows the fragile nature of the project which has
been examined by Lisbeth Lewander35. It had obtained a thousand pounds from
the Royal Geographical Society on the basis of joint biological research to be
carried by two members of the staff of the British Museum of Natural Science.
But the base would remain Swedish and be located at the Antarctic Peninsula
or at Joinville Island. It was to be supplied by Norwegian and Chilean whalers
from Deception Island36. However, a Swedish Whaling Company would act as
an umbrella for the Norwegian and Chilean whalers. The project received
successive blows: any application coming from a foreign whaling company was
ruled out as unacceptable by the British authorities; biologic research at the
Orkney Islands had already been planned by a formidable adversary, the
marine biologist Johan Hjorst, also the main Norwegian negotiator with the
British authorities. Finally, the Foreign Office acted decisively in favor of
Shackleton´s enterprise, as was reported by the Royal Geographical Society
whose preference lnitially lay with Nordenskjöld. While the official veto ad-
dressed a British national, John Foster Stackhouse, who was a prestigious
Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, it obviously inclined the balance
against the Austrian Dr. Koenig, who had equipped Filchner´s vessel Deutsch-
land. König and Stackhouse were rivals with Shackleton in the attempt to stage
a transcontinental crossing of Antarctica, but endeavours at further exploration
of the Weddell Sea planned by Nordenskjöld and probably by Bruce were also
viewed as potential interferences with Shackleton´s grand design of a traverse
that would link the Weddell and Ross Seas37.
These examples are not chosen randomly. They are intended to unveil some of
the difficulties that intended Antarctic expeditions faced. On the other hand,
funding has not been scrutinized in a thorough manner, thus avoiding some
unwelcome conclusions. While funds were denied by the British Treasury for an
early Australian expedition, they were requested from Commonwealth countries
to support Scott´s Antarctic Expedition and at least one Australian State
(Queensland) subscribed one thousand pounds for the fund38. A question that
must also be asked is: to what extent were Shackleton´s Nimrod expedition and
the Aurora, which carried the Ross Sea Party, in fact funded by the Govern-
ments of New Zealand and Australia Funds provided by private donors could
not hold sway when compared to the huge investment involved in revamping
the Aurora for the Ross Sea Party´s rescue39.
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Amundsen’s expedition may also be scrutinized regarding the return on real
and symbolic capital invested. The expedition obtained a grant of 75.000 kroner
from the Norwegian Department of Defense, but the project was really saved by
Pedro Christophersen, a wealthy entrepreneur and one of the founders of the
Sociedad Argentina de Pesca, who donated 150.000 kroner. There were some
strings attached however. A condition was that the ship call at Buenos Aires or
Montevideo, since Amundsen´s narrative of his conquest of the South Pole
ought to be finished at don Pedro´s farm in Argentina.40
How can the support by countries and ports of call near the Antarctic be as-
sessed? The Argentine Congress passed a law to provide all the necessary
coal for Charcot´s 1903 expedition in Le Francais. The Chilean Sociedad Balle-
nera de Magallanesdid the same for the Pourquoi-Pas? both in Punta Arenas
and Deception Island. The vessel was repaired of very serious damage at a
nominal cost in Montevideo. How can the rescue of the Nordenskjöld expedition
or the Shackleton expedition be assessed, or how can supplies granted freely,
as well as free transport by vessel or train, and other facilities such as com-
munications by telephone or wire be estimated? This same question could be
raised for expeditions supported at Hobart, Lyttleton or Cape Town. But the
answer is that the presence in the Southern Hemisphere of expeditions coming
from the Northern Hemisphere towards Antarctica was worth much more than
the expenses incurred, provided that some recognition was extended to their
cooperative assistance to Antarctic exploration and science.
1.6 The Role of Institutions, Congresses and Societies
In this final section we shall trace the growing “Antarctic consciousness” by con-
sidering its manifestation particularly at the International Geographic Congres-
ses held from 1871 to 1913, ten congresses in all before another mode of
international organization with a more modern professional and scientifically
oriented spirit began with the establishment of the International Geographical
Union in 1922. The existence of continual tension between a focus on geogra-
phic exploration on the one hand and scientific research on the other will also
be noted.
Among several useful tables Professor Budd has provided in his essay on the
scientific imperative of Antarctic Research,41 there are three (N° 4, 5, 6) which
show respectively the growth in scientific associations since the formation of
Academies of Science, comparisons of Observational Systems in England,
France, Germany, Russia and the USA in the nineteenth century and the devel-
opment of International Science Associations. Mention should also be made of
Elisabeth Crawford´s studies of scientific elites during the period 1880-1914, as
well as the conceptual and historiographic methods she uses to approach a
social history of national and international scientific development, and the forces
that shape the patterns of models for international scientific cooperation42.
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Budd´s tables and Crawford´s studies supplement an excellent overview of
international cooperation between 1815 - 1914 by G.P. Speeckaert43. Budd
appropriately distinguishes between the national Academies, specialist scientific
societies such as the Linnean, Geological, Astronomical and the Royal Geo-
graphical Society which flourished in England between 1799 and 1830, and a
broader type of scientific associations, whose emphasis is more  practical, with
a greater social impact, and quite often a commitment to specific scientific and
technological undertakings: Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte
(1821), British Association for the Advancement of Science (1831) and the
American Association for the Advancement of Science (1848).
In the history of Antarctic Research, the British Association for the Advance-
ment of Science was responsible for the development of the scientific pro-
gramme undertaken by the British Expedition of James Ross. It developed a
document, duly approved by both the Royal Society and the British Admiralty,
where the proposal for magnetic observations intended to take place in areas of
the Southern Hemisphere ranging from New Holland (Australia) to Cape Horn
was partially implemented by an Observatory in Hobart. The bridge between the
period of the “magnetic crusade” and the new crusade advocated by the 1895
Geographic Congress is again made by the establishment some ten years
before the last date (Aberdeen, 1885) of an Antarctic Committee, Sir Clements
Markham becoming a member. But the personal and spiritual continuity of the
idea of an Antarctic Expedition was incarnated in Captain Davis, who served
with Fitzroy in the Beagle and was Second Master of the Terror under Ross,
and who constantly lectured and lobbied for a new Antarctic Expedition”. In
time, Clements Markham would be able to transfer this project to the Royal
Geographical Society, and finally defeat the Royal Society´s desire for a greater
scientific input and finality in the 1901 British Expedition. The publication in
1986, under the enticing title Antarctic Obsession, of Markham´s personal
narrative, whose original manuscript (“The Starting of the Antarctic Expedition,
1892-1903”) is kept at the Scott Polar Research Institute, including the original
Instructions of the Joint Committee as finally overthrown at Markham´s insist-
ence, allows an appreciation of both the scientific views of the Royal Society
and the exploration bias of the Royal Geographical Society44.
While there is no question that, from the very early stages of Antarctic explora-
tion, a certain antinomy exists between Scientists and Seamen45 the cleavage
and, at the same time, the necessary relation between science and exploration
has not been sufficiently highlighted. A recent study of Captain Scott’s expedi-
tions46 refers to the description by the novelist Joseph Conrad of the transit from
a “Fabulous” Geography including in particular the Terra Australis, to the era of
“Militant” Geography; and recalls Markham´s report to the Royal Geographicalal
Society on the need to train travelers, limiting their activities to surveying and
mapping, and his presentation to the British Association for the Advancement of
Science on that same year: “Our first work as geographers is to measure all
parts of the earth and sea, to ascertain the relative position of all places upon
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the surface of the globe, and to delineate the varied features of that surface”. A
useful complement to the quotation is Markham´s own article on the field of
geography published several years after.47
The fact is that national geographic societies, but also local geographic socie-
ties as the Polar Society of the city of Bremen, play a decisive role in fostering
international exploration. Publications such as the “National Geographic Maga-
zine” (1889), “Annales de Geographie” (1891), “The Geographical Journal”
(1893) and “Geographische Zeitschrift” cross the interest barrier of specialists
into the realm of the general public. But societies, publications and congresses
mobilize simultaneously the interests of exploration and science. While the
lineage of scientific congresses can be traced to Alexander Humboldt who
organized at Berlin in 1821 the first congress of German naturalists, explorers,
researchers and philosophers, it is the sequence of geographic congresses,
which indicates the relative balance between exploration and science. A table
has been appended to facilitate the examination of the dominant themes in the
first ten International Geographic Congresses (1871-1913).
That table reflects the balance of resolutions and decisions adopted at Inter-
national Geographic Congresses and reveals that during the fifty years counted
from 1871, the polar areas were not neglected and exploration was constantly
promoted, but the geographic societies of Europe, within the pattern established
by the Royal Geographical Society and Sir Clements Markham, were strongly
dominated by explorers, surveyors and cartographers. Since the end of the First
World War, a more scientific spirit prevailed, as the International Geographical
Union has been run by professional geographers and organized as a strictly
professional organization.48
While the World War declared in 1914 did not stop Sir Ernest Shackleton from
undertaking his ambitious Trans-Antarctic Expedition, it did interfere with many
other initiatives, and was certainly a blow to the internationalist approach advo-
cated by the International Polar Commission (IPC). The IPC has been studied in
some detail by Aant Elzinga49. Cornelia Lüdecke50 has provided a picture of the
German attitudes towards such organization. The German reluctance to the
type of approach taken by the IPC was most certainly shared by Great Britain
and the Royal Geographical Society. France also differed from the prevailing
view of the IPC which tried to balance a variety of conflicting factors, such as
national positions, explorers’ interests, a reliance on private initiative, a lack of
genuine representation (i.e. Borchgrevink and Sobral appeared as represen-
tatives of Norway and Argentina without consulting their respective govern-
ments).
Moreover, we share Elzinga´s appreciation for this first effort to institutionalize
Antarctic exploration and research. In particular, the creation of an International
Antarctic Institute, the bibliographical effort undertaken by Jean Denucé, the
idea of an International Polar Museum, but above all the concept of a perma-
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nent international organization while all previous Polar Commissions had been
entrusted only with the organization of the Polar Years. The IPC, for the first
time, was a forum attended by representatives of the southern nations (Aus-
tralia, Argentina, Chile and New Zealand) and remains  a watermark in the
process leading towards the present Antarctic Treaty System, including
governments represented by diplomats, scientists grouped in SCAR, national
Antarctic programmes with the Council of Managers of National Antarctic
Programms (COMNAP), and the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat providing the
continuity of the special legal and political regime applied to Antarctica.
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1.8 Appendix I: Figures of the Southern Consciousness
Three maps are shown to indicate some visual aspects of the trend towards
Antarctic consciousness.
Figure 1-1: One of several plates that illustrate Richard Proctor’s book The Universe and the
Coming Transits. London Longmans, Green, 1874.
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Figure 1-2: Official Chilean map designed in 1884 by Engineer Alejandro Bertrand, intended to
be used in all schools of the Republic. Antarctic lands are incorporated and the profile of the
Andes continues with Mount Haddington on Ross Island, Antarctica.
Figure 1-3: Map constructed in 1907 by Chilean geographer Risopatrón of part of the quadrant
he named the American Antarctic in an essay published in 1908. This map was used by the
Chilean and Argentinian Governments  to discuss a delimitation treaty in Antarctica during
inconclusive negotiations (1906-1908).
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1.9 Appendix II: International Geographic Congresses (1871 – 1913)




Organization and focus Initiated by Charles Ruelens and ad-
dressed to specialists of “la science de
la terre” in order to honour Mercator
and Ortelius whose statues were
unveiled. Central issues concerned
surveying, place names and map
projections. One of the few professio-
nal geographers of the times, Elisée
Reclus attended and actively partici-
pated in the meeting.
Polar Issues The geographical section was domi-
nated by Neumayer´s proposal for an
Antarctic Station during the forthcom-
ing Transit of Venus (1874).
2 1875 Paris
Organization and focus Attended by Richthofen, Perthes,
Petermann, Sir Henry Rawlision RGS,
Lesseps, Béaumont, Vivien de St.
Martin. A twofold definition of geo-
graphy  considered as an end in itself
(géographie physique) and as the
study of the relationship of the earth
with its inhabitants (géographie politi-
que, ethnographique, éconmique) was
approved.
Polar Issues Exploration was established as a
distinct section.
3 1881 Venice
Organization and focus Conducted its business in eight
sections that formed the basic
framework for future congresses.
Polar Issues Exploration continued as a distinct
section. Colonial issues were domi-
nant but the polar regions were
mentioned.
4 1889 Paris
Organization and focus Chaired by Ferdinand de Lesseps,
President of the Geographical Society
of Paris. Structured in seven groups.
Polar Issues Lesseps introduced the issue of Arctic
and Antarctic expeditions in the group
dealing with voyages of exploration
but the matter was not debated.
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5 1891 Berne
Organization and focus Attended by Allbrecht Penck, Eduard
Brückner, Joseph Partsch and Sir
Thomas Holdich. Penck proposed a
world map on a standard scale of1:
1,000,000.. First attempt by Kalten-
brunner to establish an International
Geographic Institute.
Polar Issues Exploration was neglected as the
decision supporting the world map
stated “car il ne reste pour ainsi dire
plus de grandes découvertes à faire”.
6 1895 London
Organisation and focus Chaired by Sir Clements Markham
RGS. Special attention given to the
teaching of geography. Commissions
appointed for the development of a
bibliography of geographical works
and the promotion of polar exploration.
Polar Issues Resolution 3 advocated exploration of
the Antarctic Regions, as “the greatest
piece of geographical exploration still
to be undertaken”and recommended
to scientific societies to undertake this
work “before the close of the century”.
7 1899 Berlin
Organization and focus Chaired by Ferdinand von Richthofen.
Stressed the importance of scientific
work. H.R. Mill, J. Scott Keltie, Fried-
rich Ratzel, P. Vidal de la Blache,
Erich von Drygalski contributed to the
debate. Otto Nordenskjöld and William
S. Bruce also attended the Congress.
Polar Issues Markham proposed a division of labor
between the British and German
expeditions to Antarctica. Drygalski
agreed and proposed a scheme for
international meteorological Antarctic
cooperation. Chairman Richthofen
requested Argentina to upgrade its
sub-Antarctic observatory at Año
Nuevo Island.
8 1907 USA
Organization and focus The Congress itinerated between
Washington D.C. and 4 other cities.
Chaired by Robert F. Peary, the Arctic
explorer. Penck´s world map was
strongly supported by the American
Geographical Society chaired by
Isaiah Bowman.
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Polar Issues The recommendations of the  Inter-
national Polar Congress (Brussels,
1906) establishing an International
Polar Commission (IPC) were
endorsed.
9 1908 Geneva
Organization and focus Chaired by the President of the Geo-
graphical Society of Geneva, Penck
(Germany) and Gannet (USA) report-
ed on progress achieved by the
international world map project. The
number of sections expanded to 14.
Polar Issues Adopted Resolution 5 advocating the
“systematic exploration of the polar
areas” introduced by Arctowsky who
presented a paper on Antarctic explo-
ration; and Resolution 4 supporting
the International Polar Commission,
introduced by Lecointe.
10 1913 Rome
Organization and focus Structured work on eight sessions
incorporating methodology and teach-
ing as separate sections. The Com-
mission for the International Map
decide to call a conference in Paris in
December, 1913. Oceanographic work
was promoted. A move to create an
International Geographical Union was
delayed by the outbreak of war.
Polar Issues Umberto Cagni reported to the Con-
gress on the work of the International
Polar Commission (IPC)
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2 The National Geographic Magazine’s portrayals of Antarctica
Jason Davis, Department of Geography, The Ohio State University, USA
Email: davis.1937@osu.edu
Abstract
This paper explores how Antarctica has been portrayed by various authors from
1888 to 1997 in the National Geographic Magazine and how this might reflect
trends in the dominance of various interest groups over that period of time.
Previous scholarship in popular geopolitics has shown that the study of popular
media can offer insights into the political process, which bolsters the efforts
undertaken here. The analysis undertaken involves the creation of six themes
derived from previous scholarship of Antarctic identities as well as observations
of the quotes regarding Antarctica garnered from National Geographic articles
from this period of time. These six themes are: Antarctica as a place of national
interest, Antarctica as a place of science, Antarctica as an economic opportuni-
ty, Antarctica as an environmental "World Park", Antarctica as an aggressor to
be conquered, and Antarctica as a source of awe. Using these six themes as a
guide and overarching structure, this paper explores the metaphors presented
within each theme and how they advance the goals of various interest groups or
reflect changes to Antarctic politics over time. The growth of multiple interests
from just an initial view is shown to have occurred, with the International Geo-
physical Year of 1957-58 as a focus point of changes to Antarctic identity.
2.1 Introduction
“The media is often presumed to exert a prominent role in shaping public opin-
ion and hence foreign policy formulation. Interestingly, according to some U.S.
Antarctic policymakers, the most influential media force pertaining to Antarctic
policy in recent years has been The National Geographic Magazine1.
The political construction of Antarctica is informed by a number of different
sources. Critical studies of geopolitics have suggested that there is both a for-
mal geopolitics, composed of experts and government officials signing treaties
and trying to control the process, and a popular geopolitics, composed of the
construction of ideas for mass consumption and prevailing attitudes2. Studies of
the United States of America’s involvement in Antarctica have been largely cen-
tered on analysis of formal geopolitics, studying the actions of policy-makers3.
Although the public perception of Antarctica is sometimes regarded as a non-
factor4, it is an important socio-cultural and political background element and
has had an influence in Antarctic policy as a form of popular geopolitics. If I may
extrapolate from the introductory quote, the most powerful influence on Ame-
rican perceptions of Antarctica over the last century has been the National
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Geographic Magazine. This paper will investigate the representations of Antarc-
tica produced in the texts of the articles within National Geographic Magazine
in order to understand how the different portrayals of the continent have surged
and declined in popularity in accordance with the evolution of activities on the
continent.
Popular geopolitics is comprised of media elements such film, television, politi-
cal cartoons, newspaper, magazines, music, and even architecture which affect
public perceptions of geopolitical issues. Outside of Antarctica, scholars have
shown how popular geopolitics can influence events as well5. If produced in a
purposeful manner to mislead the public, this is known as propaganda. Not all
popular geopolitics is propaganda, but all of it adds the creation of a discourse
that can shape the course of political debate. Particular magazines have been
analyzed as institutional sites where geopolitical knowledge is constructed.
Reader’s Digest has been shown to have attempted to shape political percep-
tions of the United States public regarding the Cold War between the United
States and Soviet Union by creating spaces within its text where the two could
be counterpoised against each other using specific narratives6. Popular maga-
zines have therefore been shown to have a hand in shaping political discourse.
The National Geographic Magazine is one of the most popular magazines to
regularly incorporate Antarctica. Indeed, the editors even claim that "Few re-
gions of the earth seem to hold greater fascination for Geographic readers than
do the Poles, both North and South" (James 1990). The National Geographic
Society, the parent organization of National Geographic Magazine, occupies a
unique place in the American cultural and political milieu. It is a private organi-
zation which has had close ties to the United States government. It sits on the
uneasy line between scientific research and popular entertainment. It has a
worldwide readership of six million people7. Although the general goal of the
Society is to promote scientific research, it does not always reflect the views of
the modern scientist, but instead creates a narrative about the places it details
for its own agenda.
National Geographic Magazine is the main medium through which the public of
the United States receives information about places which may be considered
exotic to their everyday experience. The Antarctic is considered an exotic local
for most Americans, and is therefore mostly perceived through this magazine.
The magazine’s set of editorial policies encourage positive accounts of subjects
covered and a writing style that is accessible to the public8. Through this pro-
cess, the editors claim to articulate a progressive national vision9. The maga-
zine has been shown to reflect hegemonic American ideals through its articles
and with that has been critiqued for its orientalist editorial tendencies and other
American cultural traits and perceptions. Specifically, National Geographic
Magazine has been used to examine how the United States perceived “The
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New South”10, the justification of U.S. territorial expansion into the Philippines11,
and the coding of gender in primatology studies12. All of these analyses lead me
to believe that National Geographic Magazine is an excellent source to use in
order to understand how the U.S. public geographically imagines Antarctica.
Popular perceptions of Antarctica have helped to define how its governance
should operate and its acceptance of certain laws. Changes to the popular
conception of the Antarctic continent have lead to large impacts in its laws and
regulations. An example of this would be the demise of the Convention on the
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA): which was
finalized in 1988 but brought down through the widespread promotion of a
“World Park” conception of Antarctic identity, and subsequent adoption of a
temporary mining ban in the Madrid Environmental Protocol of 1991 because of
this promoted identity13. Some scientists feared that the adoption of a “World
Park” identity would result in a decrease in scientific power on the continent and
opposed it14. The importance of public perceptions of Antarctica has been re-
cognized by the United States Antarctic Program (USAP). The USAP has gone
to tremendous lengths to accommodate a mythology of Antarctic science, cast-
ing the continent as a “natural laboratory for the sciences”. The USAP’s over-
seer, the National Science Foundation (NSF) seeks to popularly promote a
scientific perspective on Antarctica through promoting the Antarctic Artists and
Writers Program, annual invitations for journalists to report on Antarctic scienti-
fic activity, and educational programs to take grade-school teachers to the
region to work with scientists15. These directed efforts to control or influence
U.S. public perceptions of Antarctica show the degree of influence that popular
geopolitics has over the USAP.
2.2 Methods
The focus of my study was the archival record of the articles of the National
Geographic Magazine. Although previous studies of the magazine have fo-
cused on the pictures, it has been pointed out that the narratives of the ac-
companying articles can be just as revealing16. I used the databases of the
complete National Geographic Magazine (1888-1997) on CD-ROM. I input
“Antarctica” into the program’s search engine in order to select the relevant
articles and 119 articles were listed. In this way, I allowed the Magazine’s index
to inform what could be considered an Antarctic article or not. Some articles
were letters, one-page summaries, or notes from the editors but most were
feature-length articles. All 119 articles that were offered were read, and from
those 437 quotes were selected that referred to Antarctica in some way. My
criteria for selecting the quotes were that they had to refer to Antarctica,
qualities of Antarctica, activities undertaken in Antarctica, or motivations for
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going to the Antarctic within the context of the quote. These quotes could then
be divided up and classified according to pre-existing criteria mixed with my
own observations.
There are a number of ways to classify the way that people talk about the Ant-
arctic. Elena Glasberg is currently working on an Antarctic Artists and Writer’s
project entitled “Final Arrivals, Endless Ends: A US Antarctic Imaginary” which
posits that Antarctica is perceived as a frontier in which both utopic and apoca-
lyptic visions are articulated in fictional accounts of the continent17. Val Kirby
and his group have pursued studies of how individuals perceive “Antarctic Herit-
age” through a variety of what they call “filters and kaleidoscopes”, resulting in a
fourfold typology: an Emotional Version, a Cultural Version, a Natural and Cul-
tural Version, and a Global Version18. Klaus Dodds used critical geopolitics to
classify geographical representations of Antarctica into five eras: Antarctica as a
partially filled space (1900-40), Antarctica and the Cold War (1945-60), Antarc-
tica as a place for science (1960s), Antarctica as a place of resource potential
(1970-80s), and Antarctica and the global environmental challenge (1990s)19.
Divisions into interest groups such as environmental, geostrategic, and ideolo-
gical interests have also been used20.
I combined elements of these previous typologies along with my own observa-
tions to create six categories of Antarctic description: Antarctica as a place of
national interest, Antarctica as a place of science, Antarctica as an economic
opportunity, Antarctica as an environmental “World Park”, Antarctica as an
aggressor to be conquered, and Antarctica as a source of awe. The first four
categories were largely based on different interest groups described by
others21. The last two categories are more emotional interpretations of Ant-
arctica, which may be reflected in the idealizations of Antarctica as a utopia or
dystopia22. All six of these themes feature prominently in the magazine’s
descriptions of Antarctica, and deserve scrutiny.
Although a quantitative study of the number of quotes in each category might
have been useful, this was problematized. Some quotes incorporated more
than one theme and could not be strictly classified as one or the other. Also,
quantifying the number and types of quotes would not address the questions of
how attitudes changed or what interest groups were represented. Therefore my
analysis is to examine the quotes for consistent metaphors and themes within
the overarching categories.
Semiotic analysis is the tool which I use here to take apart what the articles are
saying and try to understand their patterns and underlying interests. Within
each of the themes, there are a number of metaphors used to refer to Antarctica
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or qualities of the continent and activities on it.
Metaphors allow us to understand one thing (in this case, Antarctica) in terms of
another (the symbolic reference). These metaphors will be analyzed to see
what interests are being served by their use or what ideas the writer is attempt-
ing to convey23. I will take into account the context of Antarctic history that the
statements or metaphors take place in and attempt to ascertain patterns of the
use of concepts. It should be noted, however, that I am attributing meaning to
these words based on own my interpretations and experience. All narratives are
open to interpretation24, and I therefore encourage the reader to engage in the
sources directly25. What follows are my interpretations of the words and meta-
phors which construct each category and how they fit into the timeline of Antarc-
tic history.
2.3 Antarctica as a place of national interest
Antarctica has long been held as a place of interest to states. It may be of inter-
est to them as the result of a number of goals, which may include the potential
for attaining natural resources, attainment of geostrategic ground, the incorpor-
ation of further territory into empire, or the converse of denying the territory to
other parties. The official U.S.  approach to Antarctica has been shaped by the
1924 Hughes ‘open door’ doctrine, articulating that the U.S.   makes no claims
to Antarctica and simultaneously recognizes no claims26. There was some
conflict about this within the U.S. government, but the politics of the Cold War
combined with the success of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-
58 solidified this position and helped to make the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 a
document in which claimant and non-claimant nations agreed to work coopera-
tively in Antarctica. Within the pages of National Geographic Magazine, the
promotion of an American claim to Antarctica has competed with an image of
Antarctica as a site of international cooperation in which the U.S. participates.
The rise and fall of the push to claim an American portion of Antarctica has
been largely reflected through the use of flags in Antarctica.
The rhetoric surrounding U.S. territorial claims to Antarctica occupied the first
part of the twentieth century National Geographic Magazine coverage of the
continent, but faded out as the rhetoric of international cooperation swept in and
dominated the last half of the last century . Articles in the magazine from 1903
to 1912 argued forcefully for the recognition of American accomplishment in
Antarctica and against the subsequent denial of this by scholars from other na-
tions27. Although an American claim to portions (if not all) of Antarctica is never
stated directly in these articles, the securing of the honors of discovery implies a
subsequent basis for claim. More direct references to U.S. claims to territory
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were made a little later by Admiral Richard Byrd and Lincoln Ellsworth28. There
are also mentions of other nations claiming dominion over Antarctica and sub-
Antarctic islands during this time period29, to the degree that the naming of
Antarctic features told a story of the nationalities of those who first encountered
them30. In this way, claims are linguistically inscribed upon the landscape and
maps that describe it. The last strongly-worded claim to territory comes from a
mention of encountering Chileans at Deception Island in December of 195531.
After the IGY of 1957-58 and the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, talk of claims be-
comes more muted and sterilized. The next time that claims are explicitly men-
tioned is in the 1970s , and nations are supposed to “forgo territorial claims to
the continent for at least 30 years”32. There is also talk of claims to South
Georgia Island being contested between Britain and Argentina, as the Falkland
Islands are33. The same article points out that both the United States and Soviet
Union share a policy of neither claiming nor acknowledging claim to Antarctic
territories. An article encompassing all of Antarctica from 1987 explains to the
reader that “National claims are frozen; their boundaries … are relegated to a
small inset in our supplement map”34. The term “frozen” here is not only apt
because of the cold setting, but it gives the impression of Antarctic claims as
biological entities trapped in ice: they still exists (and may be alive or dead), but
they are immovable and inactive. The relegation of territorial claims to a small
insert also shows their declining importance. This diminishment continued into
the 1990s, in which another broad article about Antarctica declared that "The
promise - and peril - of Antarctica has been that no one owns it, although seven
nations have pressed sometimes overlapping claims"35. The reality stressed in
this quote is that no one owns Antarctica, and that claims have only been
pressed and not realized.
Claims are one aspect of some national political agendas, but another aspect is
international cooperation. Cooperation is a broad term which can involve vary-
ing degrees of integration between two groups. The general trend in National
Geographic references to cooperation in the Antarctic has been to go from less
integrated and cordial to more friendly and involved, particularly in the conduct
of scientific activities. Cooperation in Antarctic endeavors has been written
about in the magazine as early as 1899, but the cooperation of nations was
generally defined as splitting up the Antarctic territory into discrete units such
that activities would not overlap36. This form of cooperation was created to
avoid unpleasant interactions by avoiding interactions altogether. As the refer-
ences to possible American claims grew in number, references to international
cooperation faded from view.
References to cooperation in the magazine re-emerged and strengthened with
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the development of the IGY in the 1950s. Articles referred to scientists from
different countries pooling their findings, and noted the free exchange of ideas
that was taking place between nations during the “worldwide collaboration” that
was the IGY37. This describes an exchange and interaction between nations,
rather than simply a division the work of science to be conducted. These activi-
ties connote exchange between equals, but convey little enthusiasm for the
task. In 1968, “working together” was used to describe the interaction of Rus-
sian and American scientists in Antarctica in counterbalance to the Cold War
idea that these two groups should be separate38. It implied that something
progressive was being accomplished. The term “goodwill” developed to de-
scribe the bond between scientists from different nations39. This implied an
even more positive connection between the two groups. This increasing idea of
friendship and goodwill between people of different nationalities had a cre-
scendo within Will Steger’s expedition across Antarctica as he described it:
"Perhaps our expedition - as a small example of multinational effort
focused on the last great frontier - would be accepted as a contribu-
tion toward the world's new awakening"40.
Through this statement, Steger implies that international cooperation is leading
us to a new and better political attitude towards Antarctica and the world.
Flags have stood in as representative for nations at many occasions, and
through the use of flags in descriptions of the Antarctic the shift from viewing the
continent as a place to be claimed to a site of international cooperation can be
seen. Planting a flag  in the ground can be seen as a display of personal ac-
complishment, but when the flag represents a nation this has long been under-
stood as an indicator of claiming a portion of land. That was certainly the intent
of Sir Ernest Shackleton (1877-1922) when he raised the flag at the southern-
most point in his trip:
"We hoisted his Majesty's flag and the other Union Jack afterwards,
and took possession of the plateau in the name of his Majesty"41.
As if by magic, the entire plateau had become British territory through the
simple act of inserting the British national flag (nicknamed the Union Jack).
During the period of time before the IGY in which U.S.  explorers sought to
claim portions of the Antarctic, the planting of the flag  was often used as a
metaphor for claiming the territory. The U.S. flag is sometimes referred to as
“Old Glory” or “The Stars and Stripes”, and those nicknames were engaged by
a number of American explorers as they described their actions and plans to
claim parts of Antarctica. The National Geographic Society attempted to garner
support for an Antarctic expedition by appealing to the reader’s patriotism in
saying that “[t]he primary object of the expedition would be to plant the Stars
and Stripes at the South Pole…”42. By placing the U.S. flag at the South Pole
first, the potential expedition likely had the goal of establishing a basis for an
American claim to the territory. When other nations reached the pole first, other
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undiscovered sites in Antarctica became prone to flag-planting. Lincoln Ells-
worth (1888-1951), an American Antarctic explorer, boasted in the magazine
that he had raised an American flag  over 350,000 square miles of the last un-
claimed land on earth and named it after his father43.
Besides existing as a symbol to claim territory, flags were used in Antarctica for
symbolic gestures which signified the changing attitudes towards nations in the
Antarctica from claimants to cooperators. Although the pole had already been
flagged through a land traverse, this did not stop Admiral Richard Byrd (1888-
1957) from using a flag to mark the occasion of the first flight over the South
Pole. He brought along the flags of Norway and Britain to honor the first two
explorers to reach the South Pole, but reserved a unique honor for the U.S. flag
which he brought along when he reached the air above the Pole:
“We opened the trapdoor and dropped the American flag, weighted
by the stone from Bermett's44 grave. We saluted our country's flag
and the spirit of our gallant comrade”45.
Although not strictly a territorial claim, it does mark the first supposed flight over
the South Pole as an American achievement. What gives this event added
poignancy is contrasting it to the flag  symbolism used by Byrd at a subsequent
flight over the South Pole:
“I dropped a cardboard box containing the multicolored little flags of
the United Nations. The symbolism should be obvious- the dedication
of this goal of so much selfless heroism of the Norwegians and the
British to the ideal of brotherhood among peoples"46.
This act symbolizing “brotherhood among peoples” was to herald the develop-
ment of the IGY and an increase in the rhetoric of international cooperation
within the National Geographic’s portrayals of Antarctica. The first person to
scale Antarctica’s highest peak built on Byrd’s symbolic example and planted
the 12 flags of the Antarctic Treaty nations at the top of the mountain47. The use
of multiple flags in these areas high above the rest of Antarctica had come to
signal the international cooperation that was taking place below them.
2.4 Antarctica as a scientific “Laboratory”
The conduct of science in Antarctica has changed through the years both in
character and size. Science is a broad term which can cover a wide range of
activities, but the goal of those activities, as seen by National Geographic, is the
production of knowledge48. Throughout the last century  of the magazine, there
have been changes to the scale of knowledge production described in Antarc-
tica as well as shifts in the priorities of which subjects to study. Science has
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become the dominant activity on the continent through the developments of the
IGY and subsequent inscription into the Antarctic Treaty. The Antarctic Treaty is
an agreement made between nations, however it positions science as the one
activity which legitimates national membership in the Treaty through Article
Nine49. The growth of the dominance of science in Antarctica can be seen
through the increasing use of laboratory metaphors to describe the continent
and its component parts.
This growth into a dominant activity was accompanied by a change in the char-
acter of scientific contingents of Antarctic expeditions. Throughout the first half
of the last century, leading up to the IGY, the most heavily promoted Antarctic
science was that of geography. Other sciences were acknowledged as being
important and conducted alongside geography, but it was the understanding
and mapping of this previously unexplored continent which took precedence
over other activities. Several early accounts of expeditions made this very ex-
plicit by listing geographic discovery as the first in a list of sciences to be con-
ducted50. Other scientific observations, such as meteorological records, were
said to be specifically valuable if they were conducted in newly-discovered
area51. At the same time, different priority lists show that science is less impor-
tant than shows of national claims or accomplishment during this period. The
ranking of geographic interests above other scientific ones was also an indi-
cator that national interests were prioritized higher than the pursuit of general
knowledge, since early geography was known to be an imperial science, help-
ing to catalog territory and legitimate the claims of its sponsors. For those
people who did not think that planting the U.S. flag at the South Pole was
sufficient enough reason to mount an expedition, scientific advancement was
given as a secondary reason to send an American expedition to the South
Pole52. Amundsen was praised in the magazine for finding a new route to get to
the South Pole and increase geographic knowledge, just as other expeditions
were criticized for attempting the only known route53. This known route was
taken because the representatives of the nations involved sought to be the first
to claim dominion over the pole first and prioritized that above the collection of
new data in new lands. The scientific results and collections acquired during the
German expedition were clearly stated to be the property of its government,
although scientists would be employed to arrange them54. In this way, scientists
were directly subsumed beneath the state.
The growth in the importance of conducting Antarctic science for its own sake
started appearing in the rhetoric of National Geographic in the 1930s and grew
from there. Byrd noted that science made up the bulk of the work conducted
during the time his group was in Antarctica and was proud to send out “one of
the longest sledge journeys ever made for purely scientific purposes”55. In a
later expedition, Byrd commented that he took more people to the continent
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solely because he would require a large staff of scientists56. In a counterpoint to
the 1910 proposal of a South Polar expedition, Byrd also curtailed his own am-
bitions to get to the Pole on one trip with scientists in favor of scientific objec-
tives:
"Needless to say, there was an urge to go on to the Pole itself, which
they could have done had they prepared for it. But their work lay in
the mountains which, scientifically, were more important than reach-
ing the Pole"57.
As the importance of science in general arose, the stress on geographical dis-
covery started to wane. This paralleled the development of scientific equipment,
which scientists were eager to apply to the continent. Although in his 1947 ar-
ticle, Byrd still ostensibly ranked geographical discovery above pure science, he
included this quote:
"Equally as important as immediate geographical discovery was the
responsibility of learning to use these marvelous new instruments, to
test them under extreme conditions, to ascertain and devise means
of overcoming their defects. In this respect we were pioneers, trail
blazers of exploration's new age"58.
The simultaneous subjegation of “pure science” to geographical discovery and
the equality shown between that discovery and the testing of new scientific
equipment indicates that this was truly a transition period in which priorities
were changing even within the article itself. The quote acknowledges this transi-
tion itself by noting the entrance of “exploration’s new age”.
This new age of a more scientific brand of Antarctic exploration was readily ap-
parent in the National Geographic articles regarding development and conduc-
tion of the IGY. The shift to a scientific motivation came with some skepticism,
but the scientist Paul Siple tried to assuage the reader’s doubts:
"Some people, I know, find it difficult to believe that such stations in
Antarctica are truly part of a peaceful, open, international scientific
research effort. They question the avowed free exchange of scientific
discovery among IGY nations. They point out that American armed
forces built our Antarctic houses. They even circulate rumors we are
planning to use Antarctica for testing atom and hydrogen bombs.
These rumors are definitely not true"59.
An open confrontation of these doubts was appropriate for the time, given the
history of nations claiming portions of the continent as their own. As noted in the
previous section, this period of time was also a transition from claims to coop-
eration rhetoric, so the overall image of Antarctica had to be transitioned. Know-
ledge during this time was extolled as a great enterprise, being of inestimable
value, and raw material for future problem-solving (Siple 1957; Dufek 1959;
Fuchs 1959). The scientific work became less about striking out into newly
discovered territory and more about the scientific questions that the continent
could yield answers to through investigation. Admiral George Dufek (1903-
1977), the Naval Commander of Operation Deep Freeze which prepared the
American scientific stations for the IGY, noted that recruiting scientists had




 Byrd 1935: 457.
58
 Byrd 1947: 432.
59
 Siple 1957: 20.
Steps of Foundation – Proceedings of the 1st Workshop of the SCAR History Action Group
38
become more difficult as Antarctic work became more routine and less
glamorous60. This was a sign that scientific activity had gained a degree of
normalcy in Antarctica.
Although the glamour had worn off, this new age of scientific investigation in
Antarctica brought with it many advantages and power for scientists. After the
IGY, it was more well-established that science could be legitimately called a
dominant activity on the continent. In an article entitled “New Era in the Lone-
liest Continent”, the author states that:
"The United States spends millions of dollars each year and sends
hundreds of men to this inhospitable continent, not for military or eco-
nomic reasons, but for scientific investigations and for development
of the world's last true frontier. The role of the Navy in this endeavor
is that of support- building and maintaining the bases, and providing
the housing, food, and transportation that the scientists need"61
The needs of the scientist are shown in this quote to be of primary importance.
American scientists no longer had to be experts in cold-weather survival be-
cause their logistical needs were supplied by the U.S. Navy62. Sophisticated
equipment was imported to the continent for use by scientists63. Even nature
came to be seen as subject to the need of scientists, as one noted a penguin
that was captured, studied, and then released after providing a service to sci-
ence. In the last few decades of the twentieth century , science seemed be
implicitly in command. One article abstractly labeled science as “king” in Ant-
arctica64 and another specifically noted that the chief scientist aboard the USAP
research ship Nathanial Palmer directed where it should go65.
The growth of the laboratory metaphor for Antarctica within National Geogra-
phic’s articles paralleled this growth of scientific power and prestige. Labora-
tories are sites of scientific power. Although the actual practice of science within
laboratories has been famously critiqued66, in their ideal form laboratories are
controlled settings in which the scientist may experiment without interference
from the world outside. Within the confines of the laboratory, the scientist is in
control of things. The first reference to Antarctica as a laboratory within the
magazine came from Byrd in 1930 in his description of his flight to the South
Pole:
"I counted fourteen mountain peaks (and there were more) running
north and south for about 30 miles. Here was something to put on
maps; here was a fine laboratory for geological exploration"67.
The laboratory metaphor is initially restricted to a mountain range of Antarctica,
and also limited to geologists. In his article regarding Operation High Jump later
in 1947, Byrd would expand the metaphor to include a few more sciences and
apply it to the entirety of Antarctica:
“Here has been set up by Nature herself a titanic physical, chemical,
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and biological laboratory where phenomena impossible of duplication
elsewhere are in progress"68.
This statement by Byrd would later be quoted again in the magazine, reiterating
its importance as an Antarctic descriptor69. In another article, Grosvenor would
refer to Antarctic mountains as laboratories70. Later articles would qualify the
term laboratory in different ways to stress certain aspects about Antarctica. In a
1968 article, Antarctica was described as both an “International Laboratory”,
linking it to the theme of international cooperation mentioned in the previous
section, and a “Laboratory of Peaceful Exploration” which may have heavily
contrasted with the news of the Vietnam War that the United States was en-
gaged in at the time71. The laboratory metaphor would be expanded out to
encompass the world in one article72, and so the classification of Antarctica as a
“unique laboratory” became necessary73. As environmental identities of Antarc-
tica arose, they were also incorporated into this metaphor as Antarctica became
a “vast natural laboratory for the study of our planet”74. By studying the planet,
the hope became to prevent environmental catastrophes:
"The fifth largest continent is a giant outdoor laboratory where scien-
tists strive to decipher clues to our planet's history and detect early
warning signs of global pollution"75.
This shows that while the metaphor for a scientifically controlled area has grown
to be a powerful icon for representing Antarctica, it has the capability of incorpo-
rating additional ideas into it.
2.5 Antarctica as a resource frontier to be exploited
The Antarctic is home to a number of natural resources, and National Geogra-
phic articles have sometimes speculated upon their potential use and exploita-
tion. One article speculated that one of the prime reasons that governments
supported Antarctic expeditions was out of a desire for resources76. The re-
sources, biological of whales, seals, krill, and fish have all been subject to
commercial harvesting by humans at some time during the previous century.
The beauty of the environment there has also been viewed as a resource to
lure tourists into paying money for visits. There are the mineral resources of
Antarctica as well, which were the source of much debate in the latter half of the
twentieth Century. Although interests to all of these resources are referenced,
few authors actively promoted their exploitation. Byrd explicitly stated "I dislike
to think of money in connection with Antarctica. It has higher values”77. The end
result is that there are fewer quotes that refer to Antarctica’s resources and no
well-established metaphors regularly used within the magazine. Most portrayals
of economic exploitation are used with a negative connotation.
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The earliest references to commercial exploitation in the region reflected the
industries present at the time. A century of sealing was acknowledged to have
already taken place at South Georgia Island by the time it had become one of
the largest whale fisheries in the world in the 1920s78. The increase in scientific
activity on the continent brought with it thoughts that new food resources might
be discovered in the region. Science was portrayed as the harbinger of com-
mercial exploitation:
"Testing for organic carbon present in these seas, therefore, is a vital
step towards their use. Someday, a world of vanishing resources may
turn to this area for food"79.
Speculation that krill from Antarctica might someday become an important new
food resource rose sharply in magazine articles from the 1970s and 80s80. With
the establishment of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources (CCAMLR) in 1980, this speculation began to subside. Fears
of over-exploitation began to decrease:
"Perhaps such overfishing will not occur. Costs and distance may cur-
tail the harvest. The Antarctic waters are remote from the countries
best able to exploit their resources, so it is difficult to operate a cost-
effective fishery there"81.
One article noted how this went against the model of science leading to com-
mercialization: “Exploration continues, but without the exploitation that usually
follows"82. This same expectation was applied to geological studies and mineral
exploitation.
Early articles could only speculate about the potential resources that Antarctica
might yield, particularly regarding mineral resources83. From the 1970s through
the early 1990s, intensified speculation of the mineral contents of Antarctica led
to the long negotiation of CRAMRA. During its negotiation, an article in National
Geographic noted that "[t]he most pressing issues of the Antarctic relate to
resources"84. The defeat of CRAMRA through the pressure of environmental
non-government organizations has already been mentioned85, but the rejection
of economically exploitative values can also be seen in the articles of National
Geographic. Negative portrayals of mining activities were implied in the lan-
guage of authors:
"All parties acknowledge the high risks of oil spills, pollution, and the
harmful effects of industrial activity on the Antarctic environment. Yet
many consider these risks perfectly acceptable in exchange for a few
years' additional supply of raw materials"86.
The language of this quote stresses the risks associated with industry and the
meager benefits to be gained through the exploitation of Antarctica. The con-
cerns over mining died down in the same way that they did regarding krill over-
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fishing:
"The diversity and extent of Antarctica's mineral wealth remains largely
undetermined, although extensive coal deposits are known to exist.
But daunting logistical problems make exploration and mining, already
controversial, commercially unfeasible"87.
The conclusion seemed to be that the relative inaccessibility and harsh con-
ditions of Antarctica were significantly large barriers as to prevent commercial
activity from taking place there.
The speculation over commercial uses of the Antarctic has not been limited to
minerals and sea-life within National Geographic. One creative idea to utilize
Antarctica came from Byrd, who suggested that the continent might be used to
preserve food and crops in a frozen state as a safeguard against world hun-
ger88. Dufek imagined the area’s future as a tourist paradise, and noticed some
of his men preparing for this contingency by making souvenirs89. The tourism
industry is one that gets cautious approval from some National Geographic
writers. One article noted that before the tourist trips of Lars-Eric Lindblad
started in the mid-1960s only scientists and support personnel could access the
continent, implying that more access to Antarctica was a good thing90. Other
articles temper that acceptance of tourists with the conditions that they should
not disturb the scientific work being undertaken91 or the environment92. The
tourism industry (particularly the eco-tourism industry which composes the bulk
of Antarctic tourism) is the one business which actively promotes environmental
preservation. This is perhaps the reason that it has not been wholly derided.
The industry is even said to produce environmentalists as
"… no one who witnesses the desolate beauty of Antarctica can fail
to come back home as anything but an advocate for its preserva-
tion"93.
This leads to an investigation of environmental constructions of Antarctica within
National Geographic.
2.6 Antarctica as an environmental “World Park” to be preserved
The environmentalist view of Antarctica has already been showing through
some of the descriptions of commercial exploitation, but it is not simply a reac-
tion against industry. Environmentalists generally view the earth and its envi-
ronments as something to be preserved (remain as it is) or conserved (used in
moderation, reserving some quantity for the future). Environmental ideas re-
garding Antarctica have risen largely in tandem with economic ideas within
National Geographic. The same article which addressed the exploitation of
whales and seals on South Georgia Island calls for the enforcement of absolute
protection for the sea-elephant lest it be completely exterminated94. The major-
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ity of articles which contain environmental depictions of Antarctica are from the
period of time from the 1970s onward. The metaphors of purity and a “World
Park” are regularly applied in an environmental context to stress environmental
ideals of preservation and conservation.
With the dominance of the science established in National Geographic depict-
ions of Antarctica by the 1970s, environmental concerns were fostered by bio-
logical scientists. The comprehension of the foreign Antarctic wildlife brought
with it environmental sensibilities, sometimes couched in familiar terms of poli-
tics:
"Penguins, albatrosses, skuas, seals and whales are other nations,
responding to life rhythms quite alien to our own. To the naturalist,
the Antarctic is a tremendous experience. Because of the simplified
ecosystem and the great numbers of individuals of very few species,
he can more readily observe cause and effect; he can understand
more clearly some of the basic principles of survival- and life"95.
It is the simplified ecosystem, relatively undisturbed by humans, which provides
the naturalist the tremendous experience described here. For that area of study
to be maintained, it is only logical to assume that it should be preserved in that
state for use by future naturalists to gain further knowledge of the basic princi-
ples of life. The principle of survival is described in another article as demanding
“unremitting vigilance and meticulous care” of the life-support systems in Ant-
arctica96. The killing of animals is to be opposed. To this end, the site of a
former whaling station is described as “…a silent, grim, and ugly memorial to
the relentless destruction of earth's largest living creatures"97. This places the
killing of animals in the past as a kind of dark age which progress has left
behind. The future of Antarctica is envisioned as a “World Park”. The idea of
Antarctica being set aside as that kind of international wildlife preserve is
attributed to environmental groups, such as Greenpeace, but encouraged by
several authors98. Part of that encouragement is through presenting Antarctica
as a “pure” place in danger of being contaminated.
The metaphor of Antarctic purity is increasingly used through National Geogra-
phic articles about the continent throughout the 1980s and 90s when the en-
vironmental movement was gaining strength in the region. A pure object has no
traces of foreign elements within it. Calling Antarctica “pure” also connotes a
level of cleanliness and holiness. The main reference to purity comes from the
editor of the magazine: "The purity of Antarctica, after all could change as
rapidly as its weather"99. Purity is implied to be a fragile state here and some-
thing may become impure through contamination, pollution, or disruption.
References to contamination or pollution of Antarctica abound in the maga-
zine’s Antarctic articles of the 1980s and 90s100. Most present situations in
which humans struggle against polluting the environment with their waste, but
for some writers, human beings themselves are the contaminant. In this way,
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some environmentalists conceive of Antarctica without any humans existing
there. One reference to an Antarctic film depicts the continent as “…an aston-
ishing world apart, where humans will always be out of their element"101. The
removal of human beings from the Antarctic seems contrary to other interests of
states, scientists, and entrepreneurs. While the complete removal of humans
from the continent is not a position more widely adopted, there has been a shift
in how people think about Antarctica as a result of the environmental move-
ment. In the words of one editor, “The real Antarctic challenge is no longer one
of conquest but one of preservation"102.
2.7 Antarctica as an opponent to conquer
The idealization of Antarctica as a place to be preserved contrasts greatly with
another characterization within National Geographic of Antarctica as a place to
be tamed and subdued. The theme of conquest represents no one interest
group in particular, but rather a generalized attitude towards the continent
expressed through a number of articles. The exploration of and conduct of
activities in Antarctica has been depicted by these articles as something akin to
a war. On one side of the battle are humans and on the other are the forces of
nature, which in Antarctica can be extremely inhospitable for humans. The
struggle of humans against nature is a powerful and popular narrative device
that has been the heart of a number of fictional classics. Here the conflict is
being superimposed upon real interactions between humans and the environ-
ment of Antarctica, attributing human characteristics to nature in some cases.
This whole category is a metaphor, and one used often in Antarctic National
Geographic articles to provide an exciting story. The titles of several articles
even incorporate this aggression: “The Conquest of Antarctica by Air”103, “All-
out Assault on Antarctica”104, and “First Conquest of Antarctica's Highest
Peaks”105. Exactly how this story is told reflects the importance of each of the
interest groups previously dealt with.
The earliest war-like descriptions depicted the polar explorer as a man fighting
with nature as a representative of the rest of humanity. Roald Amundsen (1878-
1928), in his attempt to reach the South Pole, was described as about to
“…inaugurate his attack upon the Pole  immediately, not waiting for
the winter to pass before beginning his advance"106.
This portrays Amundsen as bold and resolute, having the qualities of humanity
that are idealized. Former U.S. President Herbert Hoover (1874-1964), referring
to Byrd’s first flight over the South Pole, commented that:
"I do not minimize the scientific gains of such expeditions, but the
human values are so immediate and so universal in their effect that it
may well be that they transcend the scientific service. Every hidden
spot of the earth's surface remains a challenge to man's will and
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ingenuity until it has been conquered. Every conquest of such a
difficult goal adds permanently to mankind's sense of power and
security. Great explorers, therefore, do not merely add to the sum of
human knowledge, but also they add immensely to the sum of hu-
man inspiration"107.
Hoover therefore acknowledges the scientific gains from Antarctic exploration
which were becoming more prominent during this period, but ranks a general
feeling of power and security as the greater accomplishment. Power and secu-
rity are generally two ideas which are typically associated with the services that
the state provides. The fact that this statement is also coming from a head of
state also indicates the importance of the national in Antarctic expeditions at the
time. During this time, the continent was described as impregnable108. In a later
article, Byrd would declare that
"This was an enticing region! Its ice bulwarks had withstood man's
attacks for more than a century. Here were 345,000 square miles
that man had not penetrated. Our first attack had been unexpectedly
fruitful"109.
Aside from a large intonation of masculinity, Byrd shows through this quote that
he has succeeded in his explorations where others have failed. This increases
his sense of accomplishment and power over the territory which may be possib-
ly translated into a claim.
The wording of conquering Antarctica is slightly altered in the period surround-
ing the IGY, which is depicted as an assault or invasion of Antarctica. Despite
the seven claimant nations, there were really no people to conquer in Antarc-
tica, so the foe again is depicted as nature. There are numerous references to
terms of warfare through the articles of this period: attacking on several fronts, a
campaign being waged, beachheads being seized, assault tactics, and the
spearheading of an Antarctic invasion110. In later articles, the IGY and its con-
tinuing impacts are summarized with “Science Mounts a Peaceful Assault”111.
The juxtaposition of the words peace and assault reflects both the massive
influx of humans to the continent where there had been few before as well as
the fact that this was done without violence or malice. The incorporation of
“peace” also signals the rise of international cooperation that was taking place
at the time, as nations did not quarrel over the IGY, but banded together for it.
The enemy here is nature, and within the magazine, the wind is usually singled
out as a particularly hostile foe112. The ice and cold are also given credit for
thwarting human efforts113. The continent itself has been described as an ob-
stacle114. But the recent environmental movement has posed the question of
whether this obstacle is meant to be overcome.
While references to conflict and conquest have not faded from National Geogra-
phic’s articles, the approach to them has slightly. No longer are humans simply
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the aggressor against the Antarctic environment, as they clearly were depicted
during the IGY, but an opponent that can also loose ground. An account of an
archaeological investigation of one station acknowledges the environment’s
power over human creations in its depiction of that edifice: "…historic East Base
- the United States' first permanent toehold in Antarctica, surrendered to the
cold in 1948"115. The fact that it was a toehold signifies the meagerness of the
base in relation to the vastness of the Antarctic environment it was built in, and
its surrender a submission to those forces of nature. Depictions of native Em-
peror penguins imply their mastery of the environment: "Largest of 17 penguin
species, they are the undisputed rulers of earth's coldest realm"116. By labeling
penguins as rulers of Antarctica, this quote implicitly denies that position to
humanity. It is also implied that humanity can’t even contest that position, since
the title is undisputed. One writer even expressed:
"…I have come to see this transient frontier not as a harsh place but
as a living creature that nurtures a multitude of other lives. Yet no hu-
mans can ever live here. We can't conquer it, settle it, even own it.
The winter ice belongs only to itself"117.
In this quote, the Antarctic cannot be conquered by humans, and there is little
else that they can do there either. These quotes which utilize symbols of conflict
and dominion reflect the extreme environmental position that humans do not
belong in Antarctica, a position that has grown stronger in recent years.
2.8 Antarctica as an inspiration of awe and spiritual connection
There is a final approach to depicting Antarctica within National Geographic
which does not depict it as a site to be dominated by particular interests or as
an implicit foil to humanity, but rather as an inspiration of awe and wonder that
humans can interact with. This is the second generalized attitude towards Ant-
arctica. Antarctica, in this depiction, is a beautiful place which inspires fascina-
tion, love, and devotion. It is a complement to the humans that encounter it,
representing everything unknown compared to our known world. Whatever the
explorer lacks, it has, and vice-versa. But rather than see this as an oppositional
relationship, as the previous approach does, this approach views Antarctica as
a more mystical and powerful partner:
"Death, of course, is an ever present part of the backdrop for any
expedition that pits fragile humans against exceedingly powerful (I
refuse to call them hostile) forces of nature"118.
Through the inspiration of awe, the explorer is impelled to merge with this
unknown and incorporate it into their being. This is an attitude that has been
consistently articulated by the many different humans that have written about
the continent in the magazine. The descriptions of Antarctica are lyrical and
poetic here. It also complements the fluctuations of several themes and the
types of people who are found on the continent.
As the great majority of humans who explored the continent were male, the
                                                
115
 Parfit 1993: 110.
116
 Oeland 1996: 53.
117
 Stevens 1996: 53.
118
 Lewis 1984: 642.
Steps of Foundation – Proceedings of the 1st Workshop of the SCAR History Action Group
46
continent was portrayed as a mysterious and alluring female in many early
articles. Shackleton cites the lure of the Antarctic as one of his motivations for
exploring there119. Antarctica is also portrayed as an ice princess by Byrd:
"At the bottom of this planet lies an enchanted continent in the sky,
like a pale sleeping princess. Sinister and beautiful she lies in her
frozen slumber, her billowy white robes of snow weirdly luminous
with amethysts and emeralds of ice, her dreams iridescent ice halos
around the sun and moon, her horizons painted with pastel shades of
pink, gold, green, and blue. Such is Antarctica, luring land of ever-
lasting mystery”120.
Ideas of the enchantment and divinity of Antarctica abound in Byrd’s article,
which also describes the continent as a “Sermon in Ice”121. The way that Byrd
describes Antarctica here makes it sound beautiful. Other authors have also
cited beauty as a quality of Antarctica without such an intricate metaphor as
Byrd has provided122. However as women were introduced to Antarctica, this
beauty became rhetorically detached from a female depiction of the continent.
In more recent days, the continent has almost become a refuge from the rest of
humanity. Many authors write of (with varying degrees of affection) the sense of
isolation that they have felt in Antarctica123. This may have been paralleled with
the rise of international cooperation and increase of scientific activity on the
continent. The increasing interconnectedness of the world through the process
of globalization has been paralleled for some people by increasing feelings of
alienation and separation. The Antarctic is an area that allows for that and
where such feelings might be seen as appropriate, as it is distant (in many
senses) from the rest of the world. David Lewis, in his description of his solo
boat journey around Antarctica, said that:
"I longed to be able to pray, to cry out for help, but strangely I was
not lonely. My drama was being played out on the vast stage of the
ocean, with death lurking in the wings, but my solitude was never
lonely. I never experienced total isolation like someone friendless in a
big city"124.
This connection with nature may replace this disconnect that is felt elsewhere in
the writers’ lives. It also reflects an urge to return to nature that the rising envi-
ronmental movement incorporates.
2.9 Conclusion
There is definitely a connection with the way that Antarctica has been portrayed
in National Geographic Magazine and the shifts between the interest groups
that have had an impact on Antarctica. The short list of states involved in Ant-
arctic expeditions at the start of the twentieth century were slowly made to
share influence and power over the continent with a growing list of actors. The
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widening scale of state actors involved in Antarctic governance was reflected by
the shift from magazine article references to claims to international cooperation.
The widening scope of non-state actors involved was shown by the incorpora-
tion of other metaphors for Antarctica, reflected in the increase of the use of
Antarctic descriptors such as a scientific laboratory or an environmentally pure
world park. It is also evident that the IGY of 1957-58 was a pivotal period of time
around which great changes took place in Antarctica. The way that Antarctica
was discussed after the IGY differed from the way it was discussed before the
event. We currently live in a period of time in which many different conceptions
of Antarctica overlap and coexist, and it leads me to wonder if the upcoming
International Polar Year of 2007-8) will bring with it a similar transformation in
Antarctic perceptions.
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3 History of Antarctic Research: The Australasian Context
David Michael Dodd, Honorary Fellow, The Australian Centre, The University of




The history of Australian Antarctic research is being examined within the con-
text of Australia’s involvement in Antarctica during the first three Polar Years,
with particular reference to the interest shown by early scientific societies, sci-
entific institutions and governmental agencies.
The activities of these agencies are being further examined within the context of
the four Workshop Themes during each Polar Year time frame. The establish-
ment of the short lived Australian Antarctic Committee 1886/88, which grew out
of the activities of the first Polar Year 1882/83 and the role played by Royal
Society of Victoria and European scientists both in Australia and overseas
(Neumayer, etc.), in developing Australia’s interest in Antarctica is also being
examined. Within a purely historical context, Australia’s association with early
Antarctic and sub-Antarctic exploration from the 1800’s to the Challenger
Expedition of 1874 will also the documented. The ‘Heroic Age’ activities centred
on Australian Antarctic Territory and the Ross Dependency, followed by the
Second Polar Year activities (the Mawson Years) and the Third Polar Year
(IGY1957/58) activities (the Law Years) and Antarctic Research in the modern
era – the past 40 years, will be examined.
The treatise will form a valuable backdrop to the Royal Society of Victoria’s
voyages of scientific discovery for young scientists (refer to the RSV-INTREPID
- IPY project No 81), to be conducted during the forthcoming IPY 2007-2008.
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4 Wilhelm Filchner and Antarctica
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4.1 Curriculum vitae of Wilhelm Filchner
Wilhelm Filchner was born in Munich on September 13, 18771. Soon after his
birth the family moved to Bayreuth, but after the sudden death of his father, the
family moved back to Munich where Filchner spent his youth. He soon showed
interest in fine arts and received various artistic inspirations, mainly by the
famous artists Lenbach, Stuck, Böcklin, Siegfried Wagner and others. The
family, however, decided that the young son should take up a career as an
officer.
In 1900, being a cadet in the military (Fig. 4-1), he used a three-month leave to
undertake his own first expedition to Russia, the Caucasus and Turkestan. With
his -for this time rather spectacular- ride over the Pamirs2, he soon found sup-
port for further plans. Due to an accusation for being a spy he got no permit to
enter the territory of the Russian Empire for a certain period.
Figure 4-1:Wilhelm Filchner 1905 (Filchner
Archive, BAdW, Munich).
Figure 4-2: Travelling in Central Asia at Fil-
chner’s time (Filchner: 1938)




 Filchner’s list of publications is given in the appendix of the paper.
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For getting a scientific basis for preparing and carrying out his expeditions, he
studied surveying and geography at the Technical University of Munich followed
by practical education (mostly in Berlin) especially in geophysics at various
military and civil institutions. In this time he had close contacts to various trav-
elling scientists such as Sven Hedin (1855-1952), Ferdinand Frh. von Richt-
hofen (1833-1905), Armin Vámbéry (1832-1913) and numerous others.
Filchner’s next expedition led to North-East Tibet and Western Chinain 1903-
1905 with the main goal to carry out Earth-magnetic measurements as well as
mapping (Fig. 4-2). For preparing an expedition to Antarctica, Filchner had
intensive contacts with Otto Nordenskjöld (1869-1928), Ernest Shackleton
(1874-1922), Fridtjof Nansen (1861-1930), and Georg von Neumayer (1826-
1909). A test voyage to Spitsbergen/Svalbard) was undertaken in 1910 (Fig. 4-
3, 4-4). The expedition comprised six people, who crossed the main island from
the Advent Bay to the Wiche Bay.
Figure 4-3: Spitsbergen 1910, the crew: up-
per row, left-right: Barkow, Seelheim, Phi-
lipp, lower row: Przybyllok, Filchner, Pot-
peschnigg) (Filchner und Seelheim 1911:
Tafel 11).
Figure 4-4 Spitsbergen 1910, crossing the
ice field (Filchner und Seelheim 1911: Tafel
5).
In the same time period as Roald Amundsen (1872-1928), Robert Falcon Scott
(1868-1912), and the Japanese Nobu Shirase (1861-1946) Filchner started the
Second German Antarctic Expedition (1911-1912). For more details see below.
The plans to participate in a further expedition to the Arctic organized by
Amundsen failed due to the beginning of World War I, in which Filchner parti-
cipated as an officer3.
From 1926 till 1928 a long expedition to Central Asia followed (Fig. 4-5). The
goals were similar to those of the expedition of 1903-1905. As a special task the
connection of the Earth-magnetic networks observed in Europe to Western
Asia, China and India was planned and finally carried out in a 6000 km long
loop from Tashkent to Leh. The geographic coordinates of the observed sta-
tions were determined by astro-geodetic methods. Besides these registrations
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detailed route mapping was done, too, together with meteorological measure
ments and other data collection.
As a famous result of this expedition, the film "Mönche, Tänzer und Soldaten
(Monks, Dancers and Soldiers)" has to be mentioned. The film follows the
course of the route of the expedition from Tashkent via Ili (former Russian
gouvernement Turkestan), Urumtschi (Sinkiang) and Lan-chou (Kansu, China)
to the Monastery Kumbum (Province Amdo, Tibet, west of Sinning-Fu). Espe-
cially the chapters referring the Monastery Kumbum present a historically val-
uable documentation of this famous site, which at the time accommodated up to
7000 monks. The film shows various scenes of the monastic life at that time. In
the Chinese Cultural Revolution 1966-1976, the monastery was severely da-
maged, only a few original buildings remained. At present a rather small group
of monks is allowed to continue the religious practices.
In order to stabilize the loop of Earth-magnetic observations another expedition
to Central Asia followed in the years 1934-38 (Fig. 5-5), the main work resulted
in a 3500 km long line Lan-tschou - Leh connecting the most eastern and west-
ern points of the previous loop.
Figure 4-5: Filchner‘s expeditions 1926-28 and 1934-38 to Central Asia and the observed Earth-
magnetic lines (Filchner 1950: 180).
In 1939 a new expedition to Afghanistan and Iran for similar purposes as before
was started, but having arrived in India, Filchner changed his plans and turned
H. Hornik and C. Lüdecke: Wilhelm Filchner and Antarctica
55
to Nepal where magnetic surveys were carried out in the Western and South-
Eastern regions. Due to severe health problems Filchner returned early on to
India hoping for and finally receiving medical help. World War II then had fully
broken out, so, together with many others, Filchner was interned in a British
military campwhere, however, he was allowed to work and move rather freely.
After the ending of the war he stood in Poona, but finally returned to Europe in
1949 to settle in Zürich, where he spent his last years and died on May 7, 1957.
In Zürich he became familiar with the professors for geodesy at the ETH Zürich,
F. Baeschlin and F. Kobold who were members of the German Geodetic Com-
mission, so by them connections to his home town Munich followed. By these
contacts Filchner’s estate finally found its place in the Filchner-Archive at the
Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities (<http://dgk.badw.de>).
4.2 Filchner and the Second German Antarctic Expedition 1911-1912
4.2.1 Antarctic Problems at 1910
Between 1901-1905 five expeditions investigated Antarctica from different
places and concluded that Antarctica was a continent. Around 1910 new
questions came up. Is Antarctica a continent with mountain ranges going
through it? William Speirs Bruce (1867-1921) had the idea that the mountain
range of Victoria Land would be a continuation of the mountain ranges of
Graham Land (Antarctic Peninsula)4. Wilhelm Filchner wanted to investigate if
Antarctica is a continent, divided in an eastern and a western part by an inlet
filled with ice and going from the Weddell Sea to the Ross Sea5. Are west and
east Antarctica connected by land or separated by water (Fig. 4-6)?
Figure 4-6: Map of Antarctica showing Filchner’s Antarctic expedition route (Filchner 1911: 154).
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4.2.2 Main Tasks of the German Antarctic Expedition 1911-1912
Filchner wanted to go south from the Weddell Sea with dog or pony sledges,
cross the Pole and proceed to the Ross Sea with the help of depots set by a
second ship from that direction. He hoped that Robert Falcon Scott (1868-1912)
might take over this part. When this plan could not be realised, Filchner con-
centrated on the investigation of the area south of the Weddell Sea. His main
tasks were
 - Oceanographic measurements in the South Atlantic during the crossing.
 - Meteorological and magnetic measurements during the wintering on Antarc-
tica.
 - Geological observations during sledge trips in Antarctica.
Filchner bought a three masted Norwegian barque with auxiliary machine,
which had been designed especially for work in ice. The “Deutschland” was
refitted for an Antarctic expedition at Blohm & Voss in Hamburg (Fig. 4-7).
Figure 4-7: Filchner's ship "Deutschland" (Filchner Archive, BAdW, Munich).
4.2.3 The expeditions members
Filchner's ship "Deutschland" left Hamburg on 3 May 1911, and arrived in
Buenos Aires on 7 September. Unfortunately Filchner did not lead the expe-
dition from the very beginning as he still had to organise the funding of the
expedition6. Seelheim should replace him during the crossing to South America,
where he would take over the leadership in Buenos Aires. Besides Seelheim
                                                
6
 Lüdecke 1995: 135-136, 158-160.
H. Hornik and C. Lüdecke: Wilhelm Filchner and Antarctica
57
and the ill technician Neuberger Ule and Lohmann left having completed their
investigations during voyage (Table 4-1, Fig. 4-8). Four other seamen among
them the very experienced carpenter and only diver available, who came from
the First German South Polar Antarctic Expedition, were exchanged. Personal
problems between the expedition member were already there, when Filchner
came aboard. He produced even more problems, as he did not adopt to the life
on a ship and to his status being under the command of the captain, although
he was a military officer7.
Table 4-1: Participants of Filchner’s Antarctic expedition:
Scientists Officers
Wilhelm Filchner, expedition leader
for the voyage starting in Buenos
Aires
Heinrich Seelheim, expedition leader
for the voyage Bremen - Buenos





Ludwig Kohl, medical doctor and
mountaineer (left the expedition in
South Georgia)
Hans Lohmann, zoologist (left in
Buenos Aires)
Erich Przybyllok, astronomer and
earth magnetician
Willi Ule, geographer (left in Buenos
Aires)
Kaspar Neuberger, technician for
motor sledges (left in Buenos Aires)
Alfred Kling, watch keeping officer
and captain of the return trip of
"Deutschland" from South Georgia
Richard Vahsel, Captain (former II.
officer of "Gauss" - First German
South Polar Antarctic Expedition)
Wilhelm Lorenzen, I. officer, captain
after Vahsel's death
Johannes Müller, watch and naviga-
tion officer
Walter Slossarczyk, III. and wireless
officer, committed suicide at South
Georgia
Wilhelm Goeldel, ship's doctor
22 seamen, among them ice pilot
Paul Björvik and three other seamen
of "Gauss" – First German South
Polar Antarctic Expedition (1901-
1903).
4.2.4 The "Deutschland" in the Weddell Sea
"Deutschland" left Buenos Aires on 4 October. The expedition arrived in Gryt-
viken on South Georgia (Fig. 4-9) on 21 October 1911. Here Filchner became
good friend with the leader of the whaling station of the Compania Argentina de
Pesca Carl Anton Larsen (1860-1924).
During their stay at South Georgia they visited the former German station of the
International Polar Year (1882-1883) to determine the changes of magnetic field
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Erich Barkow Wilhelm Goeldel Fritz Heim
Conrad Heyneck Alfred Kling Felix König
Wilhel m Lorenzen Johannes Müller Erich Przybyllok
Figure 4-8: Some Participants of the Second German Antarctic Expedition (1911-1912) (Filch-
ner-Archive, BAdW, Munich).
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since then8. They also took meteorological measurements for comparison with
the data which would be taken at Antarctica. A research trip to the Sandwich
Islands was stopped due to bad weather conditions. Kohl, who still suffering
after an operation due to appendicitis had to left at Grytviken, before “Deutsch-
land” left for southern Weddell Sea on 11 December. He later married Larsen’s
daughter and was called Kohl-Larsen since then.
Figure 4-9: Whaling station in Leith Harbour at
Grytviken on South Georgia (Filchner 1994:
45).
Figure 4-10: Northeast part of the Barrier
and Vahsel Bay  (Przybyllok 1913: 3).
On 30 January 1912 the expedition found land which was named Prinzregent –
Luitpold-Land (Fig. 4-10, 4-15) . Caused by a sudden spring tide the attempts to
install a wintering station in the "Vahsel-Bay" on a previously solid iceberg failed
(Fig. 4-11). However, Filchner was the first to observe and to survey the decay
of a gigantic ice field leaving behind the Herzog Ernst Bay (Fig. 4-13). Another
started attempt to install the station on the ice cap could not be completed, too,
firstly due to enormous ice barriers broken off by the flood, and later by rapidly
developing sea ice. It was decided to stop the plan to reach the ice cap or even
the Antarctic continent and to try to return to the open sea in direction of South
Georgia.
Figure 4-11: After the catastrophe on Station
Iceberg, 18 February 1912 (Filchner 1994:
116).
Figure 4-12: Dog lines durring ice drift, 7
September 1912 (Filchner 1994: 183).
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By various manoeuvres the ship could be let out from the most dangerous
areas, where it presumably would have been crushed by pack ice. Never-
theless, the ship soon was inevitably trapped by ice at 73°34' S, 33°12' W.
Unable to move, the ship started on 15 March 1912 an 8-month drift north
generated by the Weddell Sea Gyre  (Fig. 4-12).
Figure 4-13: Status of break-up of part of the
barrier, 7 p.m., 24 February 1912 (Filchner
1994: 127).
Figure 4-14: Sketch of “Deutschland”’s win-
ter quarters in the Wedded Sea (Filchner
1994: 1 47).
A station for scientific observations was installed on solid sea ice and the work
was continued as far as the conditions allowed (Fig. 4-14). By this occasion a
160 km sledge trip was undertaken to the location 70°32' S, 43°45' W to inves-
tigate whether the suspected Morell Land existed or not. It proved that former
reports were obviously based on fallacies by mirages. On 8 August 1912, cap-
tain Vahsel died due to syphilis, succeeded by Lorenzen, whom Filchner dis-
liked as much as Vahsel before. The social conditions aboard "Deutschland"
had developed unfavourable with two groups fighting against each other and
thus obstructing all activities. On 26 November the ship got free at 63°37' S,
36°34' W and immediately returned to South Georgia,  arriving there on 19
December. With Larsen’s help the expedition was dissolved officially due to a
mutiny against Filchner. The plans for a further expedition to Antarctica were no
more discussed.
4.2.5 Results
Filchner showed that there was no inlet in the Weddell Sea, but a limiting ice
shelf - today  called  Filchner Ice Shelf.  Just  by  chance  the southern most
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sounding of the ocean depth (1158 m) indicated a trench, which nowadays is
called the Filchner Trench, leading in a NE-SW direction. When the "Deutsch-
land" drifted in the Weddell Sea  it provided the first evidence of the Weddell
Sea Gyre.
Figure 4-15: Prinzregent Luitpold-Land and the position of the Ice Barrier, 28 February 1912
(Filchner 1994: 93).
Apart from these rather accidental results, pioneering work was done by aero-
logical ascents to describe the condition of the upper air of the Weddell Sea,
which showed an inversion of temperature at 2000 m.
Oceanographic investigations, moreover, led for the first time ever to a descrip-
tion of the temperature distribution of the southern Atlantic Ocean. Most inter-
esting was the discovery of four alternate ocean layers transporting warmer and
colder water south and north respectively.
4.3 Outlock
In 1982 the German Antarctic "Filchner-Station" was installed on the Filchner
Ice Shelf in the Southern Weddell Sea. The tasks for the station, operated by
the Alfred Wegener Institute in Bremerhaven were especially glaciological and
geophysical research on the shelf ice (Filchner-Ronne Ice-Shelf Programme -
FRISP). In 1998 a several thousand square kilometres large block broke off
from the shelf ice and started to drift off. At the time of the event no staff was in
the station. In a special action in February 1999, all equipment could be res-
cued and brought to the Polarstern.
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4.5 Appendix: Books written or initiated by W. Filchner
4.5.1 Popular Books
Ein Ritt über den Pamir, Berlin 1903
Das Kloster Kumbum in Tibet. Ein Beitrag zu seiner Geschichte. Berlin 1906
Das Rätsel des Matschu. Meine Tibet-Expedition. Berlin 1907
Quer durch Spitzbergen, Berlin 1911
Zum sechsten Erdteil. Die zweite deutsche Südpolar-Expedition. Berlin 1923
To the Sixth Continent: The Second German South Polar Expedition, 1911-
1913. Translated and edited by W. Barr, 1994
Sturm über Asien. Erlebnisse eines diplomatischen Geheimagenten. Berlin
1924
Quer durch Osttibet. Berlin 1924
Tschung-Kue. Das Reich der Mitte. Alt-Chinavor dem Zusammenbruch. Berlin
1925
Hui - Hui – Asiens Islamkämpfe. Berlin 1928
Wetterleuchten im Osten. Erlebnisse eines diplomatischen Geheimagenten.
Berlin 1928
Om mani padme hum. Meine China- und Tibetexpedition 1925/28. Leipzig 1929
Kumbum Dschamba Ling. Leipzig 1933
Bismillah! Vom Huang Ho zum Indus. Leipzig 1938
Ein Forscherleben. Wiesbaden 1950
In der Fieberhölle Nepals. Wiesbaden 1951
together with D. Shridhar Marathe: Hindustan im Festgewand. Celle 1953
Kumbum. Lamaismus in Lehre und Leben. Zürich 1954
4.5.2 Scientific Work
Wissenschaftliche Ergebnisse der Expedition Filchners nach China und Tibet
1903-05, 11 vol., 6 map-collections, 1906-14
Ergebnisse der W. Filchner’schen Vorexpedition nach Spitzbergen 1910. Dr. H.
Philipp (Hrsg.), 1914
Erdmagnetische Messungen während der deutschen Antarktischen Expedition
von Prof. Dr. E. Przybyllok
Die astronomischen Ortsbestimmungen und Höhenmessungen Dr. Filchners
auf seiner Expedition in China und Tibet 1926/28. Ed. by E. Przybyllok and
K. Walter
Die erdmagnetische Beobachtungen von Dr. W. Filchners auf seiner Reise
nach China und Tibet 1926/28. Ed. by O. Venske
Kumbum-Dschamba-Ling. Das Kloster der hunderttausend Bilder. Leipzig 1932
Kartenwerk der erdmagnetischen Forschungsexpedition nach Zentralasien
1926-28, Erster Teil: China und Tibet I. 1933,  China und Tibet II. 1937
Geographische Bestimmungen und Höhenmessungen in Zentralasien. Ed. by
E. Przybyllok, 1939
Meine geophysikalischen Arbeiten in Zentralasien. 1939
Route Mapping and Position Locating in Unexplored Regions. New York 1957.
Together with E. Przybyllock and T. Hagen:
Most of the popular books were published in more than one edition. Still today
the internet lists numerous books by W. Filchner. The electronic book research
system “Zentrales Verzeichnis Antiquarischer Bücher (ZVAB)” e.g. lists about
1300 findings or “Abebooks” 1000 respectively (status summer 2005).
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Abstract
This paper examines the motivations behind Argentine scientific research in
Antarctica between 1946 and 1959. It argues that that Argentina conducted
Antarctic research primarily for political purposes. During these years Argentina
was engaged in a complicated dispute with Great Britain and Chile over the
sovereignty of the Antarctic Peninsula, and Argentine politicians used science in
various ways to support their claims. The paper will also show how the rela-
tionship between science and politics changed over time as both international
and domestic circumstances changed. These changes will be examined by
looking at the organizational structure of Argentine Antarctic Science, the type
of scientific research conducted, and the ways in which Argentine politicians
made use of Antarctic science in their political rhetoric.
5.1 Introduction
In 1959, Contraalmirante Rodolfo N. Panzarini, director of the Argentine Antarc-
tic Institute, published an article entitled “Argentine Scientific Interests in Antarc-
tica.”1. In this article Panzarini attempts to set out the motivations for Argentine
involvement in Antarctic science. The article begins with a description of the
uniqueness of the Antarctic continent and the sheer excitement of scientific
research in the region. It goes on to stress the connections between Antarctica
and the Southern Hemisphere in such fields as geology and meteorology, ar-
guing that geographical proximity gives Argentina both a special responsibility
to conduct research in the region and a particular advantage in doing so. Utility
is a major part of his justification of Argentine scientific interests. He mentions
potential mineral resources alongside actual marine riches, and also argues for
the usefulness of Antarctic research in various fields such as weather forecast-
ing, radio communications, and air transport. The article stresses the difficulty of
conducting scientific investigations in such an inhospitable environment, but
states proudly that Argentines have proved themselves capable of the chal-
lenge. Finally, Panzarini makes a moral or utopian case for Argentine Antarctic
Science, arguing that such research enhances an understanding of the planet,
which he sees as an intrinsically good thing. One factor entirely absent from
Panzarini’s discussion, at least on the surface, is that of politics.
This paper will address a similar question to that posed by Panzarini: why did
Argentina engage in scientific research in Antarctica between 1946 and 1959?
However, in contrast to Panzarini, this paper will argue that during these years
Argentine Antarctic Science took place primarily for political purposes. Through-
out this period Argentina was involved in a complicated dispute with Britain and
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Chile for the sovereignty of the Antarctic Peninsula and the surrounding sub-
Antarctic islands2.
Argentine governments – in a similar fashion to their British and Chilean coun-
terparts – used the scientific activities of Argentine nationals to support their
claims to legal possession of the region. This international sovereignty dispute
was a constant throughout the period 1946-1959, and Argentine governments
never ceased to use Antarctic science to support their claims. At the same time,
as this paper will show, the ways in which politicians promoted and used Ant-
arctic science changed over time as both internal and external circumstances
changed. By the time the Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959, the connection
between Antarctic science and politics had become very different from in 1946.
This paper will investigate the various connections between Antarctic science
and politics at three levels: the organizational structure of Argentine Antarctic
Science the nature of the scientific research conducted, and the use made of
Antarctic science in Argentine political rhetoric. Following a brief historical
background to the sovereignty dispute, the first main section of the paper will
suggest that Argentine Antarctic Science over the period 1946-1959 broke
down into three distinct phases: 1946-1951, 1951-55, 1955-1959. The second
and third main sections of the paper will follow this chronological division as
they examine the nature of Argentine scientific research in Antarctica and the
changing ways in which politicians made use of this science.
5.2 Historical Background
During the Spanish Colonial period, Imperial Spain made claims to lands in the
Western Hemisphere all the way to the South Pole. However, by the time of
Argentine independence in 1816, Antarctica remained undiscovered, and the
Spanish claims remained hypothetical at best. During the nineteenth century
Argentina had some involvement with the Antarctic sealing industry, but it was
not until the beginning of the twentieth century that the South American country
began to show any official interest in the southern continent. In November 1903
an Argentine naval ship, the Uruguay, rescued the stranded members of Nor-
denskjold’s Antarctic Expedition. In the same year the Argentine government
took over the operation of a meteorological station on the South Orkney Islands
built by the Scotsman William Speirs Bruce. In late 1904, an Argentine com-
pany, the Companía Argentina de Pesca Sociedad Anónima, began whaling
operations from South Georgia. In 1907, and again in 1908, Foreign Ministers
from Argentina and Chile met to discuss the question of Antarctic sovereignty.
But these negotiations broke down without agreement, territorial rights in Ant-
arctica did not become an important question in Argentine politics until thirty
years later.
In 1908 Great Britain claimed possession of the Antarctic Peninsula and the
surrounding sub-Antarctic islands by issuing Letters Patent (a form of Govern-
ment Decree) that created the so-called Islands Dependencies3. This claim was
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revised in 1917 to avoid an overlap with Chilean and Argentine Patagonia. The
main purpose of the British claim was to tax and regulate the booming South
Atlantic Whaling Industry, centered upon the island of South Georgia4. The very
name of the Dependencies, together with their administrative connection with
the Falkland Islands, led to discontent among many Argentines, for whom the
Islas Malvinas, taken by force by Britain in 1833, were becoming a symbol of
national unity5. However, it was not until the mid 1930s, with the surge of a
particularly anti-British nationalism in Argentina, that the Antarctic Peninsula
really started to become an important issue in Argentine politics6.
Just before the outbreak of the Second World War, a Norwegian invitation to
attend a polar conference in Bergen stimulated further Argentine interest in
Antarctica7. The outbreak of hostilities in Europe meant that the Bergen
conference did not take place, but the provisional Argentine Antarctic Commis-
sion formed to prepare Argentina’s case at the conference remained operative.
In November 1940, the Government of Chile seized the diplomatic initiative by
making its own claim to the Antarctic Peninsula which overlapped substantially
with that of Britain8. Over the course of the next six years – through maps,
expeditions, acts of possession and government statements – Argentina put
forward its own official claims to the Peninsula region, thereby setting the stage
for a three way sovereignty dispute with Great Britain and Chile (see Fig. 5-1 for
the Argentine claim)9:
Towards the end of the Second World War, Great Britain responded to South
American assertions of sovereignty in Antarctica by sending the secretive
Operation Tabarin to establish a legal effective occupation in the region10. The
British expedition had a significant scientific component, which strengthened the
link between Antarctic politics and Antarctic Science and influenced the subse-
quent sovereignty dispute11. The connection between Antarctic science and
politics was not an entirely new one: the earlier “scientific” expeditions of
Shackleton, Mawson, Richard Byrd and the British Discovery Investigations had
all contained significant political undertones. In May 1940 the newly created
Argentine Antarctic Commission headed by Isidoro Ruíz Moreno made a report
to the Argentine Government regarding the legality of a potential Argentine
claim to the region.12  The report had concluded that Argentina did have a good
case for sovereignty in the Antarctic Peninsula, not only because of its geogra-
phical proximity, but also because it had exercised “effective occupation” over
the entire region since 1904 through its meteorological station at Laurie Island
in the South Orkneys. From the very start of the active period of the sovereignty
dispute, the Argentine government made use of the scientific research of its
nationals to support its political ambitions13.
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Figure 5-1: Contemporary Argentine map of the Antarctic Peninsula. Most of the Argentine
bases shown were built in the period 1946-1959.
5.3 Organizational Structure
For the vast majority of the period between 1946-1959, Argentine Antarctic
Science was not in the hands of specifically scientific ministries. Instead, it was
under the direct or indirect control of the Foreign Ministry or various branches
and incarnations of the Ministry of Defense. This gives a rather crude initial clue
as to the purpose of Argentine scientific research in Antarctica at this time. In a
more complicated fashion, the changing nature of the institutional structure that
lay behind Argentine Antarctic Science provides a useful insight into the politics,
especially the internal politics, that lay behind the science. The key figure in
Argentine politics at this time was General Juan Domingo Perón, who was pre-
sident of Argentina between 1946 and 195514. Between 1946 and 1959, Argen-
tine Antarctic Science can be broken into three distinct periods that broadly
follow the chapters within Perón’s presidency 1946-51, 1951-55, 1955-59.
These sections will be explored in detail in the paragraphs that follow. Argentine
Antarctic Science was not an abstract and separate part of Argentine history
over this period, but rather that it was an integral part of the broader changes.
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In March 1946, shortly after the election of General Perón, decree number
8,507 reorganized the Argentine Antarctic Commission, under the leadership of
José M Moneta, a famous figure in the history of Laurie Island15. The commis-
sion had originally been created in 1940 but had become inactive after a military
coup in 194316. The re-organized Antarctic Commission remained part of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, although it greatly increased the scope
of its membership to include representatives of the Justice, War, Naval, Agricul-
ture and Aeronautical Ministries. The main task of the Commission was political
rather than scientific: namely to send expeditions to Antarctica in order to assert
Argentina’s sovereignty rights. Several months after the reorganization, Moneta
resigned, claiming that the new President failed to support his plans for re-
newed Argentine activity in Antarctica17. Pascual La Rosa, who succeeded
Moneta as leader of the commission in October 1946, enjoyed greater support
from the President and under this new leader Argentina resumed its expeditions
to Antarctica.
Early in 1947, Argentina sent its first expedition to Antarctica for four years. This
expedition, which founded a meteorological station in the Melchior Archipelago,
was conducted almost entirely by the Navy and set the tone for similar such
expeditions which took place in 1948, 1949 and 195018. The dominant role of
the Navy in Antarctic expeditions meant that Naval Officials came to dominate
the organizational structure. The Navy’s hegemony in Antarctic affairs had been
earned through over 40 years of involvement with the southern continent, but
during this period it was something of a double-edged sword for President
Perón. On the one hand, moves to assert Argentine sovereignty in Antarctica –
particularly against British “imperialists” – fitted neatly with the nationalist ele-
ment of Perón’s policy. On the other hand. the Navy was perhaps the Argentine
Institution most fiercely critical of the new President, and its leaders saw in
Antarctica a chance to assert their autonomy19. As Perón’s grip on power in
Argentina increased, he looked for a way to usurp the Navy’s power in Antarctic
Affairs.
The second phase in the chronology of Argentine Antarctic Science began with
Perón’s takeover of Antarctic affairs. Perón’s actions in assuming control of
Antarctic policy mirrored his tactics in other areas of national life. Unhappy with
the existing organizational structure, Perón simply created a new organization,
favored this with his patronage and put his own man in charge. The foundation
of the Instituto Antártico Argentino early in 1951, coincided with the so-called
First Argentine Scientific Expedition to Antarctica that took place at the same
time and which founded the San Martín base in Marguerite Bay. The driving
force behind both the Instituto and the Scientific Expedition was Colonel Hernán
Pujato of the Argentine Army20. Pujato had won the support of the President by
putting forward a systematic program for a permanent Argentine presence in
Antarctica. This program included greater scientific activity in the region.
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Pujato’s rise in Antarctic affairs marked a distinct shift from the Navy to the
Army. High ranking naval officers responded to this shift by refusing to supply a
boat to the Scientific Expedition, meaning that a merchant vessel, the Santa
Michaela, had to be found instead21.
Initially the Instituto – soon to be renamed the Instituto Antártico Hernán Pujato
– was under the control of the Ministry of Technical Affairs. This was the near-
est that Argentine Antarctic policy during the period 1946-1959 came to being
under the control of a specifically scientific ministry. But in July 1952 the Insti-
tuto passed to depend upon the Ministry of Defense and its successors. Al-
though the Instituto did make a greater effort to coordinate Antarctic Science, its
primary purpose remained political as the preamble to its founding decree made
clear: “It is the firm intention of this government to secure undeniable rights to
the Antarctic region for the Argentine nation.” The Antarctic Commission in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was never formally disbanded during this period, al-
though its importance waned rapidly after the foundation of the Antarctic Insti-
tute. Through the creation and patronage of the Antarctic Institute Perón left his
distinctive stamp upon the organization structure of Argentine Antarctic Science.
However, in doing so he had further alienated the Navy.
The third phase of Argentine Antarctic Science during this period began when
the Revolución Libertadora toppled President Perón in September 1955. At this
time General Pujato was commanding Argentina’s newly constructed Belgrano
base on the edge of the Filchner Ice Barrier in the Weddell Sea. When Pujato
returned to Argentina early in 1956, the new government immediately informed
him that he was no longer director of the Argentine Antarctic Institute, and he
was forced to resign. The Revolución Libertadora, which had been largely
inspired and led by Naval Officers, therefore marked another distinct shift in the
organizational structure of Antarctic Science. However, the new military govern-
ment maintained Perón’s overall policy of asserting Argentina’s rights to sover-
eignty in the region.
Under the military government, the Instituto Antárctico was re-constituted for a
second time and became part of the Naval Ministry; Contraalmirante Panzarini
became its new director. The decree that reorganized the Instituto stated that it
was “an organism of scientific and technical character with the purpose of stu-
dying Antarctica.” The Instituto moved to its present location in the center of
Buenos Aires, and the building was equipped with up to date scientific facilities
including apparatus purchased in the United States22. By this stage Antarctic
Science had gathered international significance with preparations for the Inter-
national Geophysical Year that would take place between 1957 and 1958, and
the Instituto played a major role in coordinating Argentina’s contributions to this
important scientific endeavor. Prestige in Antarctic affairs had become inextri-
cably linked to scientific research, and the political and scientific work of the
Instituto could hardly be distinguished. By the time the Antarctic Treaty was
signed in 1959, Argentina had returned to democratic government under Pre-
sident Frondizi.
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The Treaty was presented to the Argentine people as a guarantee of Argen-
tina’s sovereignty in the region rather than as an internationalization of the
continent. Nevertheless, the Treaty led to a major change in the international
politics of Antarctica and represented a conclusion of sorts to the three-way
sovereignty dispute in the Antarctic Peninsula.
5.4 Antarctic Science
The organizational structure of Argentine Antarctic Science can only tell us a
limited amount about the type and the nature of the Antarctic science carried
out by Argentine scientists during the period from 1946 to 1959. To learn more
about the science as science we have to turn to other sources, most notably to
the published results of the research. These published scientific papers may be
misleading, since for the first two parts of the chronology outlined above, Argen-
tine scientific publications on Antarctica were very limited. Only in the third
period from 1955 to 1959 did publication really take off, especially through the
Instituto Antártico’s “contributions” series23 This does not mean that no research
took place in the first two periods of my chronology; indeed, many of the papers
are based on research carried out at precisely this time. Nor can the Institute’s
own publications be taken as representing all the scientific work taking place in
Antarctica: much meteorological research, for example, appears to have been
published and used in different ways. But the expansion of scientific publication
after 1955 does tell us something about the changing priorities of Argentine
Antarctic Science, not least the fact that from this date onward the country felt
that it was politically expedient to be seen to be doing scientific research. And
the publications themselves do give some hint as to the focus of Argentine
Antarctic Science.
Between 1946 and 1951 there was little co-ordination of Argentine scientific re-
search. Just as the Navy dominated the political organization during the period,
so too it dominated the scientific work being carried out. The simple fact that it
was the Navy that was providing transport for the expeditions meant that it was
the Navy that was in a position to carry out research. The research conducted
quite naturally reflected the priorities of the Navy: oceanography, cartography
and meteorology. For example, the expedition of 1946/47 established a meteo-
rological station in the Melchior Archipelago; the expedition of 1947/48 acceler-
ated hydrological studies in the Gerlache Strait, the Melchior Archipelago and
Dallman Bay24 It could be argued that some of this work, in particular cartogra-
phy, had an obvious political dimension. Maps had been used by the Instituto
Geográfico Militar to make Argentine claims to the region, and maps provided
the battlefield upon which the “war of Antarctic names” took place.25  To name a
place was to claim it, and Argentina renamed many of the places which had
been given English names. Additionally maps and charts – as well as meteo-
rology and oceanography – were useful strategic tools, and helped to give a
country a practical advantage in the region. The high quality of Argentine carto-
graphy was revealed by a British Admiralty complaint to the Foreign Office that
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the Argentines and Chileans had far superior maps26. At this stage the link be-
tween science and politics remained fairly obvious, as the scientific research
conducted had clear political advantages.
The “First Scientific Expedition to Antarctica” sent to establish the San Martín
base in Marguerite Bay in 1951, may have been intended primarily as a political
tool to wrest control of Antarctic matters from the Navy, but it also began a
period in which the range of scientific research being carried out increased
markedly. Two main factors assisted with this increase. Firstly, the Antarctic
Institute provided a center to co-ordinate and focus Antarctic Research, under
the single-minded leadership of Pujato. Secondly, the fact that the Army took
over from the Navy as the dominant force in Antarctica led to a growing interest
in the interior of the Peninsula. During this period various studies took place:
geological surveys of Deception Island and Half Moon Island; underwater geo-
logy of Deception Island; investigations of the Paleontology of Hope Bay; bio-
ecological investigations of insular and continental fauna; glaciological studies;
astrophysical and geomagnetic studies; contributions to the study of systematic
botany; studies of human life in Antarctica; and contributions to the geological
study of the South Orkneys.27  These scientific investigations were carried out
by a team of researchers from the national universities and from various state
bodies. Generally, the results of this work were not published until a later date,
and General Pujato became keen to accelerate the publication process. The
first scientific paper published by the Instituto Antártico – I.R. Cordini’s “Contri-
bution to the Knowledge of the Argentine Sector of Antarctica” – came out in
1955 before the overthrow of Perón. It is interesting for a number of reasons,
not least because of its politicized title and for the fact that the name “Hernan
Pujato” has been erased from every page. During this stage, Argentine scientific
research began to move away from having the obvious political motivations of
the earlier period, although, as the title of Cordini’s work revealed, politics re-
mained very close to the surface.
Between 1955 and 1959 the Argentine Antarctic Institute published 47 scientific
“contributions.”28  The number of articles dealing with the following themes was
as follows: campaigns/expeditions (16); biology (10); geology (5); institutional
(5); geophysics (3); meteorology (2); oceanography (1); cartography (1); human
ecology: (1); other (3). Apart from the large focus on campaigns and expeditions
(over one third) there does not appear to be any significant political trend in the
type of scientific research being published. Biology and Geology are high on the
list mainly because the Peninsula region lends itself to such studies. The rela-
tive absence of publications on Meteorology, Oceanography and Cartography
reflects the fact that the National Meteorological Service, the Navy and the
Instituto Geográfico Militar each continued with their own research independ-
ently of the Antarctic Institute. In 1956 a scientific department was formally
integrated into the Instituto.29 The permanent scientific staff was made up of
four geologists, two biologists, two geophysicists, one physiologist, one chemist,
one meteorologist, and one glaciologist. The head of the scientific department
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was Otto Schneider, a geophysicist. The inclusion in the scientific department of
several scientists who had earlier worked with Pujato suggests a certain political
pragmatism among both the scientists themselves and the Institute.
The most important scientific research done by Argentine scientists during this
final period was done as part of the IGY, that took place during 1957 and 1958.
This work was detailed in an Argentine report to SCAR.30 All eight of Argen-
tina’s permanent stations participated in some way with the IGY research, as
did several research ships and temporary scientific bases. Research was done
in ten main areas: meteorology, geomagnetism, the aurora, the ionosphere,
glaciology, seismology, oceanography, tides, gravity and biology. The aurora
research is an interesting example since it took place at all eight permanent
stations and was coordinated by the Instituto Antártico. Each station conducted
a visual observation of the night sky for three hours every day and gave a
detailed description of the aurora where it was present. On special alerts and
the so-called “World Days” additional observations were taken. The report to
SCAR notes that “All stations were equipped with cellulose acetate color filters
and with a special auroral clinometer. Some stations had, in addition, red and
green interference filters. Aerological sounding theodolites were used by some
observers for detailed observation of azimuths and elevation angles.”
Additionally, the Belgrano base near the Filchner Ice Barrier on the Weddell
Sea (Argentina most southerly base’s) was equipped with an Alaskan type “all
sky camera.” This camera took 24 hour continuous recordings during the dark
season, and continuous nocturnal readings for the period between March and
September 1958. By this stage there appears to have been no direct political
motivation behind the type of research conducted, although it is interesting to
note that all Argentina’s research during the IGY took place within the sector
which Argentina claimed.
5.5 Political Rhetoric
Throughout the period 1946-1959 Argentine politicians made use of the scien-
tific work being done by Argentine nationals in Antarctica, in order to support
their claims to sovereignty in the Antarctic Peninsula. In the crudest form, politi-
cians viewed scientists as effective occupiers of Antarctic territory: to boast of
Argentine nationals living and working in the Antarctic Peninsula was to make a
legal case for possession of the region. In a similar fashion, politicians used the
fact that Argentine scientists were taking the trouble to conduct scientific re-
search in such inhospitable surroundings as evidence of Argentina’s commit-
ment to the region. This “difficulty” argument was often loaded with racial under-
tones, and the political rhetoric presented Antarctica as a proving ground for the
Argentine criollo race. In a much more sophisticated fashion Argentine politi-
cians actually built the results of scientific enquiry into their case for sovereignty.
For example, the Natural History Museum in La Plata displays fossils discov-
ered in the Antarctica Peninsula alongside similar fossils discovered in Argen-
tine Patagonia, putting the two together to make a case that the Peninsula
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region is a “natural” extension of Argentine territory. By the 1940s and 1950s,
many of the scientific facts used by Argentine politicians to support their case –
such as that of geological continuity – had already been established. But during
this period there was an ongoing dialogue between politics and science, espe-
cially as the IGY approached. Many Argentine scientists – just like their British
and Chilean counterparts – attempted to give their research a political signifi-
cance in order to win wider support for their work. Far from being neutral ideal-
ists, Antarctic scientists often presented themselves as extremely committed to
the political cause.
Juan Domingo Perón was the consummate political opportunist, and shortly
after becoming President he came to see Antarctica as a cause that could rally
the Argentine people around him. From the Argentine point of view, sovereignty
in Antarctica was intimately connected to the question of the Islas Malvinasand
their illegal occupation by the British. Claims against the British in Antarctica
therefore created a form of “formal imperialism” upon Argentine territory, which
neatly complemented Perón’s campaign against British “informal imperialism” in
Argentina itself.31  In the first period of his Presidency, the role of the Navy in
Antarctic affairs put Perón in an awkward situation: he could not overemphasize
the Antarctic issue without giving implicit support to his internal enemies. But
this did not stop Perón making use of Antarctic science and geography in his
political rhetoric. Perón’s fullest expression of his Antarctic doctrine in this peri-
od came in the introduction to a booklet published in 1948 by the Comisión Na-
cional del Antártico entitled Soberanía Argentina en La Antártida:
“The fundamental fact is that this region constitutes a natural geologi-
cal prolongation of our territory, situated in the most southern part of
our land and in the extreme south of America. Geographical and his-
torical reasons add to our legal case for sovereignty.”32
Claims to sovereignty based upon proximity and geographical continuity meant
that Argentina could not entirely deny Chile’s claims to Antarctic Sovereignty.
Indeed, so long as Argentina remained the senior partner, Perón’s position
during this period was very much to work alongside the Chileans promoting the
idea of Antártida Sudamerica against the pretensions of British imperialists.33
Following the First Scientific Expedition to Antarctica and the Creation of the
Instituto Antártico Hernán Pujato, Perón found himself in a much better position
to make political capital out of the Antarctic Sovereignty dispute. The period
1951-1955 saw a rapid increase in the use made of Antarctica and Argentine
Antarctic Science in political rhetoric. The magazine Mundo Peronista provides
an extreme example of Peronist propaganda. One article, entitled “For all the
men of the world”, discusses Argentine scientific research into cosmic radia-
tion.34  After explaining the great work that Argentine scientists were doing for
the good of humanity, the article concludes that such research could only take
place in Argentina because of its privileged geographical situation stretching
from Salta in the north to the South Pole. Such rhetoric works at a number of
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levels: the idea of Argentina justifying its sovereignty through conducting useful
scientific research resonates with traditional utilitarian justifications of imperial-
ism. Other articles were less subtle. On 15 May 1952 the Mundo Peronista pub-
lished an article about Pujato’s establishment of the San Martín base with the
headline “The Peronist example with the support of Perón and of his people.”
When asked about his most memorable moment in Antarctica, General Pujato
recalls the Argentine elections of 1951 and states that all eight members of his
expedition voted for Perón: “Eight creole hearts, eight creole votes!”  Such
blatant politicization of the Antarctic issue became all pervasive, and even
entered school curricula and text books.35 During these years the political
rhetoric around Antarctica was by no means confined to scientific interests, but
politicians did not hesitate in using the work of Argentine scientists or their
results when these suited their political purposes.
The overthrow of Perón in 1955 brought about a marked change in the political
use of Argentine science. Whereas science had generally been only one part of
Peronist political rhetoric concerning the Antarctic issue, in the period 1955 -
1959 it became central. This shift occurred more because of the growing inter-
national importance of Antarctica than because of internal changes in Argen-
tina; although there was a generally acknowledged opening up of Argentine
universities during this period that may well have had some impact. The im-
portance of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) cannot be overstated.
From the mid 1950s scientific research became the currency of political debate
in Antarctica: without a substantial scientific research program, a country lacked
a voice in the political negotiations. Under the leadership of Panzarini the Ant-
arctic Institute represented Argentina in the four conferences of coordination of
the IGY, and participated in the formation of SCAR.36
In his article “Argentine Scientific Interests in Antarctica,” Panzarini concludes
his discussion of Argentine Antarctic Science as follows:
“The geographical nearness, the historic tradition, the existing organiza-
tion, the character of the interests in play, the clear understanding of the
essence of each problem, the scientific and technical capacity of Argen-
tina and the availability of the material and human resources, estab-
lishes a harmonious combination of factors that constitutes a valuable
inheritance and signals an unavoidable duty for the country, namely to
undertake a high quality and intense scientific activity in Antarctica.”37
In this paragraph there is a sense that the rhetoric of Argentine Antarctic Sci-
ence has gone full circle. Panzarini’s language sounds very similar to Perón’s
case for Argentine sovereignty in Antarctica written eleven years earlier, which
in turn mirrors the original language used by the Argentine Antarctic Commis-
sion in their letter to the Foreign Ministry in 1940. Just as Moreno and his col-
leagues used geology and geography to justify an Argentine interest in Antarc-
tica, Panzarini is ostensibly making a case for scientific research rather than
legal possession. In the context of 1959 the absence of any explicitly political
rhetoric in Panzarini’s article is hardly surprising. The overlapping language of
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science and politics suggests that the two elements have become profoundly
connected, to the extent that even Panarinzi’s failure to mention political motiva-
tions can be seen as being to some extent political. In the new language of the
IGY, SCAR and the Antarctic Treaty negotiations, it was no longer politically
expedient to mention politics.
5.6 Conclusion
At the Antarctic Treaty negotiations in Washington D. C.  in 1959, Adolfo
Scilingo, the head of the Argentine delegation, made a strong case against the
proposed freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica38. Argentina feared
that absolute freedom to conduct scientific experiments would undermine its
supposed sovereignty in the region. “Scientific” bases could be established
wherever a country wanted, and could then easily be used for other, more
hostile, activities. In the context of the Cold War, the Soviet Union, rather than
Chile and Great Britain, aroused the greatest suspicion. Argentina, which had
become adept at using science as a vehicle for political purposes, could recog-
nize when others were doing the same. Although Argentina eventually gave
some ground on Article 2 – the freedom of scientific investigation would remain
as it had been during the IGY – in exchange for the proscription of nuclear
activities in the continent, its initial opposition to such a clause clearly reveals
the superficiality of any notion of “pure science”.
This paper has made two connected arguments. Firstly, throughout the period
1946-1959 the Antarctic sovereignty dispute between Argentina, Chile and Bri-
tain provided the primary motivation for Argentine Antarctic Science. Secondly,
although this international political motivation remained a constant, the nature of
the connection between science and politics changed over time, due to both
internal and external circumstances. The broad connection between politics and
science was not unique to Argentina: every country that participated  in the
scientific activities of the IGY in Antarctica had political reasons for doing so.
However, the precise nature of this connection between science and politics in
relation to Argentine Antarctic Science was unique, and this connection was
always in flux. The political background to Argentine Antarctic Science does not
detract from the quality of the science conducted, but it does explain the chang-
ing patterns of Argentine scientific activity over this period.
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5.8 Appendix: Chronology of important events in Argentina and
acticities in Antarctica 1946-1959
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6 The U.S. Antarctic Oversnow Geophysical-Glaciological Research Pro-
gram of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) 1957-58, from the
View of a Research Scientist Participant




When 12 countries established scientific stations in Antarctica for the 1957-58
International Geophysical Year (IGY), the Cold War was at its height, seven
countries had made claims in Antarctica, and the Antarctic Treaty was a few
years in the future. The U.S. program was operated by the Navy and territorial
claims were secretly made at several locations during the IGY; these were
never officially announced and the U.S. remains a non-claimant state. I was a
graduate student geophysicist (assistant seismologist) on the unexplored Filch-
ner-Ronne Ice Shelf as part of the only major field project of the U.S. Antarctic
Program.
Starting in 1957, the U.S. began a series of oversnow traverses making seismic
reflection ice soundings (and other geophysical measurements) and glaciologi-
cal studies to determine the thickness and budget of the Antarctic ice sheet.
The USSR and France made similar traverses coordinated through the IGY.
Although geology and topographic mapping were not part of the IGY program
because of the claims issue and the possibility of mineral resources, the over-
snow traverse parties did geologic work, where unknown mountains were dis-
covered. The oversnow traverses continued through 1966 and resulted in an
excellent first approximation of the snow surface elevation, ice thickness and
bed topography of Antarctica, as well as the mean annual temperature of that
era and snow accumulation.
The vacuum tube dictated the logistics of the oversnow traverse program. Seis-
mic equipment including heavy batteries weighed about 500 kg. Therefore a
Sno-Cat tracked vehicle was needed to carry this load. Usually three such vehi-
cles were needed for safety. Because about 3 l/km of fuel were consumed by
each Sno-Cat, about 100 kg/day of fuel per vehicle was required. A resupply
flight could carry only ~600 kg/flight (varying greatly as to range and type of
aircraft). Other than the resupply of the seven U.S. stations in Antarctica, the
major air logistic effort of the U.S. IGY program was support of the three over-
snow traverses.
The Filchner Ice Shelf Traverse, 1957-58, in which I participated, encountered
many crevasses. Vehicles broke through thin snow bridges and one man fell
deep into a crevasse. Fortunately there were no deaths and only one serious
injury resulting from crevasse accidents on the U.S. oversnow traverse pro-
gram, in contrast to an aircraft death rate of 3.8 deaths per year in the U.S.
program from 1955-61.
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The oversnow traverses, of the IGY employed the inductive method of scientific
research with only the general objectives of defining the Antarctic Ice sheet as
to surface elevation, thickness, snow accumulation and temperature. In con-
trast, Antarctic research today employs deductive logic with narrowly defined
objectives and testing of hypotheses. This change has been necessary be-
cause of expense, and competition of proposals by many scientists. None-
theless something has been lost by this approach, and there is still the need for
"exploration" types of research in the still unknown vast continent of Antarctica.
6.1 Introduction
In this paper I will concentrate on one of the U.S. IGY oversnow traverses,
based on my personal experience. All of the U.S. traverses used the same
equipment and techniques; however, the experience of each was unique. Our
general objective (along with that of other countries) was the definition of the
Antarctic Ice sheet (surface elevation, configuration, and thickness), snow
accumulation and other glaciological parameters.
"You can only go to Antarctica for the first time once!" Thus I was told, so I
recorded events conscientiously in a daily journal I kept from our departure in
November 1956 until our return in January 1958 to Buenos Aires, Argentina,
which was the basis for my IGY book (Behrendt, 1998). I am a geophysicist,
and in 1956 I had just finished my master's degree and had obtained a position
as assistant seismologist to work on the IGY glaciological program. I was a
twenty-four year old graduate student when I sailed from the U.S. Navy base at
Davisville, Rhode Island. I had romanticized Antarctic exploration since a boy,
and although the pursuit of science and a Ph.D. degree was my ostensible
purpose, the romance and adventure part was what really drew me south to the
seventh continent. What I didn't know then was that adventures in Antarctica
only happen when someone makes a mistake. My IGY trip became a turning
point in my life and led to twelve additional Antarctic trips over the past fifty
years, most recently in 2003.
When we headed to the Weddell Sea and the Filchner Ice Shelf to set up Ells-
worth Station there not only were no maps of the area, no one had ever been
there or even seen 90% of it from the air (e.g. Fig. 6-1): I first traveled to Ant-
arctica in 1956, at the beginning of the "scientific era" ushered in by the Inter-
national Geophysical Year (IGY) 1957-58. Two books1 are accounts of my
personal experiences in Antarctica from November, 1956 to March 1958 (the
IGY period), and October 1960 to March 1962 as a participant in this ambitious
undertaking. The Antarctic Treaty was negotiated and signed in 1959 largely as
the result of the peaceful cooperation and scientific success of the IGY and the
continuation of the research programs on the continent in the following years.
The Antarctic Treaty entered into force after all twelve signatories had ratified it
in 1961. No territorial claims are recognized, all preexisting claims are essen-
tially frozen, and no new claims can be made as long as the Treaty is in force
(indefinitely).
                                                
1
 Behrendt 1998, 2005.
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Figure 6-1: Map of Southern Weddell Sea - Filchner Ice Shelf area ca. 1956. From U.S. Navy
Hydrographic Office map H.O. 138. E indicates location of Ellsworth Station.
The only ostensible purpose of the Antarctic expeditions (of 12 countries) during
the IGY was the peaceful coordinated scientific study of the ice-covered conti-
nent. There were, of course, the hidden agendas of the Cold War, existing
claims of seven countries and the territorial interests of the U.S. and the USSR.
The U.S. and Russia still maintain that they have a "basis for a claim." U.S.
Navy Operations Highjump in 1946-47 and Windmill in 1948-49 were authorized
under a directive from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations,
and were assigned the political task "of consolidating and extending U.S. sover-
eignty over the largest practicable area of the Antarctic continent"2. Although I
cannot document it, the same directive or a similar one likely guided Navy Ope-
ration Deep Freeze during the IGY. Specifically not included in the IGY program
were geological research and topographic mapping because of the possible
political problems  related to potential mineral resources and competing terri-
torial claims. The Cold War was at its height and the Antarctic Treaty was still
three years in the future.
Although the IGY was a purely scientific program, the U.S. Antarctic Program
was strictly U.S. Navy (Operation Deep Freeze3) because of historic considera-
tions dating back to the Wilkes Expedition in 1840. The Byrd Expeditions of
1928-30 and 1933-35, although private, earned Richard Byrd the rank of ad-
miral. The Navy carried out Operations High Jump in 1946-47 and Windmill in
1948-49. At all of the American scientific stations except Ellsworth there was
joint station leadership consisting of a Navy officer (usually a lieutenant) in
charge of operations, and a civilian leader with responsibility for scientific re-
search.
                                                
2
 Sullivan 1957.
3 The Navy designated their activities during these years as Operation Deep Freeze I, II, III, and
IV for the austral summers of 1955 - 1956 through 1958 - 1959 respectively. The numbering
system was changed after the IGY period, starting with the International Geophysical Coopera-
tion, (IGC, one year, 1960) in that the 1959-60 austral summer season was designated Deep
Freeze 60.
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The National Science Foundation (NSF) provided much of the funding for the
scientific part of the U.S. Antarctic Program during the IGY, along with other
federal agencies, but their staff was not directly active in Antarctica. The entire
scientific program then was managed by the U.S. National Committee for the
IGY at the National Academy of Sciences and operated through the Arctic Insti-
tute of North America, which employed many of us. The big budget was the
Navy's and was funded through the Department of Defense. As planned, the
U.S. IGY expedition lasted from 1955 through 1959. By this time the NSF had
taken over the scientific program designated the U.S. Antarctic Research Pro-
gram, (USARP), which had a budget of about $6 million. The Navy budget for
Antarctica was about $20 million/year.
When we young scientists first went to Antarctica to participate in the mission-
oriented directed research of the IGY and in the USARP in the early 1960s, the
world was quite different from the undirected proposal-driven U.S. Antarctic
Program (USAP), of the 1980s-2006 period. The Cold War was at its height,
and the Navy and participating researchers accepted risks that would not be
tolerated today. The U.S. Antarctic air squadron VX-6 had an accident rate
eight times that of U.S. Naval aviation in other parts of the world at that time.
Because of these risks and U.S. strategic interests prior to the entry into force in
1961 of the Antarctic Treaty, with its disarmament and territorial claims articles,
we graduate students, and technicians (all male), of draft age, were deferred
from military service. We were also given a 25% hazardous duty pay differential
for the period we were in Antarctica.
Fifty years later the U.S. Antarctic Program, has altered dramatically, as has my
perspective as a researcher "on the ice" in each of six decades. Since the
1950s much has changed in the way Antarctic science and U.S. Antarctic expe-
ditions operate. Most notable are the presence of women, and, in descending
order, greater safety, availability of reliable maps, mail (more than once a year),
transportation (in the IGY we had to spend 15 months to get a three month field
season), fresh food during the summer, and of course technological advances
particularly in electronics, communication, computers, satellites, navigation, etc.
Fifty years ago, large areas of Antarctica, which we studied in the period de-
scribed here, were totally unmapped, and had not been seen from the air.
Albert P. Crary had overall responsibility during the IGY for the oversnow trav-
erse program comprising the three main U.S. Antarctic field projects, which
each operated for several seasons. These U.S.IGY traverses were:
(1) the Ross Ice Shelf (1957-58) and Victoria Land (1958-59), headquartered at
Little America Station on the Ross Ice Shelf under Albert (Bert) Crary;
(2) the Little America-Byrd (1957) and Sentinel Mountain (1957-58) under
Charles (Charlie) R. Bentley (geophysicist) and Verne Anderson (glaciolo-
gist) and Horlick Mountains (1958-59) under Bentley, operating out of Byrd
Station on the West Antarctic Ice sheet;
(3) the Filchner Ice Shelf (1957-58), led by Edward Thiel (geophysicist) and
Hugo Neuberg (glaciologist), and the Ellsworth-Byrd led by John Pirrit (gla-
ciologist), both out of Ellsworth Station on the Filchner Ice Shelf.
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We now know that the average thickness of the Antarctic ice sheet is about
three kilometers, much of it below sea level at its bed, but in 1956 the only clue
to this great mass was a short seismic reflection traverse by the Norwegian-
British-Swedish Expedition a few years earlier. The primary objectives of the
U.S. IGY oversnow (and three airborne) traverses, along with Soviet and
French traverses, was to measure the thickness of the Antarctic ice sheet
primarily using seismic reflections, and to determine snow accumulation and
other glaciological parameters. By 1966, we had accomplished this objective to
a first approximation, entirely from seismic reflection and gravity methods. The
radar ice-sounding method used from airplanes revolutionized the ease of ice-
thickness determination over grounded ice, but did not become routine in Ant-
arctica until the late 1960s. The ultimate objective was to ascertain whether the
Antarctic ice sheet was growing or shrinking; this is still a subject of some
disagreement.
Unlike today, carrying out Antarctic research,  under the U.S. program (and
probably others) was viewed by all scientists as a duty and obligation, rather
than a privilege. From its start with the IGY (1957-59)  there were never enough
experienced American geophysicists and glaciologists to man the U.S. over-
snow traverse program and other field research programs, in part because
women were barred from participating. Many scientists, including graduate
students, were recruited during the period 1956-66 from other countries. An
incomplete list includes: Charles Swithinbank and John Hollin, glaciologists,
Colin Bull, geophysicist (UK); Mario Giovinetto, glaciologist (Argentina); John
Pirrit, glaciologist (Scotland); Feng Keng Chaing, geophysicist (Taiwan); George
Doumani geologist-glaciologist (Lebanon); Manfred Hochstein, geophysicist,
and Peter Schoek, glaciologist-aurora observer (Germany), Franz van der
Hoeven, geophysicist (Netherlands); and Sven Evteev, glaciologist, USSR
Some of these made outstanding reputations later in either the U.S.  or their
original countries; one went to jail.
6.2 Fichner Ice Shelf Traverse, 1957-1958
Ellsworth Station was the most isolated of the seven U.S. stations because the
southern Weddell Sea is permanently covered by heavy pack ice and there was
essentially no air transportation. One person, Captain Finn Ronne, filled both
the role of civilian Station Scientific Leader and Naval Officer-in-Charge, so this
was the only U.S. IGY station without dual civilian-military command. He was 57
years old and the only member of our thirty-nine man party who had earlier Ant-
arctic experience. On the basis of his three previous winters there, he assumed
he could tell scientists how to do their work. It never occurred to our young sci-
entific party to look at it this way. Therein lay the root of our many problems
during the difficult 1957 Antarctic winter as, described in Behrendt (1998).
I traveled to Antarctica in 1956-57 (Deep Freeze II) on the Wyandot, a U.S.
Navy attack cargo ship escorted into the Weddell Sea by the Navy Wind-class
ice-breaker  Staten Island both ships of World War II vintage. In trying to reach
the site where we intended to build Ellsworth Station, we encountered very
heavy ice up to 8 m thick with many pressure ridges. The two ships, both
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seriously damaged, were beset several times for a total of 21 days. We finally
landed on 26 January, 1957 on the edge of the unexplored Filchner Ice Shelf,
and unloaded cargo and supplies for our station and for the geophysical trav-
erse. Instead of the planned 40 days for base construction, the ships departed
for home on 11 February, leaving the station only 70-90% completed (estimates
varied).
For the next several weeks the nine scientists and thirty Navy men worked
exclusively on base construction as the winter approached. During the fall and
throughout the winter we geophysicists and glaciologists carried out investiga-
tions in the area surrounding Ellsworth Station. The geophysical work included
seismic reflection and refractionsurveys and measurements of the sea tide of
the southern Weddell Sea using a gravimeter indoors at the station to measure
the rise and fall of the floating Filchner Ice Shelf. The glaciologists dug a 31-m
deep snow pit where temperature, annual snow accumulation measurements,
density, and other observations were made.
6.3 Oversnow traverse
At the time of the IGY all of us on the oversnow traverse program had to be
explorers as well as geophysicists and glaciologists. Most of Antarctica had not
been seen from the air, and even the coastline was not completely mapped.
Edward Thiel, and Hugo Neuberg (the traverse co-leaders), Finn Ronne,
Charles McCarthy, and William Sumrall (the latter two were Navy pilots) had
flown south over the ice shelf on 16 March, where they rediscovered a large rift
of unknown length, apparently blocking any direct route to the interior (Figs. 2
and 3). This was the Grand Chasm, of which Vivian Fuchs, leader of the Com-
monwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition, had seen the east end the previous
year. On 21 October, Ronne, Thiel, McCarthy, and Sumrall had made a flight
due south of Ellsworth over the high, grounded-ice of what is now named
Berkner Island, to the Dufek Massif (Fig. 6-2).
These mountains had been first seen, but mislocated, on a flight by William
Hawkes of Navy squadron VX-6 from McMurdo in January 1956. All else was
unknown and unexplored. Ronne is reported to have secretly dropped a claim
marker (i.e. the act of claiming this part of Antarctica for the United States) on
this flight4. This was the last claim made by the U.S.  in Antarctica, and is also
significant because it was made after the beginning of the IGY on 1 July, 1957.
We did not know if the high ice area was extensive. Ronne had named this
general area Edith Ronne Land (Fig. 1), based on his flight from the west on the
1946-48 Ronne Antarctic Research Expedition (RARE). Edith Ronne, his wife,
was one of the first two women to ever winter in Antarctica; both on that
expedition. It was on this flight that Ronne discovered and named Gould Bay
(Figs. 2 and 3). We did not know the extent of the Filchner Ice Shelf, or the´
configuration of the sub-ice bedrock. The only information we had on mountains
to the west was the reported existence of a peak seen by Ronne at 77o 30'S,
                                                
4
 Shapley 1985.
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Figure 6-2: Map of route of Filchner Ice Shelf Traverse, 1957-58 and selected geographic
features modified from American Geographical Society map of 1969, from Behrendt, 1998.
Traverse route (solid line) makes sharp bend around east end of Grand Chasm. Other over-
snow traverses are indicated by dotted lines.
Figure 6-3: AVHRR Satellite Image of Filchner-Ronne Ice Shelf area from U.S. Geological Sur-
vey. Compare Figs. 6-1 and 6-2. The Grand Chasm (Fig. 6-2) is visible in this 1970 image, but
is larger than in 1957.
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71o40'W, where we hoped to meet or at least intersect the track of the Byrd
StationTraverse.
Finally, after three months at sea, a troubled and difficult winter at Ellsworth,
and an intense few weeks of preparation, five of us (Edward Thiel, chief
seismologist, John Behrendt, assistant seismologist, Hugo Neuberg, chief
glaciologist, Paul Walker, assistant glaciologist, and Nolan Aughenbaugh,
geologist) left on an oversnow traverse across the essentially unexplored area
south of the Weddell Sea coast. We were soon to find out whether the estab-
lishment of Ellsworth Station three kilometers south of the sloping ice front of
the Filchner Ice Shelf had left us a reasonable route into the interior of Antarc-
tica, or left us isolated us north of the Grand Chasm.
Our primary objective was the measurement of the snow-surface configuration,
the ice thickness, and the depth to underlying bedrock, using seismic reflection
and gravity methods. We would measure snow accumulation, average annual
temperature, and other glaciological characteristics of the ice sheet, make
observations of Earth's magnetic and gravity fields, study the geology of any
mountains we encountered, and make other scientific observations as were
presented.
On the Wyandot and Staten Island we had determined that a 1200 m-deep
trough, of unknown trend, existed beneath the Filchner Ice Shelf front, and that
the water depth was only about 300 m to the west along the front of the Ronne
Ice Shelf (Fig. 2). On the oversnow traverse, we defined this Thiel Trough
beneath the Filchner Ice Shelf curving south of Berkner Island (Fig. 2, where it
is 1700 m deep) on the basis of our seismic and gravity soundings.
6.4 Traverse operations
On 28 October, 1957, our five-man party left Ellsworth with two Sno-Cats (the
other U.S. IGY traverses had three or four) each pulling a 2.5-ton sled filled with
fuel, food, explosives-, and all of our scientific and other equipment. For the
next 81 days we made a geophysical-glaciological reconnaissance of the
Filchner-Ronne Ice Shelf area, and made the first geologic observations of the
Dufek Massif.
I put in my first magnetic station near Ellsworth and we then headed southeast,
taking  gravity,  magnetic, and  altitude observations  every 8 km (Fig. 6-4).  We
used the gravity  and magnetic measurements to study the variations in density
and magnetic properties of rock beneath the ice, and therefore to make
inferences about the ice-covered geologic features. We also used the gravity
data to determine the depth to bedrock between the seismic reflection stations.
This is possible because the rock is much denser than the ice or water. The
lower the gravity, the deeper the bedrock. We had a radio in each vehicle, and
the drivers were in constant contact using headphones to hear over the roar of
the engines and the clatter of the vehicle tracks.
Steps of Foundation – Proceedings of the 1st Workshop of the SCAR History Action Group
88
Figure 6-4: Traverse at intermediate station. Behrendt reading magnetometer at left. Walker and
Aughenbaugh making snow hardness measurement left background. Thiel on track of Sno-Cat
after making a gravity measurement. Crevasse detector visible on lead vehicle (Photograph by
John Behrendt).
The logistics of our traverse were dictated by the fact that state-of-the-art elect-
ronics at the time depended on the vacuum tube, rather than the solid-state
electronic microcircuits available today. The hundreds of tubes in our seismic
system required large amounts of battery power produced by two 250 amp-hour
truck batteries weighing 80 kg each. The only recording system was the heavy
oscillograph "camera" with its tanks of photographic solutions (Fig. 6-5).
Figure 6-5: Behrendt operating seismic reflection equipment mounted inside Sno-Cat (Photo-
graph by John Behrendt).
Altogether the seismic Sno-Cat carried a total load of about 500 kg of electronic
equipment, gravimeter, magnetometer and seismic batteries. Counting the
weight of two people in the vehicle, we carried about the maximum allowable
load. Each Sno-Cat used about 3 l of fuel (gasoline) per km or about 200 kg for
a 50-km day for two vehicles. This fuel - a little more than one barrel per day -
would determine how frequently we needed resupply by the two available
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single-engine Otter aircraft. These planes could only carry a few barrels of gas
in one trip depending on our range out of Ellsworth. Their maximum allowed
range was only 460 km from the base, although they exceeded this limit on
several occasions.
Unlike many Antarctic field parties today, we could not have used snowmobiles
(which had not yet been developed) because of our heavy loads. There were
two other significant reasons for using the high fuel-consuming Sno-Cats on the
traverses. The first was safety. A Sno-Cat was the lightest snow-pressure vehi-
cle available at that time, which proved very important in crossing crevasses.
Also, because we were a working scientific field party, not an adventure expedi-
tion, any convenience in general camping greatly speeded up our progress. We
slept in the Sno-Cats, so on a number of occasions when we had been up for
24 hours or more, it took less than a minute to crawl into a sleeping bag after
stopping for the "night," or after downing a quick meal. Putting up and taking
down Scott tents, commonly used by geologists in semi stationary Antarctic field
camps today, would have been time consuming and inconvenient for a field
party moving every day. This was particularly true when stopping in a storm or
when surrounded by invisible bridged crevasses. Several years later, when I led
a traverse with three vehicles, we traveled with one six kilometers ahead of the
other two for barometric altimeter corrections.
Navigation over the course of a day's travel was by dead reckoning using the
gyro compass mounted in the lead Sno-Cat, #1. A few years later the U.S.
traverses changed to magnetic compasses mounted in the Sno-Cats, which
were an improvement because of the fragility of the gyro compasses. Despite
the conventional wisdom, magnetic compasses work well in Antarctica, except
possibly very close to the magnetic pole about 2000 km from our traverse area.
About every 40-60 km, Neuberg, our navigator, measured the exact position of
the sun using a theodolite on a tripod. He determined the time with a chrono-
meter that was checked with a time signal from the U.S. National Bureau of
Standards radio station WWV, which we received well. He then calculated our
position using a slide rule (pocket calculators did not exist) to better than 200 m
accuracy using a nautical almanac. It was easy to steer a Sno-Cat in a straight
line despite the weaving, which averaged out. Therefore, we could correct the
dead reckoning positions of the 8-km spaced gravity and magnetic stations
along our route, every day that we stopped for station work, using the accurate
position obtained from the sun shots.
Steering the Sno-Cats on a planned course, with compasses and odometers,
was amazingly accurate. In 1960-61 I navigated by dead reckoning to poles left
by an earlier traverse and later to a field camp in zero visibility caused by blow-
ing snow. Unlike ships and airplanes, Sno-Cats did not drift sideways. Traveling
at only 5-8 km per hour, they did not get very far off course in 8-12 hours.
We had no geographic information, so we used a blank gridded chart as does a
ship plotting its position at sea. In this manner we mapped the course of our
traverse and any features of the snow surface that we could observe. As our
horizon was quite limited, the process somewhat resembled blind men attempt-
ing to describe an elephant.
Steps of Foundation – Proceedings of the 1st Workshop of the SCAR History Action Group
90
6.5 Crevasses
About 10 km out of Ellsworth Station, the sled behind the lead vehicle broke
through a snow bridge into a crevasse, and sank about a meter, but was pulled
out by the Sno-Cat without stopping. This minor incident set the pace for the
entire 2100-km long oversnow traverse. Crevasses are tension or shear frac-
tures in the ice shelf, having steep vertical sides and extending from 20 to >100
m deep. This small crevasse was probably about 20 m deep, pinching out at the
bottom, but we generally could not see the bottom when looking down. The
extreme case on our traverse was the Grand Chasm (Figs. 2 and 3), which
extended entirely through the 700-m thick ice shelf there. With essential guid-
ance by radio from a single-engine Otter aircraft we negotiated our way safely
through the complex crevasse pattern at the east end of the Grand Chasm.
Although we commonly saw open crevasses on the traverse, the ones that
gave us the most trouble were bridged with snow and could not usually be seen
from the surface as we drove along. Sometimes we could safely drive across
snow bridges, but other times we broke through. The Sno-Cats were nearly as
safe as a man on skis because of their relatively low weight and four wide-
tracked pontoons. It is much easier to see bridged crevasses from the air, but
this method is severely limited, even when a plane is flying directly over the
terrain.
The lead vehicle had a crevasse detector mounted in it projecting about 6 m
ahead (Fig. 6-4), but it was never of much use to us. There were many false
indications or indications of crevasses with bridges too thick to concern us. This
detector was probably meant as a surveying instrument; as such, during the
unloading of the ship it might have been useful in locating dangerous spots on
the route to the camp. However, at the five to eight kilometers per hour we were
attempting, it was not effective. When we encountered serious problems, we
realized from the start that we had to leave the Sno-Cats and search out each
crevasse out with long T-handled tubular aluminum probes. We traveled in
Figure 6-6 (left): Sno-Cat and sled broken into hidden bridged crevasse. Note T-handled probe,
ice-axe, and crevasse detector extending forward of Sno-Cat (Photograph by John Behrendt).
Figure 6-7 (right): Man trapped in narrow crevasse after breaking through thin snow bridge. He
was uninjured and rescued using a wire-rope ladder (Photograph by John Behrendt).
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crevassed terrain most of the 81 days of the traverse; several times vehicles
and sleds broke through (e.g. Fig. 6-6), and one man fell in about 10 m (Fig. 6-
7), but was rescued safely. crevassed terrain most of the 81 days of the trav-
erse; several times vehicles and sleds broke through (e.g. Fig. 6-6), and one
man fell in about 10 m (Fig. 6-7), but was rescued safely.
Radio communication with Ellsworth Station was very difficult throughout the
traverse, not only because our 7.5-watt transceivers were not very powerful, but
also partly because we were on an ice shelf floating on seawater - a good elec-
trical conductor. There were periods of time when we had no radio contact for
several weeks and several hundred kilometers of travel. Today lack of radio
contact for even a day is cause of concern, and probable launch of a search
and rescue flight.
All our cooking was done outdoors on a large "white" gasoline stove. In contrast
with the 200 kg of fuel we burned in the vehicles, the weight of any food we
carried was negligible. Because of this we dined very well on fresh-frozen food
including a 3-kg beef tenderloin every other day. Because there were many
delays caused by crevasses and vehicle breakdowns, we gradually found our-
selves (in the 24-hour daylight) on a 36-hour schedule: 12 hours science, 12
hours travel and 12 hours sleep (interrupted by huge meals).
6.6 Seismic and glaciology observations
We spaced seismic-glaciology stations at about one day of travel distance apart
(~50-60 km). The geophysical measurements at these consisted of a seismic
reflection  sounding  (Fig. 6-8)  to  measure  the  depth  to  bedrock and seismic
Figure 6-8: Geophysicist firing small explosive charge to obtain reflection from the base of the
ice. The reflected energy was picked up by 24 small geophones connected to 330-m long
cables and recorded in Sno-Cat (see Fig. 6-5). Box on Nitramon explosives in foreground.
Chest reel for seismic cable is shown (Photograph by T. Laudon).
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measurement of the increase in sound velocity (and thus snow density) with
increasing depth. We would lay out our 330-m seismic cables in an L shape,
which we unrolled from reels carried on our chests. We would then hand drill a
2-9-m-deep shot hole at the apex of the L. We fired a small explosive charge of
0.5-2 kg of ammonium nitrate detonated with an electric blasting cap and a 0.5-
kg high-explosive primer charge. The sound waves penetrated to the ice-water
contact (in the case of the floating ice shelf) and to the water-rock (or ice-rock)
contact and reflected back to the surface where they were picked up by the
geophones. Each of the 24 geophones was attached to one of the channels in
the cables. The seismic signals were amplified and recorded on photographic
paper for each of the channels. On a few occasions the wet paper record froze
in my hands as I wrote the data on the back. We could identify the reflection by
noting the wave form on each channel at slightly longer times, the farther the
geophones were from the shot point at the center of the "spread" at the Sno-
Cat. Because we knew the velocity of the sound wavesin the snow, ice, and
seawater beneath the ice shelf, we could calculate the depths to the various
reflectors The L-shaped array allowed determination of the dip of the underlying
bed of the ice.
There was some hazard associated with laying out the cables when we were
working in crevassed areas. In these cases we skied, which offered some pro-
tection. We also used skis when we were not in areas of known crevasses, if
the snow was soft. Neuberg and Walker used a two- or three-meter pit in the
snow  (Figs. 6-9  and  6-10) to measure snow accumulation and other glacio-
logical parameters such as density and temperature. In addition to the snow pit,
Figure 6-9 (left): Walker digging snow pit on traverse for glaciological measurements
(Photograph by John Behrendt).
Figure 6-10 (Right): Hiro Shimizu measuring snow stratigraphy for accumulationdetermination
in piton Antarctic Peninsula Traverse (1961-62). Note thermometers at 10-cm intervals in pit
wall (Photograph by John Behrendt).
they would hand drill a hole 9 m deep and place an electric-resistance tempera-
ture probe on a cable in the bottom. This would come to equilibrium "overnight"
and the average annual temperature of the surrounding area was obtained.
This is possible because the winter-temperature cold waves and the alternate
summer-temperature warm waves damp out essentially to a constant  tempe-
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rature at that depth after several years.The mean annual temperature was
measured this way to an accuracy of about 0.1o C at intervals of 40-50 km on
thousands of kilometers of oversnow traverses crossing Antarctica. If repeat
measurements were made at some of these locations today, any global warm-
ing greater than about a half a degree during the intervening 40-50 years could
be detected.
Figure 6-11: Sno-Cats approaching Dufek Massif (Photograph by John Behrendt).
After many crevasse problems, we climbed and crossed Berkner Island, and
arrived at the Dufek Massif on 9 December, 1957 (Figs. 6-2 and 6-11). We
spent six days making geologic observations and exploring the range, before
heading northwest across what is now named the Ronne Ice Shelf. Our farthest
point just northwest of Korff Island was reached on 1 January, 1958. Because
we were beyond the range of the single engine Otter aircraft supporting our
party, we retraced our route several hundred kilometers. During one 24-hour
period we drove the Sno-Cats 224 km, which may still be a record for a tracked
vehicle in Antarctica. We were evacuated by air to Ellsworth on 17 January,
leaving the vehicles and equipment for the men who would replace us.
6.7 Accomplishments
The main scientific accomplishments of the 2100-km Filchner Ice Shelf trav-
erse5 were to a first approximation:
(1) Mapping of the surface and bedrock topography of the Filchner-Ronne Ice
Shelf area including the 1200-1700-m-deep Thiel Trough beneath the Filch-
ner Ice Shelf; our results showed that the Filchner-Ronne Ice Shelf area
(Figs. 6-2 and 6-3) is >400,000 km2 in contrast to the ~80,000 km2 shown on
the earlier maps (Fig. 6-1); Berkner and Korff Islands and Henry Ice Rise
were crossed and approximately delineated (Fig. 6-2);
(2) Measurements of snow accumulation, mean annual temperature and other
glacial parameters; and
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(3) A geological reconnaissance of the Dufek Massif, part of a large mafic
intrusion; there are "dry valleys" and melt ponds containing algae (which
were sampled and identified).
In 1990 the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting approved Special Reserved
Area (SRA) and Special Protected Area (SPA) status for the dry valley (Davis
Valley) and ponds (Forlidas Ponds), respectively as a result of my submission
of a draft management plan.
The other U.S. IGY traverses and those of other countries produced similar
results. In six years, the approximate snow surface and bed contour of Antar-
ctica were mapped (Figs. 6-12 and 6-13).
Figure 6-12: Map of Antarctic ice-surface topography as known in 1962 (from Bentley 1964).
6.8 Opportunities for Young Scientists in ÍGY
Although we scientists who went to Antarctica, in the IGY, were certainly "inno-
cents," as I have suggested6, I admit to being somewhat disingenuous when I
also used that term to apply to the scientific planners of the oversnow traverse
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Figure 6-13: Map of rock-surface elevations as known in 1962 (from Bentley 1964).
program. They had no Antarctic experience, but were seasoned researchers
who had recently come through the applied research programs of World War II,
working with the military and using the inductive approach had, not serendipit-
ously, made great scientific advances. They took us young Ph.D.s and graduate
students and threw us to the wolves; they expected us to manage without
supervision for a year and produce results. We did.
Because we "innocents," who headed south in 1956, were born during the
Great Depression and were part of a generation few in number, in contrast to
the baby-boomers who followed, we had a tremendous advantage in starting
our careers just as large increases in research funding were made after World
War II, particularly as a result of Sputnik and the Cold War. We advanced
rapidly in our careers in the 1960s, not because we were better than today's
young scientists but because we were one or two orders of magnitude fewer
(with an order of magnitude more money for research compared with pre-IGY
times). Nevertheless, what I miss now as an Antarctic scientist is not primarily
the money, but the sense of excitement that can only come when a scientist is
among the first to investigate a vast unknown area without restriction or inhi-
bition.
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6.9 Conclusions
Over the course of my scientific career (since the International Geophysical
Year), I have come to realize how much the research methods I learned half a
century ago established the pattern I have followed ever since. What we geo-
physicists and glaciologists set out to do in the IGY in the oversnow traverse
program had only the very general objective of determining the three-dimensio-
nal configuration of the Antarctic ice sheet and, ultimately, of discovering wheth-
er it was increasing or decreasing in size. As broad and unfocussed as our re-
search might seem by today's standards, we found many scientifically signific-
ant and interesting results through inductive reasoning. That is, we looked
around Antarctica in a general way to see what we could find. This method had
inspired the establishment of the U.S. Geological Survey in 1879. George
Woollard used inductive reasoning in making and interpreting a gravity map of
the U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s and so did Maurice Ewing when he set out to
study the ocean floor.
The inductive method has probably resulted in the greatest geological and
geophysical discoveries, but it is no longer in fashion7. Now we mostly use the
deductive method, which begins with a specific hypothesis or question and then
searches -- not broadly, but narrowly -- for evidence to support or reject the
hypothesis. In the current climate the deductive method is necessary for writing
scientific proposals to funding agencies for expensive research programs with
shrinking funds.
Sadly, the inductive approach to research planning appears to be no longer
viable. Because of the large number of excellent scientists competing for limited
resources for work in Antarctica and elsewhere, careful attention must be paid
to the specific problem being investigated and its importance relative to com-
peting, and more or less equally significant proposals. Perhaps there is no other
way, but much of the excitement of heading into the unknown which we experi-
enced in the IGY, is missing today. I am referring not just to the fact that Antarc-
tica was still largely unexplored then, but also to the attitude of seeing and
sampling and mapping everything. Although sharply focussed research is pos-
sible today because of our results 50 years ago, still, for example, much geo-
physical "exploration" is still necessary using modern techniques to define the
crustal geology beneath the ice.
Because of hidden agendas related to the Cold War, U.S. (and possibly Soviet)
scientists felt that Antarctic research was a duty rather than the privilege it is
considered today. The U.S. air program averaged 3.8 deaths per year from
1955-61 in contrast to 0.1 deaths per year since 1970. At least three U.S. sci-
entists died in the early period of the U.S. program, (including Edward Thiel, co-
leader of the Filchner Ice Shelf raverse, who died with four others while making
airborne geophysical measurements in 1961). When, if ever, do the ends justify
the means? It is one thing if mature individual researchers, professional techni-
cians, aviators, and others take risks with full awareness of the hazards. But it is
quite another thing if relatively naive graduate students and new Ph.D.s looking
for adventure, such as my colleagues and I in the 1956-1962 period, are sent
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into harm's way without knowing specifically what they will face. Ambitious
senior researchers pursuing their personal scientific objectives, even though
these may be of vital national and international importance, have traditionally
used younger scientists that way. I have worked both sides of this street in the
past 50 years. Field science has always been risky even before Darwin set out
on the Beagle and likely will continue to be so. I have been one of those willing
to take these risks, but I have lost a number of friends and colleagues to re-
search in Antarctica and elsewhere. I am not so sure I could recommend this
path to others. I think it is essential that graduate students and other young
assistants be well informed of the risks they will be taking. Then they can decide
whether the results are worth it.
The International Polar Year (2007-08) is commencing and again there will be
great opportunities for young researchers and students. However, Antarctic
research today is relatively mature and there are a much greater number of
young scientists. In contrast the U.S. IGY oversnow traverse program had to
recruit from abroad to fill a couple of dozen positions. Substantially more effort
will be needed to insure opportunities for those inspired by the outreach pro-
grams sponsored by the U.S. Antarctic Program,  in the U.S. and comparable
programs integrated within the overall international effort. It is apparent from my
observations of Antarctic studies in the last decade that many excellent young
scientists educated through Antarctic research activities, must search else-
where to find fulfilling careers. Because of the rigorous demands of Antarctic
research, they will be well prepared for alternative careers in science or science
related fields.
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In 1820, the Russian expedition headed by Faddey Faddeevich Bellingshausen
(1778-1852) and Mikhail Petrovich Lazarev (1788-1971) onboard the sloops
Vostok and Mirny discovered the Southern polar continent after circumnavigat-
ing it. The Russian sailors directly approached the shores of the unknown land
nine times. It is quite natural that limited information about the new continent
available at the beginning of the nineteenth century did not allow F.F. Bellings-
hausen and M.P. Lazarev to make the conclusions about the scale of their
geographical discovery. Recognition of this scientific and seafaring deed came
much later when the British explorer John Murray (1841-1914) proposed the
name of the southern polar continent – Antarctica In his report presented in
1886 at the session of the Scottish Geographical Society, he combined the
routes of different national expeditions to this Earth’s area, which served as a
basis for the first mapped contours of the Antarctic continent. In this work, the
achievement of Russian seamen clearly demonstrated their enormous contrib-
ution and priority.
During preparation of the Second International Polar Year (IPY) 1932-33 Soviet
investigators proposed the program of the USSR Antarctic expedition, its aim
including organization of the polar station on Peter I Island and oceanographic
studies of the Ross Sea from board the Aleut, one of the ships of the Soviet
whaling fleet. However due to some organizational causes, this section of the
Second IPY program,  was not realized.
The USSR started regular Antarctic studies in 1956 when the logistics and
methodological preparation for a grandiose research program – the Internatio-
nal Geophysical Year (IGG) (1957-58) - began. On July 13, 1955, the USSR
Council of Ministers issued a Decree about the organization of a Complex Ant-
arctic Expedition (CAE) of the USSR Academy of Science. The USSR Academy
of Science was entrusted with supervision of the expedition studies, and the
Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route of the USSR Ministry of Marine
Fleet was made responsible for the logistics support. The Arctic Research
Institute whose staff had a very rich experience of organizing studies on the
coast, islands and drifting ice of the Arctic Ocean was in the structure of the
latter. This fact determined the appointment of the known polar explorer Hero of
the Soviet Union the AARI Deputy Director Mikhail Mikhailovich Somov (1908-
1973) to the position of the Head of the first CAE by the Presidium of the USSR
Academy of Science.
On November 30, 1955, the diesel-electric ship Ob departed from Kaliningrad
for its first Antarctic cruise. A known polar navigator Ivan Alexandrovich Man
(1903-1982) was the ship’s master. On January 5, 1956, the ship approached
the Davis Sea coast where on February 13, the first Soviet Antarctic station
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called by the name of the sloop of the Russian expedition of 1819-1821 Mirny
was opened. In 1956-1958, the CAE personnel opened Oasis station in the
Bunger Oasis and the inland stations - Pionerskaya, Komsomolskaya, Sovet-
skaya, Pole of Inaccessibility and Vostok, (Fig. 7-1). The main task of these
stations was to provide national studies in Antarctica and support the participa-
tion in forthcoming IGY. Actually they had the same scientific program. Mirny
was the biggest one. The latter had an amazing destiny: it was to become the
center of geophysical studies in the vicinity of the South Geomagnetic Pole. On
Figure 7-1: Antarctic stations and field bases of the USSR 1956 –1958.
July 21, 1983, the absolute minimum surface air temperature of -89.2° С  was
recorded here. Later, the deepest in the world ice borehole of 3623 m was
drilled at Vostok station (1999), and directly beneath the station, the largest
sub-glacial lake was discovered that received the same name.
The IGY period has become the beginning of the regular and multi-profile
Soviet studies of the ice continent and the Southern Ocean seas washing it. At
the end of the twentieth century the Antarctic investigations of the Soviet Union
and at recent time of Russia were not stopped even for a day. For the past 50
years, the work magnitude changed but its character remained the same: the
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national Antarctic expedition carried out research studies at permanently oper-
ating stations, seasonal field bases, in sledge-caterpillar traverses, by means of
aviation and during the voyages of research vessels.
After completing the IGY Program, the expedition changed its name from the
Complex to the Soviet Expedition, and on June 19, 1959 by the Decree of the
USSR Council of Ministers the supervision of the expedition was passed from
the USSR Academy of Science to the USSR Ministry of Marine Fleet with the
Arctic Institute being in its structure. From this time onward the institute was
called the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI), and the Soviet Ant-
arctic Expedition (SAE) has become one of its divisions preserving its inter-
agency purpose. Specialists of different research and scientific-production
organizations participated traditionally in the expedition work: Hydrometeoro-
logical Service, Ministry of Geology, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Education,
Cartographic Service and the Academy of Science. By the decision of the
USSR Council of Ministers of May 18, 1963, the AARI together with the Soviet
Antarctic Expedition was transferred to the Main Administration of the Hydro-
meteorological Service under the USSR Council of Ministers. On August 7,
1992 by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation the Soviet
Antarctic Expedition was renamed to the Russian Antarctic Expedition (RAE),
and its supervision and control was assigned to the Federal Service for Hydro-
meteorology and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromet).
The 50-year period of regular national studies in the Antarctic can be divided
into 3 stages. The first stage (1955-69) was a reconnaissance one. The main
aspect at that time was investigation of natural objects and processes in the
Southern Polar Area. After the end of the IGY, the Oasis, Pionerskaya, Komso-
molskaya and the Pole of Inaccessibility stations were closed and instead of
them Novolazarevskaya (1961), Molodezhnaya (1963) and Bellingshausen
(1968) stations were opened. (Fig. 7-2).
A large volume of glaciological, geomagnetic , seismic, gravimetric and meteo-
rological studies in the central areas of Antarctica was carried out by means of
special logistics and research sledge-caterpillar traverses, the methodology for
their conduct and the technical equipment being developed exactly during the
first expedition period. A large number of Russian geographical names of moun-
tains, capes, bays, inlets, coasts, lakes and other objects appeared on the
maps. The outstanding achievements of this period include the discovery of the
sub-glacial Gamburtsev Mountains in the area of the Pole of Relative Inacces-
sibility and of a vast mountainous plain in the bedrock relief of the continent –
the IGY Valley.
An important result of this stage was the Atlas of the Antarctic in two volumes
(1966 and 1969) that was awarded the USSR State Prize. The expeditional
activity in Antarctica during the first stage are closely connected with internatio-
nal collaboration and the political-legal issues of activity in the Antarctic. In
1959, 12 countries (Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Great Britain, New Zealand,
Norway, the USSR, the USA, France, Chile, South African Republic and Japan)
signed the International Antarctic Treaty that determined the basis for interstate
relations in the region.
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The second stage of the studies (1970-90) was mainly devoted to investigations
of the natural Antarctic resources. On March 9, 1966, the Decision of the USSR
Council of Ministers “On measures for further development of the Soviet studies
in the Antarctica” appeared that determined the strategy of activity of the state
in the region for a multiyear perspective. New stations were established in the
Pacific Ocean sector of Antarctica: Leningradskaya (1971) and Russkaya
(1980). The number of the year round operating national stations in the South-
ern Polar Area comprised eight stations (Molodezhnaya, Mirny, Vostok, Novola-
zarevskaya,  Bellingshausen,  Leningradskaya,  Progress  and  Russkaya),  and
Figure 7-2: Antarctic stations and field bases of the USSR 1959-1969.
their location allowed obtaining information practically from the entire continent
(Fig. 7-3). No other country at that time possessed such an infrastructure in
Antarctica.
In 1975, a research-expedition vessel was built at the Kherson shipyard (U-
kraine) for marine studies in the Antarctic and for support of the expedition. It
was named Mikhail Somov after the Head of the first national expedition to the
Antarctic. In the late 1960s, the traditional areas of commercial fishery in the
World Ocean were significantly restricted, therefore many states including our
country, paid attention to the biologically rich waters of the Southern Ocean.
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Arrival of the Soviet fishery fleet to the Antarctic necessitated special oceano-
graphic and biological studies, and higher quality hydrometeorological and
hydrographic support for shipping. For this purpose, methods for receiving
satellite images of the ocean and the continent surface were introduced at the
Soviet Antarctic stations, and a complex of upper-air sounding was supple-
mented with launches of upper-air geophysical rockets at Molodezhnaya
station. All national stations and ships operating in the Antarctic transmitted
information on the state of weather and ice conditions to this station, which
served as a basis  for operational forecasts  with different periods  (from several
Figure 7-3: Antarctic stations and field bases of the USSR 1970-1990.
hours to one or two days or more depending on the request) in advance. These
data together with current information were disseminated to the national and
foreign users.
From 1982, equipment of the Soviet Antarctic stations with satellite communica-
tion systems began expanding significantly the possibilities of information trans-
mission from Antarctica to any Earth’s region. In these years, the Soviet naval
hydrography specialists prepared a large number of navigation charts and man-
uals for ensuring safety of shipping in the Southern Ocean where the Soviet
vessels operated.
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Specialized fishery studies were made by VNIRO (Vsesouzniy Nauchno-issledi-
vatelskiy Institute Rybnogo khoziaistva I Okeanographii - Soviet Research Insti-
tute for Fisheries and Oceanography) specialists onboard the R/V “Akademik
Knipovich” and also by specialists of Atlant VNIRO (Atlanticheskiy Nauchno-
issledivatelskiy Institute Rybnogo khoziaistva I Okeanographii - Atlantic Re-
search Institute for Fisheries and Oceanography), AzCherNERO (Azovsko-
Chernomorskiy Nauchno-issledivatelskiy Institute Rybnogo khoziaistva I Okea-
nographii – Southern Research Institute for Fisheries and Oceanography) and
TINRO (Tikhookeanskiy Nauchno-issledivatelskiy Institute khoziaistva I Okea-
nographii - Pacific Research Institute for Fisheries and Oceanography) onboard
the ships of their organizations. The oceanographic studies of Antarctic waters
were supplemented by the annual voyages of the R/V Professor Viese and the
Professor Zubov of the AARI (1974 to 1988) under the POLEX-SOUTH Pro-
gram.
A leading role during the second expedition stage belonged to specialists of the
USSR Ministry of Geology and the Main Administration of Geodesy and Carto-
graphy under the USSR Council of Ministers. From 1972 the Soviet geological-
geophysical studies were made at large seasonal field bases that were orga-
nized in different regions of West and East Antarctica: Druzhnaya-1 (1975-
1985), Druzhnaya-2 (1982), Druzhnaya-3 (1986), Druzhnaya-4 (from 1987-up to
present) and Soyuz (1982-1988) (Fig. 7-3). Using seasonal field bases, many
areas of the mountain rock outcrops above the ice sheet surface were investi-
gated and their perspectives for minerals were determined. From 1986, marine
geophysical studies of the sedimentary rock strata in the marginal seas of Ant-
arctica began. Taking into account a large significance of resource studies of
the Antarctic region, this direction of SAE activity was officially stressed in 1985
by the Decision of the USSR Council of Ministers “On measures for intensifica-
tion of geological-geophysical activity in the Antarctic and strengthening of the
logistics base for this activity”. For conducting the field geological exploration
operations, a permanent Progress Base was established in East Antarctica
(1988). Practically all geological activities were performed by specialists of the
Leningrad scientific-production association “Sevmorgeologiya”. The Leningrad
enterprise “Aerogeodesiya” was commissioned with the cartographic support for
this work.
Expansion of seasonal operations of geologists and geodesists on the continent
resulted in the need for a significant increase of the fleet of ships performing
transport expedition operations. In some years their number comprised 7
vessels when the scientific-expedition vessel was supplemented by two ice-
strengthened dry cargo transport ships, a tanker, two passenger vessels and a
research ship. In 1987, for providing the SAE activity, a new research-expe-
dition vessel the Akademik Fedorov was built at the Finnish shipyard – the best
equipped ship at that time among special Antarctic vessels. It could move
unescorted in ice up to 1.5 m thick, had large holds, a helicopter pad and a
hangar and two powerful 50-ton cranes. The ship could accommodate 250
people including 75 crew members.
In 1980, construction of the snow-ice air strip suitable for receiving heavy trans-
port wheeled aircraft IL18 was completed at Molodezhnaya station. Later a
similar ice air field was built at Novolazarevskaya station. In 1986, the IL76 TD
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aircraft made its first flight to Antarctica from Moscow. The air strips were con-
structed from compacted snow using a unique national technology developed
by specialists of the design institute “Lenaeroprojekt”. Regular flights of aircraft
IL18 and IL76 TD from our country to Antarctica continued until 1991. The use
of transcontinental flights significantly extended the possibilities of conducting
seasonal field work of the expedition and allowed investigation of the structure
of geophysical fields in the central regions of Antarctica. Specialists of the
USSR Ministry of Geology began to actively use the flying geophysical labora-
tory at the base of aircraft IL18D. In the 1980s, the SAE wintering team com-
prised 320 people and the seasonal team - 350 without taking into account the
crews of marine ships. During this period, active work in the Antarctic was
undertaken by specialists of Goskomhydromet, Ministry of Geology, Ministry of
Fishery, Ministry of Defence, the Main Administration of Geodesy and Carto-
graphy, Ministry for Education, and the USSR Academy of Science. Internatio-
nal cooperation of Soviet scientists with their colleagues from other countries
has significantly increased. Whereas at the first stage of the studies it consisted
predominantly in exchange of specialists who worked in the Antarctic Programs
of other states, joint specialized projects and full-scale experiments were carried
out at the second stage.
One of the most important projects of that time was deep drilling of the ice sheet
that was made at Vostok station jointly with the scientists of France and the
USA. Ice drilling was carried out by specialists of the Leningrad Mining Institute
using technology and equipment, which they have specially developed. Com-
prehensive analyses of the ice core from the borehole allowed a detailed
investigation of the paleo-climatic changes over four glacial-interglacial cycles
throughout 420 kyr and by the general recognition of the world scientific com-
munity it was the outstanding achievement of the late twentieth century in the
study of our planet. Other important international projects at this stage included
the Russian-American oceanographic activities of the R/V Mikhail Somov in the
recurring polynya of the Weddell Sea in 1981 and the study of the Weddell Sea
Gyre in the Antarctic winter of 1989 from aboard the R/V Akademik Fedorov
and the German vessel Polarstern.
The development of the Antarctic Treaty continued with new acts of the inter-
national law appearing on its basis. In 1972, the Convention on the Conserv-
ation of Antarctic Seals was adopted and in 1980 – the Convention on the Con-
servation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. The need for these documents
was dictated by the concern of the international community in regulating the use
of Antarctic resources. The problem was connected not only with the biological
resources of the Southern Ocean, but also with the minerals potential of the
region. In 1988, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Re-
source Activities  was adopted. However, the Convention never came into force
due to refusal of the authorities of Australia and France to ratify it, technological
capabilities of more developed western countries and the USSR, and on the
other hand, due to a significant increase of the nature protection process in
many democratic countries characteristic of the second half of the 1980s. This
resource problem has considerably increased the number of the countries ac-
cessing the Antarctic Treaty from 15 in 1970 to 42 in 1990.
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As the major results of the second period of activities of the national Antarctic
Program, one can consider revealing the perspectives for minerals in many
regions of Antarctica, investigation of paleo-climate for more than 400 kyr,
discovery of the phenomenon of anabiosis of microorganisms in the Antarctic
ice cores, determination of new integral indicators of the perturbation of geo-
magnetic fields in the “polar caps” of Antarctica and the Arctic and  development
and introduction of the construction technology of snow-ice air strips in Antarc-
tica for receiving heavy transport wheeled aircraft.
Many of these results could be obtained only after the new technologies for
conducting the expedition operations were introduced, which include: construc-
tion and introduction into operation of special scientific-expedition vessels;
regular transcontinental flights of transport airplanes; introduction of remote-
geophysical methods of investigating the continental bedrock, ice sheet and the
sedimentary mantle of the seas; introduction of satellite technologies for
receiving-transmitting different types of information at the Antarctic stations,
creation of a large-scale observation network in all strategically important
regions of Antarctica.
The third – current stage of the national Antarctic studies that began in 1991
can be conventionally characterized as investigation of the role and place of the
Antarctic in the global natural and social processes. For our country it was
inseparably connected with the cardinal changes in the political and economical
mechanisms of the state. Russia has become the successor of the Soviet Union
in all issues of Antarctic studies. On August 7, 1992, this fact was officially
registered by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation B.N.
Yeltsin.
The late 1980s – early 1990s were marked by a sharp decrease of the budget
capabilities of the state. Three Antarctic stations had to be closed: Russkaya in
1990, Leningradskaya in 1991 and Molodezhnaya in 1998 and the expedition
personnel and the logistics support of the stations were significantly reduced.
Only two ships going to the Antarctic were left - the R/V Mikhail Somov and the
Akademik Fedorov, rather than a fleet of ships. In 1991, the IL76 TD airplane
made its last transcontinental flight to Antarctica. The number of participants of
the winter and seasonal expedition decreased to 240 people.
The situation has drastically changed in 1997 when the decision of the Russian
Federation Government “On the activity of the Russian Antarctic Expedition”
was published. It envisaged some minimum level of the expedition activity
below which it could not fall.
The main indicators of the RAE activity were determined: numbers of the sea-
sonal team - 80 people, wintering team - 90; the year-round operating stations –
Mirny, Vostok, Novolazarevskaya, Progress and Bellingshausen, seasonal field
bases – Druzhnaya-4 and Molodezhnaya (Fig. 7- 4); the expedition vessels –
the R/V of Roshydromet the Akademik Fedorov and the R/V of the Ministry of
Natural Resources of Russia the Akademik Aleksander Karpinsky; the aviation
support for the expedition was provided by 2 airplanes and 2 helicopters:
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From 1998, the RAE activity is being financed by a separate line in the Federal
Budget of Russia. Measures that were undertaken allowed stabilizing the situa-
tion. In 1999 and 2001, the government again addressed the issues of providing
support for the activity of the state in the Antarctic.
The decision of the Russian Federation Government of September 24, 2001
“On measures for provision of interests of the Russian Federation in the Antarc-
tic and the activity of the Russian Antarctic Expedition in 2002-2005” deter-
mined a multiyear perspective of the expedition activity. In 2002, its financing
has achieved the 1998 pre-crisis level. Renewal of the expedition transport
infrastructure began; the flights  of aircraft IL-76 from South Africa to Novolaza-
revskaya station where the snow-ice air field was reconstructed were resumed.
In 2005, the RAE resumed independent aviation flights from its coastal stations
to the inland Vostok station. The social issues of the expedition personnel were
drastically improved from July 1, 2002 with the salaries of polar explorers in Ant-
arctica being increased by 5-6 times.
Figure 7-4: Antarctic stations and field bases of Russia 2001-2005.
Since 1998, the national scientific studies in the Antarctic are being conducted
in the framework of the subprogram “Study and Research of the Antarctic” of
the Federal Program “World Ocean”. It includes 5 directions:  basic studies of
the Antarctic; scientific-applied studies and developments; environmental moni-
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toring of the Southern Polar Area; environmental protection; and logistics-tech-
nical support for the activities and research.
The most complicated transient period of the RAE activity in the 1990s has not
resulted in the catastrophic outcome. This has become possible due to the
enormous reserve of safety of the Antarctic infrastructure, accumulated in the
preceding years and efficient organization measures undertaken at different
levels of the Federal executive power.
Stabilizing of the economy of Russia that began in the new century allowed us
to reconsider the previous parameters of RAE activity set up in 1997. On March
10, 2005, the Russian Federation Government considered again the perspec-
tives of activity of our country in the Antarctic in 2006-2010. As a result, on June
2, 2005 the order of the Government of Russia was published determining the
optimal parameters of the expedition activity for the next 5 years.
Measures that were undertaken were aimed to preserve and strengthen the
positions of the Russian Federation in the Antarctic, fulfill the international obli-
gations of our country in the framework of the Antarctic Treaty and the Protocol
on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, expand the perspective
research in the region, ensure safety of activity of the personnel of Russian
Antarctic stations and transport operations in the expedition, renew and up-
grade the infrastructure and the logistics base of the Russian Antarctic Expedi-
tion.
The forthcoming 5-year cycle of RAE activity includes measures for preparation
and holding of the International Polar Year (2007-2008.). This fact has changed
in many respects the traditional arrangement of RAE operations formed in
recent years. It is planned to continue service of the following year-round opera-
ting stations – Mirny, Vostok, Novolazarevskaya, Progress and Bellingshausen
and reactivate the earlier closed Molodezhnaya, Leningradskaya and Russkaya
(Fig. 7-5) stations transforming them to a category of seasonal field bases.
Modern automated weather and magnetic-variation stations will be installed at
these bases, which will allow us to take again under control the situation practi-
cally over the entire perimeter of the Antarctic continent. Introduction into opera-
tion of the aforementioned bases will change to a considerable extent the ar-
rangement of the RAE ship operations and increase the role of aviation trans-
portations. With this aim it is planned in addition to the snow-ice air field at
Novolazarevskaya station to construct a similar runway for wheeled aircraft IL76
at Progress station and undertake special exploration for a possible construc-
tion of a similar runway at Vostok station. The numbers of the expedition will
increase up to 120 people in the seasonal team and up to 110 people in the
wintering team.
In spite of a reduced program of Antarctic studies, a series of outstanding scien-
tific results were obtained in the 1990s. This primarily concerns the discovery of
a vast sub-glacial lake located in the vicinity of Vostok station. The water table
area of this lake comprises more than 15 thousand km2 (equal to the area of
Lake Ladoga), the lake length is 270 km and its maximum width is about 70 km.
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Figure 7-5: Antarctic stations and field bases of Russia 2006-2010.
The water layer thickness comprises 1200 m with the southern lake area being
deep and on the contrary the northern area being shallow. The lake is located
beneath the ice with a thickness of 3700 to 4200 m. The discovery of the lake
has become possible due to a joint analysis performed by the international team
with participation of Russian investigators. The Russian Antarctic Expedition
has been investigating the lake since 1995. Detailed information on the coastl-
ine configuration, the spatial non-uniformity of the ice, water and bottom sedi-
ment thickness was obtained. These studies were supplemented by geochemi-
cal, isotopic and microbiological studies of the ice core from the deep borehole
at Vostok station. The process of the borehole drilling was completed in 1999 at
a depth of 3623 m. It turned out that below the 3543 m horizon ice is formed
directly from the frozen lake water. This ice is very clean from the biological
viewpoint, however using the molecular biology methods it was possible to
detect in it the DNA molecules of thermophilic bacteria inhabiting the hydro-
thermal vents. This discovery allows a new view of the geological nature of the
trough where Lake Vostok is situated.
Investigation of the variability of geology still remains among the possible
objectives of Antarctic studies. Current variability of climate in Antarctica does
not have a clear trend. While warming and the retreat of glaciers are noticeable
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in the Antarctic Peninsula area, there is cooling, on the contrary, in the eastern
and central areas of Antarctica.
The processes of climate variability are closely connected with the studies of
the “ozone hole” phenomenon discovered in the Antarctic in 1985. Investiga-
tions of the total ozone at Russian Antarctic Mirny, Vostok and Novolazarev-
skaya stations that began in 1975, showed that at the beginning of the twenty-
first century, the process of the “ozone hole” expansion has practically stopped
and the “hole” will probably begin to fill in during the next years. This conclusion
suggests a natural rather than an anthropogenic cause of this phenomenon,
which is probably determined by the peculiarities of the general atmospheric
circulation.
Introduction of new digital measuring complexes into the observation network of
the Russian Antarctic stations allows now a continuous registration of the
occurring helio-geophysical processes and establishment of conjugated geo-
magnetic perturbations in the northern and southern “polar caps” of the planet.
A great deal of attention during the third period of the national Antarctic studies
and activities was given to international cooperation, not only with respect to
conducting the specific scientific experiments, but also to full-value cooperation
in the area of logistics support for the Antarctic Programs. Among such projects
one should mention the Russian-American drifting station “Weddell-1” orga-
nized in 1992 in the western Weddell Sea, completion of the Russian-American-
French program of joint drilling operations at Vostok station and publication of
the Russian-German “Oceanographic Atlas of the Southern Ocean” (1992).
In recent years the Russian Antarctic Expedition using its ship the Akademik
Fedorov repeatedly delivered the cargos and personnel of Antarctic stations of
the national expeditions of the South African Republic, Sweden, Finland, Nor-
way and Germany. Joint studies of the sedimentary mantle structure of the
Earth’s crust of the Antarctic seas were carried out by specialists of Russia and
Norway onboard the R/V Akademik Aleksander Karpinsky. In 2002, the inter-
national “DROMLAN” Project was implemented where the snow-ice air field of
Novolazarevskaya station plays the main role. The national Antarctic programs
of Great Britain, Germany, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, Belgium,
South African Republic, India, Japan and Russia participate in this Project. On
the other hand, during the period 1992 to 2003 the aviation support of the
Russian Vostok station was carried out with assistance of airplanes of the
U.S.Antarctic Program,  via their main McMurdo station.
Expansion of the international cooperation corresponded to the changes in the
Antarctic Treaty structure when realization of narrow national resource interests
was replaced by a new nature protection “wave” on a global scale. In 1991 in
Madrid, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty was
adopted that declared the Antarctic to be the world natural preserve in the
territory of which all human activities should be subjected to strict regulation and
management. Our country ratified this international law act by the Federal Law
of May 24, 1997 on December 11, 1998. The Decision of the Russian Federa-
tion Government adopted “the Order of consideration and issuance of permits
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for the activity of Russian individual persons and legal entities in the Antarctic
Treaty area”.
Thus any activity of Russian individual persons and legal entities including the
national Antarctic expedition is carried out in strict compliance with the inter-
national and national law standards. This fact allowed Russia to significantly
strengthen its positions in the Antarctic Treaty structure. As of June 2005, 45
nations joined the Antarctic Treaty with 28 of them having the status of the
Consultative Parties (Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Great
Britain, Germany, India, Spain, Italy, China, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Peru, Poland, Russia, the USA, the Ukraine, Uruguay, Finland, France,
Chile, Sweden, Ecuador, South African Republic, South Korea and Japan). This
status provides a possibility for decision-making or interposing a veto on any
issue discussed in the Antarctic Treaty structure.
Among the new expedition technologies introduced into the practice of RAE
activities at the third stage, one should note organization of the first drifting
scientific station in the Southern Ocean, introduction of new modern digital
measuring systems for registration of meteorological, oceanographic and helio-
geophysical parameters at all Russian Antarctic stations and transportation
vehicles and provision of all expedition facilities with tele-medicine equipment.
A 50-year history of national Antarctic studies is closely connected with the
development of our country, its economical state and foreign policy. Coming to
Antarctica in 1956, our state has strongly and with confidence secured its place
there fulfilling comprehensive scientific programs for the benefit of human
progress.
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8 Georg von Neumayer (1826–1909) - a Pioneer of Antarctic Research
Reinhard A. Krause, Alfred-Wegener-Institut für Polar- und Meeresforschung,
Bremerhaven, Germany,
Email: rkrause@awi-bremerhaven.de
How could Georg von Neumayer1, who had never set foot on the Antarctic
continent in his lifetime, pave the way for Antarctic research? Was he just a
theorist who promoted Antarctic research from his house and home in the
Rhineland? This impression would be completely wrong. From early years to far
beyond his 40th year of life Neumayer was determined to contribute to the
exploration of the planet, a goal he pursued with great commitment. From the
1870s onwards, led by outward circumstances, he started to concentrate on the
organisation of science.
As a child and as a youth Neumayer had the privilege of growing up in an envi-
ronment of unusual intellectual freedom. Without compromise he decided to
study science2 and enrolled at the Polytechnikum3 in Munich in 1847. Neumayer
had been assistant to the famous astronomer and geophysicist Johann von
Lamont (1805–1879) for half a year, when he abruptly quit this occupation in
April 1850 – for reasons unknown. Maybe patriotism played a role in the deci-
sion. Until then Neumayer had tried to get into the German, the Dutch or the
American Navy – but without success.4 After quitting his assistantship, he
signed up on a cargo ship bound for Brazil. On returning from this journey, he
managed to acquire his commission from the navigation training college in
Hamburg within a few weeks of lessons. He turned down the offer to join his old
crew as second mate. He still wanted to enter the Navy.
At that time the Austrian Navy was being extended. Neumayer travelled to
Trieste hoping to get his opportunity there. He worked as a navigation instruc-
tor. But after he had spent six months on the coast of the Adriatic Sea without
getting a position which suited his interests he went back to Hamburg. There he
was welcomed by C.C.L. Rümker (1788–1862), head of the navigation training
college and the observatory, and employed as an instructor. Only a few weeks
later, in April 1852, Neumayer was sailing again, this time as an ordinary sea-
man on a sailing-ship bound for Australia owned by the shipping company
Godeffroy. When the ship finally arrived in Sydney (Port Jackson) all members
of the crew deserted – except Neumayer. He managed to properly sign off after
several journeys along the coast. He immediately joined his friends in the
Bendingo Gold Fields. Here happened what every adventurer dreams of:
Neumayer’s group found a vein of gold. Before they even managed to work it,
the mining pit was flooded and washed away by a great thunder storm. This
                                                
1
 Born June 21 1826 Kirchheimbolanden, Palatinate - dead May 24 1909 Neustadt, Palatinate.
2
 Neumayer openly reflected his personal development and wrote about his adolescence in
great detail in several essays. Also see (Krause 2001: 197, and footnote 2)
3
 The Polytechnikum was an institution for teaching technical and physical academics. It was
the forerunner of the Technical University.
4
 It is obvious, that Neumayer’s wish to join the navy is to be seen in connection with his patrio-
tic basic position. The blockade of German ports by the Danish and the resulting surrender of
the Prussians was seen as a humiliation by many Germans.
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incident was like a shock for Neumayer: he decided to end his career as a gold-
digger. Before he set on his homeward journey, he roamed the area near the
river Murray for several months. Then, in January 1854, he put to sea on the
clipper Sovereign of the Seas in Melbourne. Enthusiastically he said: “I can
hardly describe, how much influence this journey had on my development as a
seaman.”
Figure 8-1: Neumayer 1852. By permission of Bundesamt für Seeschiffahrt und Hydrographie
(Source: Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency, BSH).
Neumayer’s first adventure in Australia, which lasted two years, obviously
triggered a process of maturation. His scientific ambitions became clearer. He
did not think about the navy any more. Later he was to condemn the navy as
unproductive. From now on Neumayer was only interested in nautical physics,
meteorology and geomagnetism. One of the scholars that made a large impres-
sion on Neumayer was the American Matthew Fontaine Maury (1803–1873).
Neumayer claimed to have spread the ideas of Maury as early as spring of
1852, during his short period of teaching in Hamburg (Neumayer 1909). This
would be very remarkable, because the book which made Maury famous – “The
Physical Geography of the Sea and its Meteorology” – did not come out before
1855. Maury had published the first sheet of his “Wind and Current Charts” in
1847 though, but his “Explanations and Sailing Directions to Accompany the
Wind und Current Charts” were brought out in 18515 . Maury propagated a new
                                                
5
 For a detailed history on the publication of Wind and Current Charts and The Physical
Geography ... see the introduction by John Leighly from 1963 in Maury (1861: IX–XXX).
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kind of navigation based on his own experience, the systematic evaluation of
ship’s logs as well as the use of scientific methods and new findings. He aimed
at shortening the duration of sailing journeys by choosing a certain course and
thus making passages safer. He appealed to everyone to observe with stand-
ardized  oceanographic and meteorological methods for collecting data when
aboard and to hand over these findings to the respective research institutes for
evaluation.
Maritime traffic was growing dramatically at that time, spreading mainly towards
the less travelled southerly seas due to transport to Australia. Because of this
increase, experts worldwide welcomed Maury’s initiative. The first international
conference on this topic was held in Brussels in 18536. It is worth mentioning,
that Maury agreed with Humboldt in this question7: Under whatever circumstan-
ces Neumayer may have become familiar with Maury’s ideas, he was one of the
first and most committed supporters of Maury’s system8:
Back in Europe Neumayer had long since set up a plan, which he pursued per-
sistently and skilfully: He wanted to return to Australia as soon as possible to
found an institute there, which was to serve practical seafaring as well as sci-
ence – a Central Station for Meteorology, Navigation and Terrestrial Magnet-
ism9. He hoped to obtain the required funds in Germany. On the recommenda-
tion of the chemist Justus von Liebig (1803–1873) the Royal Bavarian Cabinet
granted Neumayer the considerable sum of 3232 Gulden for the acquisition of
equipment10:
To secure the support of British authorities for his plans in Melbourne he visited
the congress of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (August
1856). Summing up Neumayer wrote: “Men like Whewell, Airy, Faraday ac-
knowledged the relevance of the plan which I presented to them so that I –
provided with their recommendation – could set my great undertaking in
motion”11. Neumayer’s cleverness also shows in another aspect: He succeeded
in getting the Hamburg ship owner Johann Caesar Godeffroy (and his brother,
                                                
6
 Maury 1855/56: 4.
7
 Maury is referred to in Humboldt’s Kosmos – with a work on astronomy though. See Humboldt
1845, vol.3: 569. In Wiederkehr und Schröder (1988: 6) it is said without reference, that Hum-
boldt heard about Maury from Rümker in 1849. This is supported by Kortum und Schwarz
(2004: 170), where it is written that Maury had his just completed Wind and Current Charts sent
to Alexander von Humboldt through Rümker. Here (p.158) it is also to be read that Maury met
Humboldt in Berlin after attending a earlier mentioned conference in Brussels in 1853. During
this encounter the title for Maury’s main work was set up.
8
 From the obituary, which Neumayer wrote for Maury, it can be presumed that Neumayer read
about Maury’s ideas aboard the Sovereign of the Seas (Hydrographische Mitteilungen 1873:
49–51). According to Wiederkehr (1987, footnote 12) Neumayer knew about Maury’s work as
early as 1849.
9
 Wiederkehr und Schröder 1988: 1.
10
 It is a non trivial undertaking to give an idea of how much 3232 Gulden means in modern cur-
rency. Around 1850 the minimum income of a four headed family was said to be around 200
Gulden. A house with garden was between 1000 and 2000 Gulden. A value of about 200.000
Euro may be reasonable.
11
 Neumayer 1901: 11.
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the Senator Gustav Godeffroy) to pay attention to his project.12 The shipping
company Godeffroy, which was increasingly engaged in transport to Australia,
was certainly interested in getting nautical-meteorological assistance for their
ships in Melbourne. The Senate of Hamburg added to Neumayer’s resources by
another 600 Mark Banco13:
In 1858 Neumayer opened an institute in Melbourne: the Flagstaff Observatory.
It flourished enormously under Neumayer’s rule until he returned to Germany in
186414. The foundation of the institute became the main pillar of the institutiona-
lization of Australian academic life. Today, therefore, Georg von Neumayer is as
famous in Australia as he is in Germany15.
His success partly results in the fact that he dealt with ocean shipping (nautical
physics), which was extremely important to Australia’s growth. While he was
working in Australia, Antarctica already played a vital role in Neumayer’s work.
This was inherent to the fact that the great circle courses, which Neumayer
propagated for the passage from South Africa to Australia, reached very high
southerly latitude16: It was an imperative to explore the meteorological and
geomagnetic conditions (declination) of this region. Furthermore, the relatively
high magnetic latitude of Australia called for a localization of the magnetic pole.
Neumayer described his “Agitation for South Polar Research” in detail17.
The famous geographer and editor of “Petermanns Geographische Mitteilun-
gen” (PGM), August Petermann (1823–1878), reported in 1863 that “Dr. Georg
Neumayer, Director of the Flagstaff Observatory in Melbourne” had written a
letter to the Imperial Academy of Sciences in Vienna to propose an expedition
to the Antarctic regions. Here it says: “May this vigorous man succeed in putting
his plan to action“18.
It is not known, why Neumayer left Australia and returned to Europe in 1864. He
himself – being very concerned about weaving a legend around his person –
never wrote about it personally.
                                                
12
 This memorandum “Denkschrift/der Brief an den Hamburger Senat/Gustav Godeffroy” is pre-
served (Wiederkehr 1987: 15). Here Neumayer points out that he followed the instructions of
the Bavarian King and that he had the recommendation of famous British scientists.
13
 20.000 Euro may be a reasonable modern equivalent for this amount.
14
 The foundation did face problems. For details see Home and Kretzer (1991). A long letter
which Neumayer sent to Justus v. Liebig in September 1857 is very informative (Home and
Kretzer 1991: 232–238). In connection with this Neumayer’s agitation for a magnetic survey of
Australia is very interesting, so are his reasons. He wrote: “[…] that there exists a relation
between the productiveness of a tract of land and the values of the magnetic constants. Further
there exists a relation between the same quantities and some geological formations, for in-
stance the coal beds as I have shown in Palatine. […] auch Goldadern (auriferous land) soll
man mit Hilfe magnetischer Vermessungen leichter finden könne.” (Home and Kretzer 1991:
230).
15
 Home and Kretzer 1991.
16
 At a great circle course between Cape Agulhas and middle of Bass Strait φ  max 58°15'S is
attained at λ  75°39'E. The distance is 5326 nm. On great circle voyages from Australia to Cape
Horn a φ  max of 63°S is reached!
17
 Neumayer 1901: 12.
18
 Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen, 1863: 428. Petermann had never believed in an
Antarctic continent, instead he maintained that the south pole was situated in a "south polar
sea".
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The first meeting of geographers in Germany was held in Frankfurt on July 23,
186519: Here Neumayer promoted the exploration of the Antarctic although
Petermann had wished to mainly discuss the exploration of the Arctic20. Impor-
tant to Neumayer were a systematic hydrography, application of science to
practical seafaring etc., installation of a nautical meteorological hydrographical
institute – a Naval Observatory (the German word “Seewarte” was created by
Otto Volger) –, carrying out of great sea expeditions, exploration of the Antarctic
Regions. In his view no other scientific project had the same relevance as an
expedition to the south polar regions. At a gathering of natural scientists in Inns-
bruck in 1869 (Versammlung der Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und
Ärzte) he publicly spoke about Antarctic research again.
In 1871 he provided the first international Geographic Congress in Antwerp with
a memorandum on Antarctic research including a map of the Antarctic21. Since
spring 1870 Neumayer had been in contact with the Command of the Austrian
Navy which was planning a south polar expedition combined with the observing
of the transit of the Venus – an idea based on Neumayer’s report. According to
Neumayer he was granted the supervision of the expedition in 1871. The plan
of the expedition was brought to a halt during the German-French War but was
not cancelled. But this was done soon after the unexpected death of Admiral
Wilhelm von Tegetthoff (1827 – Apr. 4, 1871), the protagonist of this enterprise.
Finding out that the Austrian Antarctic expedition would not be carried out struck
Neumayer deeply. In October 1871 he moved to Berlin trying to get in contact
with the Command of the Navy. He was 46 years old but without a task.
A single talk on compass deviations, held in Berlin on February 3, 1872, ended
Neumayer’s struggle for a career22. The compass problem was highly explosive
for the Command of the Navy. Especially the deviation problem – that is the
error of the compass caused by the temporally and spatially variable field
components produced by the ship itself – was a relatively new one which was
only understood in full by very few persons at that time, one of those being
Neumayer. Albrecht von Stosch (1818–1896; Head of the Admiralty, State
Secretary, plenipotentiary of the Bundesrat) recommended Neumayer become
a member of the Hydrographical Bureau of the Imperial Admiralty, which he did
on July 1, 1872. On December 24, 1872 he was promoted to Hydrographer of
the Admiralty. Neumayer used his new position for activities in research politics.
He was the driving force and the scientific mentor of the group, orienting the
expedition to the seas of the southern hemisphere with the Gazelle (1874–
1876). Thus he was tempted to equal the oceanographic journey of the British
Challenger.
The expedition of the Gazelle was a first step towards south polar research, but
Neumayer could not continue his involvement with it because he had to take
                                                
19
 The yearly gatherings known as Deutscher Geographentag (Convention of the German
Geographic Society) only began in 1881.
20
 Amtlicher Bericht 1865: 54.
21
 Neumayer 1901: 369.
22
 Wiederkehr und Schröder (1988: 19) state that the influence of the astronomer Wilhelm Foer-
ster (1832-1921), who knew Neumayer, on vov Stosch was decisive for the employment.
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over the head position of the Reichsinstitut Deutsche Seewarte (German Naval
Observatory) at the beginning of 1875. He would hold this position until 1903.
He transformed the Naval Observatory into an internationally acknowledged
institute, which was well-known for its technical and scientific innovations.
Neumayer provided many interesting improvements on technology of
navigation, meteorology and geomagnetism himself and in addition to that he
acted very stimulatingly in this field. In this way, Neumayer proved that he was
also a very competent theorist.
Besides the commitment at the Naval Observatory the year 1875 brought about
another important event: the conference of a group of 14 scientists summoned
by the Imperial Chancellory to discuss future polar research in general.
Neumayer was one of the most influential members of this commission. A basic
evaluation of polar research had become necessary because of an initiative of
the Verein für die deutsche Nordpolarfahrt in Bremen (German Society for
Arctic Exploration in Bremen), which had conducted the German East-
Greenland expedition (1869/70) under the guidance of Carl Koldewey (1837–
1908). The Bremen scientists had appealed to the Bundesrat with a petition in
order to set up another East-Greenland expedition which was supposed to be
closely linked with a planned English West-Greenland expedition23. At the same
time the coordinator of the Austro-Hungarian North Pole Expedition (1872–74)
Carl Weyprecht (1838– 1881) supported the plan of setting up a ring of
research stations around the Arctic instead of organizing new polar expeditions.
The idea behind this was: Observatories instead of expeditions.
Neumayer discarded parts of his initial ideas concerning polar research and
together with Weyprecht and others tried to realize the installation of
circumpolar stations with international participation. But when Neumayer finally
achieved an international consensus (9 states, 12 stations) , it became obvious
that the German government was not willing to provide any funds for polar
research.
At the last minute the German government agreed to participate in the first
International Polar Year (IPY) and to take its share in polar research. This
spared Neumayer and German polar and marine research a great humiliation24.
Hence the holding of the IPY 1882-1883 is inextricably linked with the name of
Neumayer. It is his greatest success as an organizer of science – an
achievement which deserved and received international respect, a merit which
ennobles German marine and polar research until today25. It is noteworthy that
Neumayer vehemently stood up for integrating the Antarctic into the Polar Year.
Apart from a number of cooperating minor stations in the southern hemisphere
Germany and France started expeditions to Antarctic regions (South Georgia
and Straits of Magellanes). Germany also held a station in the north.
                                                
23
 The protocols of these meetings and other documents remained. For background information
on the conference see Krause (1992).
24
 The Imperial Chancellor Bismarck personally started this change of policy. For further details
and excerpts of Bismarck’s letter see Krause 2001, footnote 36.
25
 The 2nd International Polar Year 1932/33 was mainly set up by Johannes Georgi (1888–
1972). Compared to the first Polar Year German involvement was very little, which is to be seen
in connection with the bad economic situation in Germany.
Steps of Foundation – Proceedings of the 1st Workshop of the SCAR History Action Group
118
As for the results of the IPY: No summarizing work came out, no circumpolar
synopsis, which had been the focus of the whole concept – at least regarding
meteorology and geophysics. The works on the different expeditions were
published in the official languages of the respective research teams. The main
work of the German expeditions (Collection of meteorological and geophysical
data) was published in September 1886. But the volumes on Descriptive
Natural Sciences and the Historical Part were not brought out before 1890/9126.
Acknowledgements of the 1st IPY which came out later agree in the fact that
the scientific outcome was considerable. Critical statements were not uttered27.
The 4th International Polar Conference was held in Vienna on April 17 to 24,
1884. This was the last international convention under the roof of the first IPY.
Almost half a century passed before the idea of a Polar Year was taken up
again. With the conclusion of the IPY Neumayer’s efforts to further polar re-
search did not come to an end. His favourite idea – Antarctic research – had not
been tackled seriously so far. So he used every opportunity to remind others of
starting to work on it. In 1865 he had described the exploration of the “Antarctic
regions as a nautical-geographical problem which remained to be solved by our
century”. With these explorations he expected to find data to better understand
meteorology and for the theory of geomagnetism. It was a “gathering of material
for theoretical research”. 130 years ago Neumayer had already phrased the
very principle which is still the motivating force of today’s polar research. When
the 5th Deutsche Geographentag (Covention of the German Geographic Socie-
ty) was held in Hamburg, Neumayer used this opportunity to vehemently pro-
mote Antarctic research. Here he also fulfilled an obligation which had its origin
in a petition by Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904) the year before28. A morning of
lectures by Neumayer, Ratzel, Albrecht Penck (1858–1945) and Carl Friedrich
Wilhelm Peters (1844–1894) was dedicated to Antarctic research. Neumayer’s
talk29 was not characterized by restraint – on the contrary. Some of his state-
ments could not have been clearer. The following phrases show his position:
“[…] for more than 40 years nothing has happened to extend our geographic
field of vision towards the Antarctic regions […] without a thorough exploration
of the physical conditions in the Antarctic it is absolutely impossible to get a full
understanding of the natural phenomena of our Earth […] without this [Antarctic]
research we cannot even think of a development of the geophysical science […]
it seems to me that the necessity of scientific treatment of the south polar
regions should be seen as an unchallengeable ethical law”30, to quote but a few.
The quotations where he bitterly and cynically talks about “general philosophical
principles and the logical element in geophysical research” have been left out.
At the end of February 1874 Neumayer had already “examined the geographi-
cal problems within the polar regions and their interrelation” in a lectures in the
                                                
26
 For details on plans for publications of the IPY as regards content and schedule see Neumay-
er (1885: 173).
27
 19 out of 25 persons of the American expedition lost their lives (position: Fort Conger, west of
Hall Basin).
28
 For details see Neumayer (1885: 174). Even the drafts for a new polar research ship were
presented. (Neumayer 1885: 196).
29
 For title see Neumayer (1885).
30
 Neumayer 1885: 176-177.
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Society for the Exploration of Central Africa. In his talk Neumayer had empha-
sized that the most pressing questions of geophysics could only be solved by
intensive polar research31. It was not until the 1st IPY 1882-1883 that new
motion came in this field. But in general the massive efforts and the agitation
were in vain.
In the opening speech of the 11th Convention of the German Geographic Soci-
ety in Bremen in 1895 Neumayer expressed his exhaustion in promoting south
polar research. He had only agreed to speak at that opening because he was
asked to speak on the same matter at the 6th International Geographic Con-
gress in London. In London Neumayer commented on the objectives and tasks
of the exploration of the south polar regions in more detail than in Bremen. He
mainly quoted works and opinions of German scientists and explained that the
range of scientific questions was reaching far beyond those of geomagnetism
and meteorology.32 At the end of his speech he stressed that it would be most
desirable to carry out research through international cooperation. He had in
mind the participation of three nations33: Following an invitation by the Royal
Society Neumayer took part in a discussion meeting on Antarctic science in
London in February 1898. “If any one event can be taken as signalling the
beginning of Antarctic science as a coherent field this discussion surely was
it.”34 It was interesting to see that the British who had a long tradition in polar
research were struggling hard to set up a new south polar expedition even
though the project had two famous advocates in Sir Clements Robert Markham
(1830–1916) and Sir John Murray (1841–1914).35 Only the Belgians with Adrien
de Gerlache (1866–1934) acted with determination and started an expedition to
the Antarctic continent in the summer of 1897. Other nations were to follow four
years later with Germany taking on a leading position36.
When choosing the destination of the German expedition Neumayer was able to
use his authority and pushed through a long favoured idea. He wanted a landfall
at 90° E, even though influential voices preferred th e area of the Weddell Sea37.
Erich von Drygalski (1865–1949), leader of the German expedition, missed the
Amery Basin (around 70° E) so that his geographic discove ries remained minor
compared to those of the British who worked in the Ross Sea. This shortcoming
discredited the expedition especially in the eyes of the Emperor Wilhelm II. This
strongly hindered the further development of German Antarctic research. Neu-
mayer who had devoted his life to establish Antarctic research was confronted
with the negative effects resulting from his geographical agenda. It was not
before 1911/12 that Wilhelm Filchner (1877-1957) with the vessel Deutschland
discovered the interior of the Weddell Sea38.
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Neumayer's life according to one of his colleagues was qualified as an "art-
work". Indeed Neumayer had shared his energy between contributing to the
general development of marine- and polar research39, as well as in establishing
a capable national institution for the support of shipping and in the creation of
international organisations. Not only is this reflected in the fact that several
places on the globe and even a crater on the moon bears his name.
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9 The Norwegian-British-Swedish Expedition (NBSX) to Antarctica 1949-
52  -  science and security




“Experience has shown that we cannot emphasise strongly enough
firstly, that the expedition has no interest whatsoever in the fairly
unimportant South Pole; secondly, that it has no political aims. It starts
out with a definite and minutely prepared scientific programme.”1
In the late 1980´s I did research on the South American politics towards Antarc-
tica and it was a pleasure to visit the various archives in Santiago, Buenos
Aires, Montevideo, Washington and Cambridge. In all places scientists and
polar officials expressed their esteem and recognition of the Norwegian-British-
Swedish Expedition (NBSX) of 1949-52. They underlined the quality of the
science produced as well as the expedition as a role model for the international
cooperation to come during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) 1957-59.
Since then, as a political scientist, I have sensed a growing urge to know about
why Sweden at all would support an expedition to Antarctica during the years
immediately following the Second World War. This article is about the possible
political motivations behind the Swedish participation  in the NBSX 1949-52.
The diplomatic efforts by the Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén to create a
Scandinavian Defence Alliance, this as an alternative to Norwegian and Danish
membership in NATO, constitutes one tentative political connotation of the
NBSX. The emerging international strategic importance of meteorology provides
another.
The most frequent way of summarizing the story of the NBSX may be illustrated
by the following few paragraphs. Shortly after the Second World War had ended
Norway took a leading role in organising the first international expedition to
Antarctica. Norway was in charge of meteorology and surveying, Great Britain
was responsible for geology and Sweden was entrusted with glaciology. The
British RAF assisted in air operations 1949/50 with five officers (in finding a
landing place for the expedition as well as for meteorological investigations, one
officer remained as radio operator), the Norwegian Wideröe Company assisted
in 1950/51 (air surveying) and the Swedish Air Force in 1951/52, with 6 officers
(originally for reconnaissance of ice conditions as well as being prepared for
emptying the base). The Norwegian sealer Norsel landed the party and the
whaler Thorshövdi assisted as well for transport of dogs aircraft and weasels.
For general overviews and details of the scientific achievements, logistics and
perspectives of international cooperation there are several works available2.
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The account is almost always written in an apolitical spirit, accentuating success
and the story of NBSX  as an experiment of international cooperation with a
remarkable scientific outcome3. The purpose of the present paper is therefore
also to challenge the received view, or at least to problematize it by introducing
a different, albeit complementary perspective that highlights the political context
of the expedition and the issues of foreign policy, security and to some extent
territorial claims. My proposition is that if we, at least as a hypothesis consider
the NBSX in terms of a “political performance” we will gain further understand-
ing both in history of science and in the field of international relations. In addi-
tion to studying the organisational arrangements of the expedition itself the
general political climate at the time also calls for the need to examine the expe-
dition within a general foreign-and security political framework, in the post-war
years, formative for the security arrangements for the western hemisphere for
decades ahead. In this perspective the polar areas are located within the overall
security doctrines of the western hemisphere at the time of the build-up of the
cold war. It is true that a recent work on Norwegian Polar History has contri-
buted to an analysis of the security dimensions of the polar areas as well as
clarified several aspects of the Norwegian participation in the NBSX, including
its interest in whaling and territorial issues4. However, there is still much to be
said when it comes to Swedish representations of the NBSX as well as about
Swedish foreign policy with regard to Polar Areas at the time. After a brief
historical background with regard to security matters in Scandinavia shortly after
the Second World War, the following sections will illustrate my hesitations to
accept the representations of “pure” science and “true international coopera-
tion”. The “purity” is questioned and the “international cooperation” is shown to
be more “international” both in quantity and quality than usually stated. Then I
will proceed to present alternative representations of the NBSX.
9.2 Post-war Scandinavian relations
In late 1945 Helge Ljung, High Commander of the Försvarsstaben (Defence
Staff had addressed the Foreign Minister as well as the Defence Minister, urg-
ing them to initiate negotiations with Norway and Denmark regarding arms
sales. Swedish army equipment and rifles were competing with British supplies,
something that would damage present security arrangements5. After a few
turbulent years the arms sales issues were settled in a satisfactory way but, in
security political terms, the degree of cooperation between the three countries
still was somewhat of an unfinished business6. At the same time scientists and
high-level officials prepared for the NBSX in Sweden, Norway and Great Britain.
In 1948 the Swedish Foreign and security policy on both the operational and
political level signified a move towards the other Nordic countries, in particular
Norway and Denmark. But frequent relations were also upheld with Bonn,
London and Washington. Communication lines, both personal and material
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were important. Information on general defence ability was communicated, in
particular on air communication systems and weather reports. Preparations
were made for closer cooperation in times of crisis. In spring 1948 the Swedish
foreign minister presented a proposal for a Scandinavian Defence Alliance with
far reaching commitments towards Norway and Denmark. In May 1948 a
political division between Norway and Sweden became clearly noticeable. The
issue concerned the degree of alignment with other alliances – read the relation
between Sweden, Norway and the Atlantic pact respectively. Despite increasing
tensions, in September-October 1948 the stage was set for examining the
prerequisites for a Scandinavian Defence Alliance, while the parties promised
that no one would join any other alliances. The option of a three-country neutral
group still figured although the negotiators recognised a dependence on U.S.
supplies such as arms and high technology (in electronics and radio communi-
cation). In January 1949 Sweden offered a far-reaching concession of military
assistance to Norway and Denmark, neither awaiting the decision of the par-
liament, nor the earlier required strengthening of the armed forces in the two-
neighbour countries. Further, Sweden did not wait for the concessions from the
U.S.to deliver arms to Sweden that were meant to boost the Scandinavian
Defence Alliance. Issues of the commitment of the western alliance now had
become acute since both Norway and Denmark had been invited to participate
in negotiations in Washington. They accepted and from spring 1949, Sweden
stood alone, outside the western pact and without open access to the most
modern military technology, Sweden and Norway thereafter developed a con-
siderable degree of cooperation with regard to security issues, on the opera-
tional level, especially for defence of seaborne trade, intelligence and aviation7.
But the cooperation on the political level was restrained. This had some effects
on Swedish policies on the rhetorical level. In the first years of the 1950´s, the
government was anxious not to present a too close cooperation with the west,
although operational policies were more permissive.8 The lines of communica-
tion went via Norway, then with the British and lastly, if not possible to avoid,
directly to the U.S.NATO-officers. Sweden did not wish to openly antagonize the
USSR, something that was the rationale for the subsequent and long-lasting
policy of neutrality until the early 1990´s.
Although the alliance never was realised, in the event of a great power conflict,
these discussions, not to speak of an alliance as such, would have had far
reaching consequences for the Swedish national interest. Modern research has
since confirmed many decades of rumours with regard to the kind, and degree,
of Swedish cooperation with the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation. There-
fore it is fairly well established that the areas of cooperation defined during the
negotiations for a Scandinavian Defence Alliance between Norway and Sweden
in 1948/49 – protection of civilian sea transports, air defence and intelligence –
actually were accomplished outside any formal agreements. This state of affairs
ought to be kept in mind when studying the planning for the NBSX, although
there are other ingredients of the pre-history of the NBSX.
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9.3 Hans Ahlmann the instigator of the NBSX
In the 30´s and in 1943/44 geologist Johan Gunnar Andersson corresponded
with glaciologist Hans Ahlmann on reviving the unrealised plans of an Anglo-
Swedish expedition from 1911-14 to the Antarctic Peninsula9. Andersson
proposed that Norwegian whaling vessels would offer the means of transporta-
tion and he urged Ahlmann to continue the proud tradition of Swedish polar
research. Andersson stated
”No one will be in better position than you to get a positive response from the
Norwegians”10. Here Andersson was referring to the fact that Ahlmann had
developed extensive both professional and private ties with Norway. The so far
generally accepted view of the prehistory of the NBSX is that within short the
destination mentioned in this correspondence became obsolete. The presen-
tation of the Nazi-German air surveying of the area Neu-Schwabenland (1938/
1939) in scientific publications reaching Ahlmann in 1942/1943, seemingly had
led Ahlmann to redirect his scientific interest, from the peninsula to other parts
of the continent. The photos indicated the possibility of interesting glaciological
research, with a possible contribution to the investigations of climate change11.
Ahlmann certainly had a long record of cooperation in polar research with dis-
tinguished Norwegian scientists, and was engaged in the resistance movement
during the German occupation of Norway. He had also been proposed as a
mediator between Denmark and Norway in resolving the issue of Eastern
Greenland in 1940 and was a well-known personality amongst Swedish and
Norwegian elites. His main field was studies of the interaction of glaciers and
the atmosphere. On several occasions Ahlmann had worked closely with Harald
Ulrik Sverdrup and he was directly involved in bringing Sverdrup back from the
US to head the newly organised Norwegian Polar Institute in 1946. In 1945 he
was appointed by the Swedish government to advise on how to strengthen the
meteorological infrastructure in Sweden, considering new professorships and
other institutional arrangements. Meteorologist C.G. Rossby was one of the first
to be contacted in this connection. Ahlmann himself viewed this advisory work
as belonging to the realm of higher diplomacy12. And indeed it was. As will be
shown meteorology was closely related to both the NBSX and the security
planning at the time. But firstly, the next section will illustrate the ambivalence
during the preparations of the NBSX. There had been several destinations and
participant countries involved.
9.4 Science and politics – a two way relationship
If one takes as one’s point of departure in the analytical level of the impact of
individuals in the Swedish history of science certainly Ahlmann and his scientific
motives to a great extent may be seen as driving forces behind the planning
and implementation of the NBSX. Still, I would like to add the focus of studying
the political settings that enabled this particular polar expedition, in which
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Ahlmann, the skilled diplomat negotiator and hybrid politician must be fore-
grounded.
Already on 23 December 1944 Hans Ahlmann wrote to the board of the Society
for Geography and Anthropology (SSAG) asking for a statement in support of a
planned Swedish-Norwegian-British or possibly Swedish-Norwegian-Danish-
Icelandic-British expedition, destined for Graham Land. He mentioned that he
had already corresponded with professor Wordie, since 1943, and therefore
knew that the British would not contribute financially, nor would the Norwegians,
towards such an expedition. Despite earlier plans for a Swedish-British expedi-
tion including certain promises regarding Swedish governmental funds Britain
was hesitant. Thus, Ahlmann was prepared to raise the funds himself in Swe-
den13. However, after the summer of 1945 the British attitude had changed.
They were now prepared to provide the necessary funds as well as an aircraft,
and possibly the Norwegians would contribute sea transport. Further, in Nor-
way, the shipping industry planned the construction of a new type of vessel for
use in polar areas - for the whaling industry. This vessel could possibly be
placed at disposal of the expedition, for two seasons. The destination was no
longer Graham Land, now it was Dronning Maud Land.
During the war Ahlmann stayed in touch with colleagues and science adminis-
trators in the Scandinavian/Nordic countries (also Denmark and Iceland) and
Britain. In the event the war would soon end, the expedition was foreseen to
depart already in 1946. It was not until 11 February 1947 that Ahlmann received
a supporting statement from the SSAG. In the meantime governments in three
countries, Sweden, Norway and Great Britain had reached agreements with
regard to funding, transports, logistics and division of labour, in part due to
Ahlmann´s skills as a lobbyist. The Anglo-Argentine-Chilean territorial disputes
on the Antarctic Peninsula may have provided an additional pressing concern
on behalf of Britain. Further, the US had launched large-scale operations in
Antarctica, by means of Operation High Jump 1946-47.
Why then would Ahlmann as late as December 1944 discuss the destination of
Graham Land rather than the piece of Antarctica claimed by Norway and threat-
ened by the Nazi-government in Germany? As a result of this threat Norway
had made its claim to Queen Maud Land on 14 January 1939. Ahlmann did
open up for other destinations in his letter, but without specifying these. This is
only one example that neither the choice of scientific issues, nor the question of
international cooperation was the result of clear-cut deliberations from a well-
defined beginning to the end. To what extent it was inconvenient at the time to
openly suggest Queen Maud Land to SSAG may be discussed but it appears
that political motives certainly were prominent. The most obvious concerned the
ambitions of Nazi-Germany with regard to Antarctica, but also the positioning of
Sweden in relation to the Norwegian claims in Antarctica?
In 1950, rather hastily Ahlmann was called upon to become the Swedish am-
bassador in Oslo (1950-56). Most sources state that although Ahlmann had
been an active planner and even initiator of the NBSX, his diplomatic career
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impeded his direct participation, on the ice. Geographers in Sweden have even
been described as shocked when Ahlmann left for Oslo14. Nevertheless, his
relocation from Stockholm to Oslo meant that he continued to be centrally
located for the political management of the expedition. Further, to judge from
his correspondence, he had a longstanding, wide network of contacts in both
Swedish and Norwegian political and economic spheres. This fact should not be
underestimated. With a slight speculative overtone I suggest that Hans Ahl-
mann was at the time “Mr Right”. The exactly right person needed to restore
Swedish-Norwegian relations, including Swedish relations with Great Britain, a
person endowed with a great amount of competence, confidence and good will.
Ahlmann, as scientist and diplomat was now to stage the NBSX for its political
performance in the insecure years of the gradual build-up of the Cold War. In
the recent Norwegian work on Polar History the reader is also informed about
the deep anxiety felt by Hans Ahlmann because he had become alarmed by the
scale of Soviet polar research and feared the possible intrusion upon Norwe-
gian interests, in the Arctic as well as in the Antarctic. It was in that context that
Ahlmann began to work for a Norwegian Polar Institute, to be led by his friend
Sverdrup, later leader of the NBSX15. By strengthening the organisational
infrastructure of the Norwegian polar policy at the time, Ahlmann also advo-
cated a strong, but indirect, support for the Norwegian claim on Dronning Maud
Land16. Likewise he supported the Norwegian presence and concerns in the
Arctic, while the Swedish government at least indirectly, gave its silent consent
for the Norwegian cause.
Ahlmann as an individual scientist represented a new type of scientific entrepre-
neurship. Rather than advocating traditional, generalist “polar science” Ahlmann
underlined the necessity of highly specialised knowledge, in glaciology as well
as in geology. Consequently, the NBSX became known for its concern with the
subject of global climate change, of great interest for Ahlmann17. In line with this
there is much to be said for NBSX as a science-driven effort, an image that
coincides with the received view. In my opinion, this scientifically interesting
subject does not suffice to explain the willingness from Norwegian, Swedish and
British authorities to co-fund the expedition in the tough period of economic and
political recovery from the Second World War.
9.5 The possibility of complementary representations
The first hand accounts and popular travel reports by expedition members, from
1950 until this very day repeat, almost as a mantra, the scientific importance
and achievements of NBSX in terms of international cooperation, in particular
for the later to come International Geophysical Year 1957/58 (IGY). Although
previous Swedish operations in both polar areas had involved other countries,
the NBSX on the rhetorical level indeed became a trendsetter for international
research expeditions to come. However, some contemporary sources reduced
the international cooperation to the literal presence of Norwegians, Swedes and
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Brits on the ice and descriptions of so called cultural differences among men of
science born in different countries. An article in The Times illustrated this by
reporting on the stoical calm and professionalism shown by the British as com-
pared to the brutish and even Hispanic violent temperament of the Scandina-
vians18! Less has been written about the extensive diplomatic efforts and insti-
tutional arrangements that preceded the departure of the expedition in 1949.
Squadron leader Kenneth Ullyett (F.R. Met S.) felt prompted to underline the
non-warlike matters to be carried out by RAF19. But in what way may we explain
the efforts in the British pre - expedition correspondence to secure the presence
of USA, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa army officers as observers to
the expedition? The answer relates to the need of more, internationally coordi-
nated, knowledge in the field of meteorology and general systems. Meteorology
as well as the security political settings are equally prominent as explanatory
factors for the NBSX as the individual motives by committed scientists. This is
clearly illustrated by one of the expedition members. In January 1949 the young
scientist Gösta Liljequist produced a promemoria of the meteorological investi-
gations during the NBSX. Synoptic meteorological measurements were planned
to complement other international studies on weather systems. On the one
hand results were of immediate interest for the NBSX, on the other hand these
same results were of great importance for all modes of transport in the southern
hemisphere, civilian or military. Liljequist wrote that such results would be
counted as the most important results from the entire expedition20. C.G. Rossby
had provided the tools of analysis21. Liljequist´s expectations were seconded by
Ahlmann in 1951, when he described the potential results as the most important
for the two polar areas, not only the Antarctic22. This may constitute one impor-
tant explanation for the Swedish willingness to contribute financially to the
NBSX in times of scarce resources.
Then, what about the history of territorial claims in Antarctica? In what way
would the intensification for this particular period relate to NBSX? Several works
have analysed the politics of Antarctica, although Swedish non-activity with
regard to claims largely remained a non-issue. In 1938 Nazi-Germany claimed
and named Neu-Schwabenland; the Norwegians  on January 14, 1939 declared
its claim to Dronning Maud Land between the 45 0 E and 20 0 W. In 1946, the
United Kingdom undertook Operation Tabarin to further manifest its interests
and foothold on the Antarctic Peninsula, with corresponding reactions from
Argentina and Chile. U.S.demonstrations of military capability in 1946/47 and
1947/48 were followed by various attempts to introduce a new political order for
Antarctica, with or without UN-trusteeship. Archival studies also reveal the
degree of preparedness of the U.S.Navy to facilitate U.S.territorial claims 1946-
48. (Similar types of instructions were issued also in relation to the U.S. acti-
vities for IGY). Thereupon, after these attempts, followed the moves of the
former Soviet Union in 1949 to demand its participation in every settlement of
affairs with regard to Antarctica. Increasing political and strategic activities thus
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followed a 1946 whaling fleet manoeuvre. In addition South Africa and Australia
expressed an increased interest in the area and France was prompted to send
an expedition to Terra Adelie to consolidate its claim via science23.
These utterances and firm expressions of foreign policy were not irrelevant for
the context of the 1949-52 NBSX. Some authors have expressed in one sen-
tence that the expedition had a few political connotations, but with few excep-
tions this theme has not been developed in any length until its elaboration in a
recent work on Norwegian polar history24. Skagestad (1971), a Norwegian
political scientist in his unpublished thesis already noted that the NBSX was
exclusively driven by the wish of Norway to strengthen its Antarctic presence
and thereby indirectly its title25. He also noted that Norway did not support the
U.S.1948 initiative for a condominium, due to fear of upsetting the Soviet Union
and thereby unsettling the delicate Norwegian-Soviet relations in the Arctic.
Swedish glaciologist Liljequist, participant of the expedition, stated in one sen-
tence the political motives with regard to the territorial claims of Norway, but
without further details26. Sweden had a low-profile approach with regard to
territorial claims in Antarctica, possibly due to lack of interest27. Nevertheless, in
my opinion it is necessary to examine the actual relations between the three
participating countries i.e. Norway, Sweden and Great Britain. Neighbours,
trading partners and possible partners in security alliances construed the
agenda for cooperation in the late forties and Hans Ahlmann showed great
skills in being sensitive to this agenda. Science and global climate change was
not always uppermost in his mind. There were several other stakeholder inter-
ests to consider.
9.6 Norway and Sweden – the revival of fraternity
In a letter dated 26 October 1945, Ahlmann wrote to JG Andersson, that Norwe-
gian whaling interests would have an interest in supporting a Norwegian-Swe-
dish expedition but it would have to be destined towards Crown Princess Mär-
thas Kyst/Neu-Schwabenland. Air surveys were seen as necessary and the
specific area would then be chosen for practical reasons. Seemingly the scien-
tific reasons were of secondary importance, or rather loosely defined?  Ahlmann
also stated that the Swedish Air Force already had indicated its interest for an
Antarctic expedition, and likewise with the Norwegian Air Force.
In a letter dated 1 November 1945, Hans Ahlmann wrote to professor Olof
Holtedahl that he intended to offer 50.000 Swedish crowns to realise a “Swe-
dish-Norwegian” or “Norwegian-Swedish” enterprise in order to investigate
Schwabenland from the ground. This if it would be possible to use parts of the
Norwegian whaling fleet to transport two small planes (one for surveying and
one for landing). The letter ended with the sentence, “As you might realise I am
more interested in a Swedish-Norwegian enterprise than in a possible Swedish-
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British”.28 This formulation may be interpreted in different ways. On the one
hand it might indicate that he, personally, still had his main priorities firmly
grounded in his own scientific interest of climatic fluctuations. At the same time
he knew about the Norwegian urge for mapping the area. Ahlmann´s plans for
an expedition to Graham Land had been abandoned, but apparently the desti-
nation was not that important, nor the question of the tripartite international
cooperation. On the other hand he might have intended to plant a seed of
“worry” within the Norwegian polar establishment, in order to stimulate an
increased level of activity. What if Great Britain and Sweden, but not Norway
would visit an area claimed by Norway in the Antarctic?
By May 1946 Ahlmann had progressed to the point of being able to present his
proposal for an expedition in Oslo and in London at the Royal Geographical
Society. Subsequently, on 28 January 1947 formal notes were sent to the
respective foreign ministries. Included were, for the first time a rather lengthy
description of the scientific values of the expedition29.
From his appearance at the Royal Geographical Society in London, he reported
that polar scientists, the Navy and the Air Force had been present and that
Britain was about to acknowledge the Norwegian claim to parts of Antarctica.
Scientists, the Navy and the Air Force, attended the corresponding meeting in
Norway. The main concern was to show Norwegian scientific efficiency in the
Antarctic after the political recognition of the Norwegian claim30. However, were
there shortages as to scientific staff? Parliamentary records from Norway show
that a probation tour was planned for the season 1946/47 as well as the pur-
chase of the vessel North Star. The alleged purpose was to train young Norwe-
gian scientists that they would not lag behind the Swedes and the British
scientists. From the Norwegian perspective the meteorological and oceano-
graphical results were held to be of great importance. Preparation would occur
before the main NBSX -expedition, scheduled for 1948. Norwegian whaling
interests were supposed to finance parts of the expenses31. The probation tour
was cancelled.
By mid November 1946 Ahlmann had informed the Swedish Foreign Minister
Östen Undén about the possible expedition, now scheduled for 1948, and
referred to the need for a Swedish contribution of 500.000 crowns. However,
only 50.000 had been secured from the government and the remaining sum
expected from Wallenberg Foundation had been withdrawn from the project32.
Meanwhile, he laid the groundwork for the participation of the Swedish Air
Force. Other records show that by late 1946 the Swedish Air Force was firmly
rooted in the operative parts of the NBSX-expedition. As mentioned above,
already since 1945, Ahlmann had been convinced of the fact that the Swedish
Air Force would take an interest in joining an expedition to Antarctica33. His
main contact was general B. Nordenskiöld, General of Command of the
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Swedish Air Force, a person known for his independent actions in strengthening
the air force vis à vis the navy and the army.
On 28 January 1947 the Norwegian government informed the Swedish govern-
ment of the Norwegian state involvement in the expedition, firmly stating the
requirements for Norwegian leadership, rather than a Swedish one. In Decem-
ber 1947 it was stated that the expedition would be postponed until 1949. Re-
cords show that the expedition was delayed at least two years, due to financial
problems and other scarce resources in Norway and Great Britain. Although a
first tripartite meeting was held in Oslo on 27 November 1946, the national
committees had still not entered their final form by May 1948. Only in October
1949 had the picture clarified; the composition of the committees was far from
“purely” scientific. High-level civilian as well as military officials were represen-
ted in the three countries. Leader of the expedition was H.U. Sverdrup and
leader of the wintering party was Captain John Giaever, of the Norwegian Air
Force; both persons were close friends of Hans Ahlmann34.
The planning of the air survey operations translated the tripartite efforts just de-
scribed into the organisational landscape of the NBSX. There was a rather late
settling of the logistics for landing the party as well as for the air surveys. Ac-
cording to RAF reports, in 1948 the Norwegians still foresaw the use of a Cata-
lina with the use of British flying personal35 and a budget of some 5 million
Norwegian crowns36. Later revised and perhaps more realistic plans instead
included the use of Norwegian Norseman planes – for all three Antarctic
summer seasons, but it was still an open issue exactly how to engage the
Swedish Air Force. It might be argued that the military “only” represented the
logistic dimension but in the following sections it will be shown that the military
was actively engaged for foreign policy purposes, far beyond the implementa-
tion of the logistic demands of glaciological and geological science. To conclude
this section - all in all the military presence was as important as the civilian one,
and foreign and security policy issues were as much present as scientific
issues. Further, the whaling industry  had also a firm interest in the expedition.
9.7 Swedish military goes abroad – but not for vacation
Although the Defence Ministry, itself by 10 November 1950 had decided that
the Swedish Air Force would participate in a mission outside Sweden’s borders,
the government delayed its formal decision until summer 1951. Already in the
Antarctic summer season of 1950/51 Captain Reinhold von Essen participated
as an observer on the NBSX, since already earlier, unspecified when but
presumably since 1945-46, there had been “talk of” participation of the Swedish
Air Force37. The existence of this observership in 1950/51 has been mentioned,
but not explained at any length in Swedish writings on the expeditions.
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According to Swedish press the Swedish Air Force ordered the study of logistics
and procedures of the flights  carried out by the Norwegian company Wideröe in
that same summer season. As for the next season 1951/52 the mission for the
Swedish Air Forcewas twofold, firstly to act as a safety measure, to fly out the
expedition members if embarking by sea were to be impossible. Secondly, the
Swedish Air Force was tasked to make 24 over flights in Antarctica for air sur-
veying and mapping purposes, partly to assist the Norwegians, partly for testing
wireless and radio communication equipment. After discussions back and forth,
in the end Ahlmann and Sverdrup had made a formal request to the Swedish
Air Force to participate in the season of 1951/5238. The expedition would cover
the costs for travels, fuel, equipment etc39. Nevertheless an additional sum of
money would be requested from the parliament (195.000 Swedish crowns).
According to the Department of Ecclesiastics the total sum of 300.000 crowns
already had been granted to the expedition, but not for the coverage of the
Swedish Air Force expenses. The sum of 195.000 and the personnel was
granted by a government decision 9 June 1951.
Due to sparse experience and little knowledge about radio communication and
navigation in cold areas the Swedish Air Force during summer 1951 had also
taken contacts with Air Force men from Norway, Great Britain and the United
States who were located in various places in the Arctic. This was only one ex-
ample of the increasing operative cooperation between neutral Sweden and the
Western Allies. As part of the effort 1951/52 Sweden sent six men from the
Swedish Air Force, under the leadership of von Essen to assist the NBSX for
the up-coming summer season. The group brought two aircrafts, a Beech craft
18-R and a small SAAB Safire as well as field equipment for radio communi-
cation. Details of the mapping activities are covered elsewhere40.
In an interview von Essen claimed that the main task for the Swedish Air Force
was to test equipment in cold weather. The interview was made after his tour as
observer but before the actual Swedish operation. He stated that it is evident
that the Air Force did not provide resources for the sole purpose that six flying
men would get abroad on a far away trip. The Air Force also expected good
value for money by testing equipment41. In the formal report following the first
visit of von Essen, i.e. from his observership in 1950/51, the reason for the
Swedish Air Force participation in the expedition for the next season becomes
even more clarified.
The original plan for von Essen in 1950 was to join the Norsel, in Göteborg
Sweden on 16 November 1950, visit Maudheim and then proceed to Halifax,
still aboard the ship. From there he would fly back home, at the expense of the
Swedish Air Force. Additional knowledge on planes and flights, radio communi-
cation and air surveys were to be sought from the Canadian Air Force. How-
ever, the schedule for Norsel made a visit to Halifax impossible and von Essen
stayed on at Maudheim. Instead Norsel left for Newfoundland and von Essen
cabled back home to ask whether he could join. He urged his superiors to give
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their permission for him to get in touch with the Air Force men that were at work
surveying areas north of Hudson Bay. Apparently, he was not granted a tour to
Canada (von Essen 1950 from Norsel, Cape Town).
The missions for the Swedish flying squadron for 1951/52 were rather well
defined with one exception – the participation in air surveying. Records show
quite clearly that Ahlmann and Sverdrup well in advance of 1950, before the
Norwegian flights, had foreseen the air surveying led by von Essen, although it
was not very clear on what distances they would fly. Nevertheless, in the von
Essen report from March 1951 it is evident that the Norwegian flights were not
too successful. Weather conditions had been difficult and flights had not been
prepared in a proper way. Much work had to be undertaken anew and by now it
was possible to state that the Swedish Air Force had been called upon! In 1950
von Essen further reported on planes and equipment and evaluated their func-
tioning. He also mentioned the necessity of social competence due to the
international character of the expedition, in particular on its way home aboard
the ship. Von Essen concluded the necessity for him to undertake a trip to
Canada before  the next season to consult experienced persons with regard to
flights in cold, desolate areas. The observations of the Wideröe operations had
not been sufficient to guarantee safety and perfect positions (navigation) in
relation to the planned air surveys. Finally von Essen reported on the testing of
cold weather garments, including survival dress and goggles. Also he in a short
passage mentioned the system of weather reports. Maudheim received infor-
mation from Graham Land, from the subantarctic island and from the Norwegian
whaling fleet. From all this it is clear that the Swedish Air Force, apart from
assisting the NBSX also had its own rationale and agenda for participation.
There was a military goal of gaining knowledge and experience relating to the
operations in extreme conditions as well as an increasing wish for closer in-
sights to the process of military build-up in the Arctic. In this regard, firstly, the
intensified work on weather system and lines of communications took place in
both polar areas. Secondly, the actual militarization of the Arctic was a fact42.
All in all operations were quite successful and afterwards the two planes were
put on Norsel, so by 15 January 1952 the planes as well as the members of the
NBSX -expedition were on their way back to Europe. The party left the ship on
Canary Island took another vessel and arrived in Southampton on 18 February
1952. In relation to the arrival to and departure from Antarctica one may take
note of the fact that the status of the Swedish flying squadron was not totally
clarified – the Swedish Air Force themselves described the unit as travelling
under civilian conditions, however requiring certain assistance from South
African authorities when landing the planes in Cape Town for further transport
towards Antarctica43.
Most historiography on the NBSX-expedition, including media reports from
expedition members including von Essen himself claim (von Essen 1954) that it
was the international status of the expedition that led to the respective nationa-
lities of the air units. This argument is somewhat of a simplification considering
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all the planning efforts and political deliberations preceding the expedition. As
argued above these international features were not at all evident in the initial
stages of the expedition since the all Norwegian, or all-Scandinavian concept
actually existed as the first option. For instance Ahlmann had been convinced of
the Swedish Air Force participation well in advance of any British or Norwegian
flights. Swedish literature on the NBSX does not tell in what manner it was seen
as suitable for the Swedish Air Force to participate in this international event at
these turbulent times. Further, there is no account of what preparations had
been made in order to plant the idea in von Essen of a Swedish officer doing
intelligence work up in the high North.
9.8 To secure security – Great Britain
In 1950, as von Essen had been an observer and wanted to join Norsel for
Halifax and later on Newfoundland, he had good reasons for his request to go
north. Perhaps his reasons were far too good for Swedish foreign policy con-
cerns?
In the season of 1950/51 B Roberts and HU Sverdrup were aboard the Norsel
to prepare for the expedition to Maudheim. Sverdrup also visited Johannesburg
to inform himself on the weather report systems connecting the whaling fleet
with Antarctica and subantarctic islands. Aboard the very same Norsel, a lieu-
tenant Forster from the British navy undertook a long trip, from Europe to the
Antarctic, then he proceeded to the Arctic . Neither his existence, nor his obser-
vership is often mentioned, but his mission was to study ice-navigation. For one
scarce piece of information see Sverdrup in The Norwegian Whaling Gazette
(1951). Thus, while von Essen flew back home; Forster actually continued to
Newfoundland and the Arctic to learn about ice conditions and ice navigation.
This reconnaissance tour further strengthens the argument of locating the
NBSX within a wider foreign-and security policy framework. A report from
Forster himself clearly formulates the positive opportunity to, in a discrete way,
study conditions aboard a civilian ship in the Arctic without being too visible
(Forster 1951). In the end von Essen had been excluded and the reasons for
this remain for future research.
Commonwealth politics added further political dimensions to the NBSX and
required time-consuming correspondence for the British and the Norwegian
organisers. So did the development of the transatlantic relations. The accessib-
le correspondence reveals that several Commonwealth countries were asked to
join with a military representative to the expedition. Roberts corresponded with
authorities in South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. The two first mentioned
countries sent observers 1949/ !)50 to study landing procedures, transports and
equipment such as instruments for investigation phenomena of the upper atmo-
sphere. The U.S.abstained from sending a person. It is interesting to note that
the Swedish foreign ministry also felt inclined to inform its legations in South
America of the observers joining the NBSX44.This was presumably due to the
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coordination of the weather services of South Africa, Argentina, Chile, and
Great Britain at FIDS, France at Adelie Land as well as with ships in whaling
fleets scheduled for the summer seasons of the NBSX. Financial means for this
synoptic weather analysis had been provided by Norway45.
So, how come that RAF, the Swedish Air Force and Norwegian government
collectively in times of economic crisis, would lend resources, men and ma-
chines to such a scientific enterprise as the NBSX? I do not mean to diminish
the importance of all scientific concerns mentioned in former books and articles
on the NBSX. Rather my argument is that there were other, parallel concerns.
Glimpses of the build-up of an international weather reporting system, coopera-
tion on the operational level with regard to intelligence systems related to the
Arctic and general foreign- and security policy concerns have been presented.
9.9 The general foreign-and security policy framework – Sweden and
Polar Areas
In 1945 there were rumours that the U.S.was about to buy Greenland, this
Captain J Giaever wrote to his friend Ahlmann46. Iceland and Greenland were
becoming the location of U.S.bases and air strips. Later sources bear witness to
the profound militarization of the Arctic47. Apart from planning the NBSX  Hans
Ahlmann planned a visit to Greenland, asking U.S.authorities (War and Navy
Departments) for permission. In his letter to Rear Adm. H Smith he requested
permission to visit Greenland as well as to enter an American plane. Ahlmann
referred directly to the important information he had gained in Moscow and from
the Arctic Institute in Leningrad48. Colonel Yates, Air Corps Chief of the Air
Weather Service of the Army in a confidential letter several months later warmly
welcomed the visit and research of Hans Ahlmann:
“With the added emphasis, which is being placed on the develop-
ment of scientific programs in the Polar Regions, I feel that your visit
to Greenland is very timely. As chief /…/ I am extremely interested in
all research programs and scientific explorations pertaining to the
meteorological  field which are presently being conducted and are
contemplated for the arctic area. I would be very pleased to receive
any reports, which you might render after the completion of your visit
to Greenland.”49
The two letters clearly show the unavoidable intimacy of science and militariza-
tion and provide short portraits of two scientists working within the build-up of a
global Cold War. Science was far from “pure” and results were far from interna-
tionally available. Within the domain of the Ministry of Defence,  and Foreign
Affairs the Cold War produced attempts at solving the security issues, at that
moment questions of an overriding importance. Meanwhile, in 1946, Harald
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Sverdrup, later to become leader of the NBSX, was on his way back home to
Norway from La Jolla, and the Oceanographic Institute in California still hesitat-
ing to take on a leading role of reorganising the Norwegian Polar Institute. Ahl-
mann had tried to recruit him and asked him to guide “geophysics” in Norway.
Sverdrup had recently turned down an offer to participate in the atomic tests in
the Pacific Ocean in favour of going to Norway50.
Turning southwards once again, in the Antarctic, the U.S.had plans for Opera-
tion High jump II, scheduled for 1949-50. Here the question of  experience at
high latitudes in the context of the Cold War was significant. Preparations in-
cluded Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Argentina and South Africa. Diplomatic
work aimed at facilitating air operations as well as access to seaports. Between
the various U.S.actors there were still internal discussions as to an actual U.S.
claim on parts of the Antarctic, based on the use of the concept of effective
occupation. The navy-planning group was hesitant whether it would do any
good to anyone to “run a show with a slogan of scientific research as a banner”.
In the discussion within the navy, in order to convince the State Department and
the Treasury for additional funds the following motivations were given: Firstly,
High jump II would occur in order to strengthen the position of the U.S.(the
wording of occupation was crossed out), secondly the operation (including three
bases) was motivated by training of personnel and thirdly, possible/ probable
scientific accomplishments were foreseen. It was also stated that all ships, men
and material could be redestined to the Arctic in case of deterioration in inter-
national relations51. Still in March 1949 discussions were held along the same
lines but in a diminished scale. In April 1949 plan Charlie was emphasized a
giant, unrestricted training operation in cold weather operations due to the “sen-
sitivity of foreign governments to our Arctic operations”. In addition the (possib-
le) acquisition of scientific information was to be highlighted “as the basic story”
to the general public – whilst the issue of claims should be put in the closet52.
Although High jump II ultimately was cancelled, the last preparations for the
NBSX  took place in a shivering period of time.
9.10 NBSX – science for security and security cooperation
The Norwegian Parliament in 1948, for the longer term foresaw a network of
meteorological stations connecting Maudheim with British and Argentine sta-
tions  on the peninsula. Also it acknowledged the importance of international
efforts of exploring the “free atmosphere” as well as the benefits for national
interests of air surveying. The close links between the western system of de-
fence and the build-up of international competence for meteorological knowl-
edge required a large research effort per se. Given that general background the
present short article on the NBSX permits at least initial conclusions on science
as politics with other means. In my view, one of the most important rationales
for the performance of the NBSX was the emerging need for increased knowl-
edge of weather systems by defence organisations worldwide. This explains
most of its international content, much better than does reference to some less
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well defined internationalism due to good will held by a few individuals. Hereby I
further question the thesis that the NBSX  is a (remarkably) early example of
some radical small state foreign policy of independence, where both Sweden
and Norway ran a preview of their respective policies established in late 50´s53.
On the reverse, the two Nordic countries were within, or in the case of Sweden
closely tied to, the western alliance, although each country had its specific loca-
tion and assignments.
At last it is also necessary to broach the question to what extent the Swedish
support of the NBSX was related to the (unsuccessful) negotiations of a Scan-
dinavian Defence Alliance. Although somewhat speculative I would like to state
that general good will on behalf of Sweden could be demonstrated in a rather
inexpensive way, both towards Norway and Great Britain in times of official and
publicly shown bitterness, after the strategic “split” on the political level in the
spring of 1949. This when Norway was on its way into NATO and Sweden
remained outside and the post-war security pattern were established in northern
Europe. Further, indirect support for Norwegian Antarctic claims could be
shown, and indirectly for Norwegian interests in the Arctic, without full scale
legal acts of recognitions. Useful knowledge could be gained without upsetting
the USSR. Further, valuable contacts could be upheld with regard to access to
know-how in cold regions despite a lack of closer formal cooperation with NATO
-countries.
On the strategic level both Sweden and Norway were strongly influenced by the
strategic conceptions of a possible third world war. The scenarios assumed
during negotiations for a Scandinavian Defence Alliance in 1948/49 survived for
several decades and the destinies of Norway and Sweden were seen as closely
related. The prime concern of Sweden was to stay outside a war and to secure
vital supplies, such as fuel and certain high technology goods. Science in polar
areas ensured an increased degree of security.
There are still answers to be sought in primary sources external to the official
travel reports and expedition accounts as well as outside the contemporary
press reports. Because the questions simply have not been dealt with, in docu-
mentation by persons participating in the expedition. Nor has later research in
Sweden highlighted these dimensions. The complementary representations
presented here suggest that Security and Foreign policy was a primary concern,
in Sweden, in Norway and in Great Britain.
The intricate European-U.S.relations visible already during the NBSX became
apparent during the planning of the International Geophysical Year for 1957-58.
The Norwegians had been slightly slow in elaborating the results from the
NBSX and Ahlmann made a summary of already well-established concerns:
“Missing maps are delaying geological results, but it is also a shame if
American planes should fly over the area and put their names on moun-
tains and glaciers or their icebreakers map the “unmapped” coast of
Queen Maud Land and put in such names as Byrd Bay etc”54.
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10 Swedish non-participation in the Antarctic leg of IGY 1957/58
Aant Elzinga, Göteborg University, Göteborg, Sweden
Email: Aant.Elzinga@theorysc.gu.se
10.1 Introduction
Over one hundred years ago the Swedish geologist Otto Nordenskjöld led what
at the time was called the Swedish South Pole Expedition1. Despite difficulties
and the loss of the expedition vessel the enterprise brought home much valuab-
le data and generated a large series of important scientific publications. Rough-
ly five decades later Swedish scientists participated in what is often regarded as
the first truly international Antarctic expedition, one that according to some
accounts served as a model for cooperative efforts during the IGY. It was the
Norwegian-British-Swedish Expedition (NBSX), also referred to as the Maud-
heim expedition2. As Lisbeth Lewander argues in another chapter in this volume
transformation in the geopolitical situation in the post-World War II world and
the inception of the Cold War were primary background factors and stimuli for
the venture. Wartime technological developments were also important. Investi-
gations were made in several fields of science.
At the individual level, the driving-force behind the new Antarctic project was the
renowned Swedish glaciologist Hans W:son Ahlmann. Although not a partici-
pant in the expedition, it was his vision and scientific prowess, excellent con-
tacts with Norwegian partisans during World War II and politicians afterwards,
combined with diplomatic skills in negotiating with the British that helped facili-
tate the venture. Many of the participants later became internationally renowned
researchers. For Sweden’s part the focus was mainly on glaciology and meteo-
rology, with Valter Schytt and Gösta Liljequist respectively as the principal in-
vestigators in these two fields.
Sometimes it has been speculated that on the basis of its excellent scientific
record in Antarctica, Sweden might have succeeded in joining the founding
nations of the Antarctic Treaty, had there been sufficient political and scientific
will to do so. A strong case might have been made on the basis of the country’s
earlier merits, but there was no one to press the case in connection with the
meetings in Washington D.C. 1959 and the conference that shaped the treaty.
Marie Jacobsson, attributes this inactivity to political naïvity on the part of
Sweden3.
Swedish scientists actually played an internationally recognized instrumental
role at the birth of the Special Committee on Antarctic Research, later (in 1961)
called the Scientific Committee (the acronym in both cases being SCAR). Valter
Schytt was even the first person to be appointed its secretary. The Swedish
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 Elzinga et.al. 2004.
2
 For a recent account by one of the participants, see Swithinbank (1999). Maudheim was the
name of the base on an ice shelf near Cape Norvegia (by the much larger Riiser Larsen Ice
Shelf) just off Dronning Maud Land, Antarctica.
3
 Jacobsson 2004: 319.
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government and the country’s scientific community however chose a low profile.
The main reasons were political. First of all Sweden’s main interests and efforts
during the IGY had been in the Arctic, particularly on Svalbard. Secondly Swed-
en lacked a policy of territorial acquisition, both 1900-05 and in the 1950s4.
Thirdly, after World War II Sweden put a lot of faith in the United Nations. This
was not so strange considering that Dag Hammarskjöld became UN General
Secretary (1953-61). Faith in the UN-system probably included belief in its role
in creating a broad intergovernmental regime for managing affairs in Antarctica.
This was a stance that deviated sharply from almost all the countries that had a
stake in the future of the icy continent. Finally, Sweden was an avowed adher-
ent to a policy of active neutrality that had kept her out of World War II. During
the period of the Cold War that followed it implied a determination – officially - to
side with neither the US nor the USSR.
The purpose of the present paper is to review the situation and to consider
some personal, institutional and political factors that led to Sweden’s non-par-
ticipation in the Antarctic leg of the IGY and the subsequent decision to abstain
from accession to the Antarctic Treaty, at least until 1984.
An interesting paradox in the Swedish historical account is that when attitudes
began to change, both within the scientific community and in governmental
circles, the spark came from a massive activity in the Arctic. An expedition
called Ymer 1980 with and icebreaker and 114 participants, led by Valter
Schytt, commemorating the event one hundred years earlier of the famous
Vega expedition through the Northeast Passage had an important spin-off
effect. Several young scientists in various disciplines developed polar interests.
The government for its part, in the wake of the Oil Crisis and the period of
negotiations of an Antarctic Minerals Convention plus the perceived possibility
that a review of the Antarctic Treaty in 1991 might close the door permanently
to any future participation, suddenly stirred to life and rapidly developed a
strategy to get Sweden into the club.
10.2 Conceptual frame
The conceptual framework that guides the present study involves distinctions
between three levels of activity that are mutually interlinked. These “levels”,
already indicated in the previous section, may be characterized by three
different key words: policy, institutions and individuals (see Fig. 10-1). At a
micro-level, individual scientists are viewed as driven by personal and profes-
sional interests. Ahlmann was a case in point. As a professor of geography at
Stockholm högskola during the 1940s he was embedded in an institutional
arrangement that allowed him to mobilize economic and infrastructural re-
sources to achieve his aims. Large-scale resources of the kind needed for an
Antarctic expedition after World War II for the most part was one where patron-
age had to involve economic backing and political authorization from above.
National subsidies were decided at the macro-level of politics and policies.
                                                
4
 Jacobsson (2004) gives a critical analysis of the historical record, arguing that historically the
lack of such a policy regarding Antarctic territory was not – as is often claimed – the result of a
moral principle (altruism) but simply due to inaptitude.
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Even though science policy did not formally emerge as a specific policy domain
until later,5 one can nevertheless say that a country’s commitment to the IGY
was prototypical of research done under the auspices of a country’s science
policy.
Subsidies at the national level were mostly motivated with a mix of scientific
institutional, economic and foreign policy as well as a matter of national pres-
tige. Symbolic as well as material activities tend to merge as indicators of
agency at the three levels of our analysis6.
Macro level:      Politics and policy
Meso level:        Institutional actors
Micro level:         Individual scientists
Figure 10-1: Conceptual schematism showing three interacting levels of agency.
The institutional level may be understood as one where the interests of indivi-
dual scientists and those of state policy meet. When positive resonance obtains
between interests at the micro- and macro-levels the efforts of individual scien-
tists are collectivized and organizationally facilitated (as well as constrained in
various ways), and intentions get translated into plans and support out of the
public purse. This allows individuals to develop networks and enrol others for
their cause, other scientists as well as politicians and high-level civil servants.
Strong individual actors become champions who define strategic scientific
orientations or re-orientations. Institutions are therefore the nodes where fund-
ing and other resources needed for infrastructural and logistical support are
brought together and canalized.
With the foregoing schematism in mind I also want to pinpoint some necessary
and sufficient conditions needed for a country to launch Antarctic activities for
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 Cf. Elzinga & Jamison 1995: 584-587.
6
 Elsewhere we use the concept of “institutional motives” (i.e., basic research, economic,
military, legal, environmental protection motives, etc.) to address the question of how polar
research can be a continuation of politics by other means (Elzinga and Bohlin 1989). For an
important distinction between the practical-instrumental and symbolic-instrumental uses of
science see Bohlin (1988), and also ∅streng (1989). Bohlin (1991) has an incisive discussion
on the various combinations and tensions between “institutional motive”, see also Elzinga
(1993).
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the IGY. To do this I shall briefly contrast the Swedish and Belgian situations
(Table 10-1). Sweden did not launch an Antarctic expedition whereas Belgium
did. The comparison of the two cases can be used to highlight several factors at
the three analytical levels of my conceptual frame. These coincided in the one
case for the Antarctic (Belgium) but not in the other (Sweden). In the Swedish
case individual scientific interests, institutional changes and national state poli-
cies conjoined readily in a plan for an IGY venture in the Arctic, thereby exclu-
ding the possibility of an Antarctic leg of the IGY.






















yes (not done) yes yes
Possibility to mobilize
national prestige?
yes (not done) yes yes
Possibility to attain a
critical scientific
mass?
yes (not done) yes yes
Possible to go alone? yes yes yes
In Belgium by contrast, Baron Gaston de Gerlache de Gomary, the son of
Adrien de Gerlache the driving spirit of the Belgica expedition 1898, took up the
Antarctic cause. During World War II he became a hero in his own right as a
fighter pilot with the British Royal Air Force. He was able to use symbolic capi-
tal, as his father before, to mobilize a large number of sponsors, including the
Belgian Royal family. He also collected money via private subscription cam-
paigns. Two Norwegian vessels were rented7. The expedition left Antwerp 12
November 1957, arriving 26 December to set up King Baudouin base on King
Leopold Bay. In all de Gerlache in the mid-50s raised the equivalent of one
million U.S.dollars, enough for Belgium to go alone to Dronning Maud Land.
The presence of a strong nationalist heritage rhetoric paid off when mobilized
by a highly visible champion for the Antarctic cause. This contrasted sharply
with the Swedish situation where Otto Nordenskjöld’s name could never trigger
the same kind of resonance and response in similar circles. Another difference
was that in Belgium, as distinct from Sweden there was a clear political will,
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 See further Van Antenboer 2001.
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perhaps influenced by the tradition of a colonial past closely linked to the
fortunes of large mining companies and the Royal family.
The two cases are also interesting because they reveal something of the pre-
conditions required in 1959 for a country to become a party to Antarctic affairs.
Poland applied to become a Treaty member but was told it would have to place
a station in Antarctica. Belgium got in at a late hour with an expedition, setting
up and running an over-wintering station.
10.3 A door closed in 19598
During the 1930s J. Gunnar Andersson, a member of Otto Nordenskjöld’s
Antarctic expedition thirty years earlier, was one of the few persons in Sweden
to advocate a second south polar venture. He noted how a Swedish-British
Antarctic expedition with a five year wintering station near Nordenskjöld’s
original site had been cancelled in 1914, falling victim to World War I, whence
Sweden lacked political aspirations in this direction and concentrated wholly on
the Arctic9. Ironically, he added: ”Among Swedish polar scientists there has
since fifty years ago existed an arrogant habit of looking down on those who
were motivated by the setting of polar records of little scientific value. I myself
belonged to that group of narrow minded critics, but now heartily want to admit
that I have changed my view regarding these exploits that are so highly praised
by the public at large.”10 Competition, he now found, was a driving force in the
development of new technologies; apart from science (meteorology, glaciology,
geology, etc.) it might yield economic benefits (for whaling and mineral re-
sources)11. In official Sweden, however, there was no visible resonance for the
latter line of reasoning12. The successful Maudheim expedition 1949-1952 ap-
parently did nothing to change this widespread apathy.
Ambassador Bo Johnson Theutenberg, Legal Adviser to the Swedish Foreign
Ministry, and representing Sweden in Antarctic affairs in the early 1980s, com-
mented on Sweden’s missed opportunity when he shortly after the country’s
accession to the Treaty reviewed the paradoxical historical record. ”While
several nations see the Antarctic Treaty as a sort of starting point for something
new in the field of international cooperation and scientific research”, he noted,
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 For more detail on events relating the closure see Lisbeth Lewander’s Licentiate dissertation
of May 1990, Kontroller over Antarktis. Suveränitetsanspråk och traktatreglering 1940-1982, in
Lisbeth Lewander Polariseringens politik. Studier av politik och kön (Karlstad: Karlstad Univer-
sity Studies 2004: 51), del II, Artikel 1: 18-20.
9
 Andersson 1945: 373.
10
 Andersson 1945: 422.
11
 Andersson 1945: 438. In a later book he gave the German Schwabenland expedition
particularly good coverage - Andersson 1954.
12
 Observers in other countries found the Swedish position rather odd, at least if one judges by
what a Chilean wrote in 1986. ”Sweden is the only country that after having conducted an Ant-
arctic expedition has not become interested in the area and has not recognized the Treaty. The
Swedes effectively mounted an Antarctic expedition in 1901-03 /.../ This expedition could have
provided a basis for a Swedish claim. In 1950-52 Sweden took part in an important joint expedi-
tion. /.../ But the Swedes never showed any interest in either the political or territorial problems
of Antarctica, or in taking part in scientific research programs that were being conducted on that
continent.” Cited from Merico 1987: 72.
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”the coming into being of the Treaty in 1959 brings, for some reasons,
something of an end to Swedish scientific involvement in Antarctica /…/ the
Washington conference in 1959, in which Sweden did not participate, and the
wording of the Antarctic Treaty, did not permit any more substantial Swedish
activities in Antarctica. It is an open question whether, perhaps, a more decided
Swedish policy in the period preceding the important Washington Conference
could have brought Sweden, with its longstanding Antarctic and polar scientific
interests, displayed by several substantial activities, such as expeditions, into
the Treaty System from the very beginning in some capacity or another.”13
Apart from involvement of some individual scientists after 1959 Swedish activi-
ties in Antarctica more or less faded.
Theutenberg noted how, since ”the only way for promoting state-interest in
general with regard to Antarctica lies, since 1959, within the Treaty System”, the
promotion of Swedish scientific and other interests had become complicated14.
The scientific society in Sweden had not sought government support for re-
search in Antarctica during the IGY or afterwards, despite ”the very obvious fact
that the Swedish scientific foundation in this respect must be considered very
strong, especially during the 50s. Such governmental support in 1959, when the
Treaty was established, could perhaps have led Swedish scientific activities in
another and more positive direction as regards Antarctica and polar research
more generally. The governmental position, on the other hand, was obviously
that Sweden did not want to become a non-consultative member of the Antarc-
tic Treaty, particularly considering its longstanding traditions and activities in
Antarctica. So the whole thing was dropped.”15
10.4 Cold War roots of the IGY
The IGY was originally conceived of as a third polar year, breaking the custom
of a fifty-year interval between polar years. Research technologies and modes
of polar transportation had developed rapidly in the 1930s and particularly
during the Second World War. Rocketry provided a possibility of launching
artificial satellites. Radar had found many uses in navigation, and small tracked
army vehicles (Weasels) were already being used in polar regions (NBSX and
French expeditions between 1949 and 1952 to wit - and Australians were using
amphibian vehicles to land scientists in the sub-Antarctic). Cosmic ray record-
ers, spectroscopy, and radio-probe balloons in the upper atmosphere all pro-
vided possibilities of much broader scope of investigations than ever before.
Developments in electronics brought with them computer aided numerical
analysis especially useful in meteorology and also in other geosciences.
A new geopolitical conjuncture prompted US military operations in polar regions
to test new technologies, clothing and materials under extreme conditions. Ope-
ration Nanouk in te Arctic 1946 was followed by Operation High Jump in the
Antarctic in 1947, and its smaller follow up, Operation Windmill, in 1948. These
events, together with the discovery of uranium in Antarctica, and Soviet whaling
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 Theutenberg 1985: 70.
14
 Theutenberg 1985: 71.
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 Theutenberg 1985.
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fleets visiting that continent, spurred several nations, among them Argentina,
Australia, Chile, France, Norway and the UK to visibly consolidate their terri-
torial claims. Scientific expeditions were used to signal national sovereignty -
science became a continuation of politics by other means16.
With the outbreak of the Korean War 1950 Research and Development funding
for military research moreover increased enormously and continued on an up-
ward curve. Sydney Chapman in his book, IGY: Year of Discovery (1959) notes
how the U.S.  alone under its IGY rocket program for the study of the upper
atmosphere launched no less than 116 rockets during the first twelve months of
the eighteen month period of the IGY17.
A significant part of the IGY involved a focus on the ionosphere. This had to do
with attempts to map and determine the cause of the worldwide pattern of elec-
tron distribution, in height and geographical position - all over the earth by day
and night and in different seasons during quiet and disturbed periods. Patterns
in the polar regions, aurora, were especially interesting, with findings significant
for both military and civilian technologies (a policy for what is nowadays called
dual-use research and technology). ”Ionospheric irregularities caused by an
aurora can modify electromagnetic waves, thereby affecting communications
with satellite systems and affecting utilization over-the-horizon detector radars
for defence against strategic transpolar bomber attack. Additionally, currents
induced during geomagnetic storms in long conductors such as telephone
cables, power lines, or pipelines can cause damage or serious failure.”18 Im-
provement of radio communications and weather forecasting in the Arctic were
of great importance to the nations surrounding it, a need augmented by Cold
War military escalations. In 1954, for example, 40 Defence Early Warning
(DEW) stations began to be built from Alaska, across northern Canada, and on
Greenland as part of a huge system to meet the USSR head on across the
North Pole in case of war19. The DEW Line became officially operational 31
July, 1957. Radio physics and meteorology along side rocket science were
important Cold War disciplines.
Considering the foregoing context it is not surprising that there was a lot of
suspicion around, and much second-guessing in both Washington and Moscow
as to what the other side was up to and intended to do behind the screen of the
IGY. Discussions on the use of missiles to carry nuclear warheads or spy
behind enemy lines were not uncommon. In all this Sweden came to play an
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 All this jockeying took place in a new era of geopolitics marked by Truman’s doctrine of
containment (1947) and the advent of the Cold War. In Europe a group of nations signed the
Brussels Treaty (March 1948) agreeing to develop a common defence system with five coun-
tries to ”meet the Soviet threat”. A year later Canada and the U.S.  joined them to form the
North Atlantic pact (later NATO) which also roped in several other nations, including both Den-
mark and Norway, leaving Sweden isolated in its earlier parallel attempt to form a Scandinavian
Defence Alliance on more neutral grounds (see further Lewander in this volume). The U.S. for
its part found Sweden’s post-war neutrality objectionable and the idea of a technological boycott
was even entertained.
17
 Chapman 1959:57. For lists of all the rockets sent up by both the US and USSR see Wilson
(1961)
18
 Osherenko and Young 1989: 27, citing Bradley and Winakur.
19
 Cf. Wedin 1967.
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important role as a place where scientists from various countries could meet on
neutral ground.
10.5 Sweden’s stake in the IGY
When the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) first issued its call for
a new international Polar Year, Sweden was quick to respond. The national
Geodesy and Geophysics Association created a national committee, at the time
called the Polar Year Committee (the PYC was created as early as 28 Oct
1952). The meteorologist Carl-Gustaf Rossby was made chairman, physcist
Nicolai Herlofson, Laborator at the Swedish Institute of Technology in Stock-
holm , Vice Chair, and Bert Bolin Secretary20.
Due to economic constraints, Sweden was unable to intensify its efforts in all
areas of the geosciences. Strict priorities had to be set. Cosmic physics and
meteorology were singled out as the primary focal points. There was a certain
increase of activity at the Swedish solar observatory on Capri, Italy, but the
major thrust consisted in launching an expedition to Spitsbergen, an effort that
turned into a joint venture together with Finland and Switzerland – hence it is
referred to as the Swedish-Finnish-Swiss expedition of 1957/58 58 at Murchison
Bay, Kinnvika, Nordaustlandet on Spitsbergen.
Sweden sent specialists in cosmic physics, auroral studies, earth magnetism,
meteorology and atmospheric chemistry. Finnish scientists made observations
of the air and tidal changes, while the Swiss measured electricity and radioac-
tivity in the atmosphere. The Swedish focus reflected the interests of the two
leading personalities that headed the PYC, meteoreological work and geocos-
mic physics (cosmic rays, aurora and geomagnetism).
Herlofson was interested in aurora, electronics and geocosmic physics. Rossby
had been recruited back to Sweden from the USA to establish a world-class
institute for meteorological research. Bolin, who was to become his successor in
Stockholm, is the same person who in our own time became a renowned mete-
orologist and climate researcher, the influential first chairman of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). He was Rossby’s assistant and more
or less took over the latter’s academic duties whenever Rossby was away21.
Stockholm University’s Department of Meteorology provided a small room to
those involved in planning and operations of the Swedish IGY effort.
It was Bolin who on the advice of the ”Polar Year Committee”, and with input
from Liljequist, wrote the draft of the Swedish IGY programme22. It carried the
imprint of Rossby’s and Herlofson’s scientific interests. Rossby was at that time




  When Rossby suddenly died in 1957 Bolin officially took over, becoming Full Professor in
1961 (at the age of 36).
22
 The cost estimate was for 2 million SEK to cover the years 1954/55 until 1960. The detailed
programme and budgetary plan was sent in to parliament 18 Aug 1954, whence the budget for
the preparatory year 1955/56 was definitely settled and the framework for subsequent years ap-
proved.
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already concerned with atmospheric chemistry and the circulation of the atmo-
sphere. He wanted to set up a meteorological station on Svalbard to measure
trace gas contents in the atmosphere to determine possible transport of impuri-
ties from industrial regions in the north23.
Leader of the Swedish atmospheric chemistry project became Erik Eriksson. He
studied the regional distribution of CO2 content as well as the presence of dust
and salt particles in the air24. The Arctic was a suitable zero reference point to
study air pollution. Eric Dyring was put in charge of cosmogeophysic. Observa-
tion of earth magnetism fitted nicely alongside the aerological studies along a
line near the tenth meridian of longitude that skirted Svalbard. All this in turn
fitted into the international design of a global network of IGY observations posts.
Not unimportant for the Swedes was that their IGY effort also followed a certain
tradition. Spitsbergen had also been the site of Swedish research stations
during the two earlier polar years.
Already in 1954 a decision was taken to make Gösta Liljequist leader of the
expedition to Murchison Bay, Kinnvika25. If Liljequist felt slighted before, he now
during the IGY, thanks to Rossby and the emphasis on meteorology and atmo-
spheric problems, could pride himself on being a step ahead of Schytt and
gaining an opportunity to demonstrate his own leadership qualities. Liljequist’s
wintering party counted 13 persons: 8 Swedes, 3 Finns and 2 Swiss.
Tacked onto the expedition, but not part of the official Swedish IGY programme
was an ad hoc enterprise led by Valter Schytt, a glaciological expedition that set
up Ahlmann station and made several traverses26. Liljequist, who became pro-
fessor in Uppsala during the IGY, has written a major volume on Swedish polar
research. In it he recalled: ”When Schytt came home to Sweden, preparations
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 At first a site near Longyearbyn was considered, but there a mountain slope interfered with
the air-flow. Lloyd Berkner on behalf of IGY’s Executive had constantly been urging the Norwe-
gians to set up a large station at Cape Linné near a Soviet outpost in order to counterbalance
Russian efforts. Originally this was to involve a joint Norwegian-Swedish expedition, but the
Swedes pulled out of this venture in 1955. The official reason given was magnetic interference
caused by Norway’s Isfjord Radio. Unofficially the reason was political. Neutral Sweden did not
want to antagonize the Soviets and therefore opted instead for cooperation with Finland on an
expedition to Nordaustlandet. Finland for its part had a friendship pact with the Soviet Union
(Friedman 2004: 388).
24
 Liljequist 1993: 544.
25
 Liljequist was a meteorologist who had participated in the NBSX whence he had to defer to
his colleague Schytt who was five years younger. Schytt had been Ahlmann’s protege and as
such had been selected by the older glaciologist as leader of the Swedish contingent in NBSX,
where he actually was second in command, directly under the Norwegian John Giaever, and
with Gordon de Q. Robin representing Britain as third in command. Liljequist (1960) gives a po-
pular account of the Swedish IGY effort.
26
 Schytt had been in the US as a guest professor at Evanston Illinois since the autumn of 1953,
spent March 1954 in Canada’s North West Territories and thereafter during the summer did
some glaciological work on the Greenland ice sheet near the US military base Thule. In the
course of these activities he developed important contacts with American glaciologists. However
his absence from Stockholm meant that he was not there when the final decision on Sweden’s
IGY effort was made. It might be added that at the time he also lacked academic clout, still
being in the process of writing up his PhD thesis on the basis of field work carried out in the
Antarctic during the NBSX of 1949-52. It was first in April 1958 that he successfully defended
his thesis, and by May he was off to Svalbard for the second season of his own glaciological
expedition that he had succeeded in tacking onto the official IGY expedition.
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for the International Geophysical Year 1957-58 were going on, but there was no
place for glaciology. However, he started to prepare an expedition of his own
and, though the means for such an enterprise were missing to begin with, a
possible solution emerged”.27 Schytt got funding from the research council and
private donors. A Finnish colleague who was interested helped obtain Finnish
funding. But everything hung in the air until finally the Swedish Army provided
two weasel over-snow track vehicles. Schytt’s add-on-expedition comprised 6
Swedes, 2 Finns and an American28. Well in advance of his Spitsbergen expe-
dition Schytt had the good fortune of receiving an invitation from a leading
Soviet scientist to join the icebreaker Ob on its tour into the Arctic and was able
to visit the site of his planned expedition and do some reconnaisance work in
August 195629. The invitation was received during the course of an IGY Arctic
Conference held May 22-25, 1956 at Saltsjöbaden.
10.6 Saltsjöbaden 1956 – a neutral site for an Arctic conference
The Swedish national committee had been asked by the international commit-
tee to host a special Arctic conference30. The Arctic conference was probably
prompted by the vigorous Soviet preparations already afoot in that region,
something that worried Lloyd Berkner who was to become President of ICSU
1955-195831. A letter from the Bureau of the Comité Speciale de l’Année Geo-
physique Internationale (CSAGI), signed by Lloyd Berkner, reads as follows:
”Since the Brussels meeting /of the CSAGI 1955/ there has been demonstrated
a very considerable need for an Arctic Conference similar to the Antarctic Con-
ference that was held under the sponsorship of Ing. Gen. Georges Laclavère in
Paris last year /i.e., 6-10 July 1955/. This need has become especially pro-
minent since the publication of the rather complete plans of the Soviet Union,
which now discloses certain inadequacies in the total planning of various
nations concerned. So far as I know, the nations interested in Arctic research
are the following: Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Norway, Swe-
den, Switzerland, U.S.A, and the USSR”32.
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 Liljequist 1993: 544.
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 The latter, Weston Blake, was from the Department of Geology at Ohio State University,
Columbus Ohio. Schytt had gotten to know him well during the glaciological excursion on the
Greenland ice sheet 1954. Blake was later to pursue further glaciological work on Svalbard.
29
 Actually three Scandinavian scientists joined the Ob on its way to pick up researchers from
Soviet polar ice floe stations. Besides Schytt there was Erik Eriksson and the  Norwegian
metereologist and NBSX-veteran Nils Jørgen Schumacher.
30
 This was something similar to the Antarctic conference held in Paris in 1955 where the Soviet
scientists had suddenly shown up, and the position then taken by the organizer Colonel G.R.
Laclavère was to keep politics and economics out of it all in order to create a space for science.
It was a position especially underlined in supportive declarations by Argentinian and Chilean
delegates; cf. Laclavère 1961: 159-160.
31
 The Soviets had in 1937 initiated a pioneering effort in establishing a nine-month scientific
drifting station on a large ice floe at the North Pole. They proceeded to set up a large network of
meteorological stations on islands north of Siberia and subsequently, especially after World War
II increased the number of drifting stations. To catch up the US began their own studies by oc-
cupying ice islands from 1952 onward. Such islands were floating airfields and mobile bases for
mapping undersea terrain, studying oceanography, meteorology, and climate and for radio com-
munication and radar detection purposes. For an early account of the Soviet head start see Sei-
denfaden 1938: 184-190 and 197-206.
32
 Berkner 9 January 1955.
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The ambition was to obtain a balanced coverage of the Arctic and suitable coor-
dination, and probably from the West to counterbalance Soviet operations. In
spite of the IGY the Arctic never became a demilitarized zone.  Under the ice
nuclear submarines, like the Nautilus (first to cross underwater to and surface at
the geographic North Pole), plied the waters as demonstrations of military
strength33. Nevertheless the IGY facilitated some scientific cooperation in the
Arctic across the Cold War divide, which in itself became a spur to scientific
competition, especially in the Antarctic.
In the charged and suspicious atmosphere that existed at the time, Sweden
was a natural choice as a site for an Arctic IGY conference. Senior Swedish
scientists had excellent international reputations and Stockholm afforded a
neutral ground for East-West interactions. Ahlmann and Rossby moreover had
cultivated many fruitful contacts and interchange with Soviet colleagues. Ahl-
mann for his part, in recognition of the scientific work and the incidental support
of one of these colleagues, saw to it that  Professor  Mikail Mikailovitj Somov in
April 1959 received the prestigeous Vega medal34. Somov was head of the
Antarctic division of the famous polar research institute in Leningrad, leader of
Soviet IGY efforts in Antarctica, and later a SCAR delegate. In Stockholm, in a
lecture at the Physical Geography Department of the university he presented
preliminary results of his country’s polar research programmes35.
In the next section it will be shown how academic institutional trajectories, per-
sonal interests and contacts intertwined and had a bearing on the fortunes of
several actors, not least the two central Swedish figures of the NBSX, Liljequist
and Schytt. As a meteorologist Liljequist’s career was in tune with Rossby’s
ascendence while Schytt and glaciology in Stockholm had to struggle to find a
niche, particularly since Ahlmann’s role as active senior partner had ended a
few years after Rossby came to Sweden.
10.7 Ahlmann interests and his departure from academe
In 1931 Ahlmann had led the Swedish-Norwegian expedition to Nordaustlandet,
Spitsbergen, assembling valuable information about the accumulation of inland
ice. It was the first study ever of the metereological factors to which the Spits-
bergen glaciers owed their existence. In 1934, jointly with Harald Ulrik Sverdrup
he led another expedition to Spitsbergen, where data on firn stratification was
obtained. Further work was done on a glacier in Iceland. The continental nature
of northeast Greenland was studied in 1939. During the war data analysis and
emphasis on the role of the circulation of the earth’s atmosphere occupied Ahl-
mann. In reading the 1939 German Antarctic Schwabenland expedition’s report
and studying the accompanying photographs in 1942 he was much taken. Here
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 It should also be remembered that in the case of space research, another part of IGY, the US
and USSR started a race to launch the first ever artificial man-made earth circulating satellite, a
race won by the Sputnik 1957. The Americans had two failures before they too got their first sa-
tellite in orbit. These programmes were in part geared to developing technologies to carry inter-
continental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.
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 Ahlmann 1960: 250-255.
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 Somov 1960: 241-255.
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was something that fitted in with his glaciological concerns. There appeared
what to him were telltale signs of either remnants of an earlier ice age or else
evidence of the retreat of glaciers also in the Antarctic. Ahlmann developed his
own interpretation using changes in the glacial landscapes of Spitsbergen and
Greenland as analogues36. The pictures taken by the Schwabenland expedition
and its accompanying report helped Ahlmann to launch an Antarctic expedition,
the NBSX. It was Ahlmann’s last great project, ultimately predicated on the
belief that there might be global characteristics of to the climate warming pro-
blem (at the time it was referred to as climate improvement)37.
In 1950 Ahlmann’s resigned from the geography professorship at Stockholm
högskola. He had been there 21 years. The move was at the request of the
government to help patch up strained relations with Norway..38 His new post
was Swedish ambassador to Norway where he remained until early 1956. For
his junior academic colleagues the move came as a shock. For some of them it
implied a loss of opportunities and a substantially weakened geography depart-
ment. Schytt’s absence from Stockholm so soon after his return from NBSX and
the Antarctic was a further disadvantage for the glaciologists when it came to
setting agendas for IGY (Table 11-2).
Table 11-2: Interplay of interests and motives at three different levels.
Political level Establishment of the International
Metereological Institute and interests in the
Arctic




Impact on individual career and
research opportunities for a
younger generation
Liljequist, Wallén, Schytt, Eriksson, Bolin
It was not until 1954 that a new professor was installed on the geography chair
in Stockholm, Gunnar Hoppe, whose speciality became glacial morphology and
glacial geology. Hoppe however came in too late to influence the IGY effort,
                                                
36
 ”As far as I am aware”, he wrote, ”these conditions are the first more certain indications in in-
terior Antarctic of a relatively late warm period”, even if one did not know when. ”However there
is nothing that tells against the assumption that it constituted something similar to the postgla-
cial warm period on other parts of the globe.” (Ahlmann 1948: 251). For further detail see Swith-
enbank (1999) and for the broader context Elzinga (2001: 192-200).
37
 Although mainly Norwegian financed, it was widely regarded as the first real international sci-
entifically oriented expedition. Later writers, like Albert P. Crary, a leading geophysicist-glaciolo-
gist in the US during and after the IGY, commented that this particular expedition which includ-
ed no more than fourteen men laid a foundation. What he had in mind was its role as a precur-
ser to a mode of organization with the first major traverses into the interior as well as its appar-
ent transnational spirit (Kirwan et.al. 1949: 11-13; Ahlmann 1948: 241-267). This also became
the received view, an internalist scientific one that ignores external driving forces at macro-
political and institutional levels. For a corrective see Lewander in the present volume.
38
 Compare footnote 16, above.
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since the key decisions had already been made. At a later stage Hoppe be-
came involved in a controversy on whether or not a large ice-sheet had covered
NW Europe, including Svalbard and the Barentz Sea region. This was a hypo-
thesis he favoured, and it prompted a series of expeditions directly promoted by
Stockholm University, among them a major one to Svalbard in 1966.
In Stockholm in the early and mid-fifties it was cultural geography that was in
fashion, a discipline on the rise after the war. It was in line with political develop-
ments of the post-war Swedish welfare state and the need for mandated
research into regional and urban planning. An indication of this shift in the
balance of power in geography was the creation of a new chair at Stockholm
University 1955 devoted specially to cultural geography, a vital subject with
some powerful academic and political actors. At the same time the older chair
held by Gunnar Hoppe was renamed Physical Geography. In the interim, from
1950 when Ahlmann left, until 1954 when Hoppe was appointed, physical
geography had lost momentum39.
10.8 Rossby’s entry and American style entrepreneurialism
The Rossby era of meteorology on the other hand was a success story for all
concerned. Like Sverdrup in Norway, Carl-Gustaf Rossby was recruited back to
Scandinavia shortly after World War II, in his case in 1947. He was by then a
renowned scientist with a wide net of international and especially US contacts
that he used to advantage in Sweden.
Originally born in Sweden, he did his PhD at the famous Bergen school of mete-
orology in Norway. He came to the US on a scholarship and remained there,
becoming a naturalized citizen. He became professor first at MIT where he
started a meteorology department, and then for a time he was Vice Director of
the U.S. Weather Bureau, leading that organization’s research. In 1941 he was
called to Chicago as professor with the special task of training a large number
of military meteorologists needed for the war effort. His theoretical work devel-
oped in tandem with this, giving rise to the Chicago school of meteorological
research that drew worldwide attention.
After the war he was instrumental in promoting computer-aided numerical ana-
lysis for weather prediction (and hopes for future weather control), training
members of a new generation of theoretically minded meteorologists. He also
negotiated substantial grants from the Office of Naval Research and successful-
ly lobbied the Pentagon to fund research into global warming. Being a member
of one of the panels of the military’s Joint Research and Development Board
(which existed until 1953) he participated in the foresight-like exercises in which
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 The professorship was vacant, and the head of the department (Prefect) for a while was one
of Ahlmann’s favourite students, the Icelander Sigurdur Thorarinson, whose heart however was
set on research in his home country. Ahlmann’s favouring the Icelander probably upset a youn-
ger student, Carl Christian Wallén who completed his doctorate in 1949 with a thesis on glacial
meteorology. Wallén never became a professor. Instead he came to pursue a non academic
career, first with the Weather Bureau, Svenska Meteorologiska och Hydrologiska Institut, and
then internationally, ending up as a high ranking scientist-cum-civil servant at the WMO in
Geneva.
A. Elzinga: Swedish non-participation in the Antarctic leg of the IGY
155
scientists in different fields joined together with military men to negotiate appro-
priate future research agendas. Such panels existed for oceanography, meteo-
rology, terrestial electricity and magnetism plus seismology, earth measure-
ments and volcanology40.
After coming back to Sweden after the war he continued his pioneering work
and continued to rely on military funding, among other U.S.Air Force grants,
now careful however - as he used to say - to ”decontaminate” the money be-
cause Sweden was neutral country41 A year after his arrival he founded Tellus.
Bert Bolin was the first executive editor of the new journal that soon became an
important organ for publishing research results from countries both East and
West.
Rossby was at the peak of his powers in Sweden when he presided over the
Swedish IGY committee. When he proposed his priorities for the IGY he not
only had a lot of international scientific contacts and power, but he also had
forged strategically significant bonds with the Swedish Natural Sciences Re-
search Council and with the country’s social democratic government. The
former included Torsten Gustafsson the physicist in Lund who was close to
Prime Minister Tage Erlander. In addition he cultivated close contacts with the
Under-secretary for Research and Higher Education, Ragnar Edenman, as well
as Rikard Sandler the senior member of the First Chamber of Parliament and
former Foreign Minister. It was Sandler who headed the commission that in
1954 reviewed the prospects of establishing and recommended permanent core
funding for IMI, the International Metereological Institute that began 1 Jan. 1955
in Stockholm. The Swedish government has since that time provided annual
core funding for IMI. Opening its doors in 1955 with Unesco recognition the
institute still is a platform for international research and training42.
10.9 The Stockholm Conference 1957 - the beginnings of SCAR
September 9-11, 1957 an ad hoc meeting of ICSU was held in Stockholm. It
was convened to ”examine the merits of further investigations in Antarctica,
covering the entire field of science,and to make proposals to ICSU on the best
way to achieve such a programme.”43 Originally Lloyd Berkner had contacted
Hans Ahlmann, Sweden’s nestor in polar research. Ahlmann however declined,
probably because he had been away from active academic life since 195044.
Out of the meeting came the recommendation and later decision to set up a
permanent Scientific Agency for the coordination of Antarctic research, later
called SCAR. It was in early August that professor Carl-Gustaf Rossby had
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 Stockholm Promemorium (1957). The host was Nicolai Herlofson, a professor in electronicsat
the Royal Institute of Technology, replacing Rossby who in the meantime had died (19 August
1957).
44
 Ahlmann had just moved back to Stockholm in 1956, but was tied up with other duties. During
his absence from Stockholm University Rossby had become the strongman, so the request was
passed on to him as head of the Swedish IGY. When Rossby suddenly died the task became
Herlofson’s.
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agreed to convene the meeting of all twelve countries that were planning to do
research in Antarctica (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, UK, US, USSR). Australia, Belgium, New
Zealand and South Africa were unable to send delegates. Of these three, South
Africa was the only country that clearly agreed to continue activities after the
IGY, whereas the other two declared that they were either financially fatigued or
would have enough data to keep busy for quite some time. Of the countries that
attended the conference several expressed similar concerns.
The idea of polling countries active in Antarctica during the IGY had already
arisen early on ICSU’s special committee (CSAGI) responsible for Antarctic
research. Some scientists felt it would be useful to continue after IGY, others
thought it was desirable to stop at the end of 1958. ICSU’s Executive Board
therefore June 28, 1957 endorsed the view that the matter should be probed.
Apart from being a neutral country Sweden was a good site for such a confer-
ence given the substantial contributions its scientists historically had made to
Antarctic science. The conference was held at the Grand Hotel at Saltsjöbaden
just outside Stockholm.
Despite Ahlmann’s absence there was nevertheless a certain continuity in the
Swedish Antarctic legacy, in as far as his student Valter Schytt was engaged as
secretary for the project, and it was he who carried much of the actual burden of
organizing the conference and its follow up, at least until late April 195845.
Schytt early on became a leading authority on glaciology. His studies at Maud-
heim already attracted considerable attention amongst experts. Those in charge
of the U.S. glaciological programme under IGY sought his comments and
constructive criticism early 1956. Responding to a letter he made detailed
suggestions to improve the U.S. programmes, particularly the one relating to
studies in the Northern Hemisphere. Regarding the U.S.glaciological compo-
nent in Antarctica he remarked: ”Reading the Antarctic program made me feel
very small. I thought, we had a rather big glaciology component in our expedi-
tion, and it certainly kept me busy as a bee. However, what you are planning to
do is of quite another order of magnitude.”46 One can imagine that Schytt may
have been a bit envious. However there is no indication that he at the time
wished to get back to Antarctica. His mind was set on making his expedition
near Murchison Bay, Spitsbergen a reality. At the same time he kept himself
well informed about UK, New Zealand, US and USSR) operations, particularly
when it came to glaciology in Antarctica, writing an important review article on
the subject in Swedish in the semi-popular scientific journal Ymer47.
The turning point for continuing research cooperation in the Antarctic after 31
Dec 1958 came in August 1958 when it became clear that both the US and the
USSR) intended to carry on. For fear of losing in credibility regarding its claims
to sovereignty even smaller countries like Norway felt hard pressed to follow
suit, which they did. Consequently 1959 was designated the year of Internatio-
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nal Geophysical Cooperation (IGC) to oversee a tapering-off program for the
original IGY programmes. Three special ICSU committees were created for
continued coordination of oceanographic, Antarctic and space research, re-
spectively: SCOR48, SCAR and COSPAR49. It was in Moscow that SCAR was
formally constituted with 12 participant nations and four institutional members
(IUBS, IGU, IRS, IUGG50) plus WMO. ICSU ratified SCAR in Oct. 195851.
A reading of Schytt’s logbook as SCAR secretary indicates that he essentially
ended his organizational work for SCAR towards the end of April 1958, shortly
after he defended his doctoral thesis, and before heading off to Spitsbergen.
Schytt probably intended to continue his secretarial duties in the Fall, but upon
his return from the glaciological expedition it appears that he had developed
some health problems which forced him to resign. Naclavère the head of
CSAGI and the first president of SCAR expressed his regrets regarding this
decision52. Gordon de Q. Robin (another NBSX veteran) took over and conti-
nued as SCAR secretary until 1970, also serving as editor of the SCAR Bulletin
that regularly appeared in Polar Record. This was another step in the institutio-
nalization of SCAR. It was with Schytt’s departure for Spitsbergen and his sub-
sequent resignation from SCAR that the Secretariat in effect moved from Stock-
holm to the Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI) in Cambridge.
10.10     Conclusion
A combination of factors contributed to Sweden concentrating its IGY efforts in
the Arctic, while no initiatives were afoot to participate in the Antarctic. Ahl-
mann’s departure from Stockholm in 1950 implied a relative decline in the
position of physical geography at SU. At the same time with the arrival of Ross-
by on the scene research in meteorology began to flourish. The prospects of an
expedition to Spitsbergen fitted well into his and Herlofson’s agendas. The idea
of an expedition to Antarctica never seems to have come up, neither amongst
scientists nor politicians. An expedition to Svalbard was far less expensive and
it was easy to gain the politicians’ ears. The Royal Swedish Navy and the Air
Force were commanded to lend logistic support. Important for conservative
circles was the fact that the Arctic was associated with a long string of illustrious
nineteenth century names of like Otto Torell, Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld and Ga-
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briel Nathorst, providing a lot of symbolic capital53. The turn of the century had
seen the Swedish-Russian Arc of the Meridian Expedition, as well as the lost
North polar balloon enterprise of the polar hero August Salomon Andrée 1897
still captured the public memory, especially since its remains had been found
and corpses brought back for public burial in Stockholm in 1930.
Compared to this Antarctic expeditions were fewer and lacked pondus. Otto
Nordenskjöld’s expedition 1901-03 was carried out in defiance of the negative
recommendations of the three-man review panel at the Swedish Royal Acade-
my of Sciences. The panel saw to it that no state funding was given, causing
Nordenksjöld a lot of grief, both during and long after the expedition54. Norden-
skjöld was obviously an outsider who did not fit into the mould of the Stockholm
elite. Moreover his base was in Göteborg from where his ship Antarctic sailed
and where he got most of his private subsidies.
The NBSX expedition for its part was largely associated with Norwegian political
interests, and a new joint venture with the Norwegian Polar Institute was not in
the cards in the mid-50s. Norway was politically intent on doing her own thing in
Antarctica and even on Spitsbergen, even though Norwegian officials were
helpful when needed. Ahlmann for his part liked to play up internationalism.
The Swedish state navigated between the two Cold War power blocks, signal-
ing neutrality at the United Nations and playing up the lack of a colonial past.
When the Indian delegate to the UN in February 1956 tabled a proposal to
include ”The Question of Antarctica” as an item on the agenda of the Eleventh
General Assembly in the autumn, Sweden indicated its interest55. Further
developed in 1958, but again withdrawn, the Indian proposal implied a far-
reaching form of internationalization of Antarctica under the auspices of the UN.
It was a stance not appreciated by the claimant countries and the US had
abandoned this idea earlier, favoring direct control by a consortium of the
nations actively involved in research56.
Among the twelve nations active in Antarctica during the IGY the seven claim-
ant countries had their specific interests to protect and did so with research in
Antarctica. The US and the USSR translated superpower politics into scientific
cooperation and competition. Japan and South Africa had their special inter-
ests. The only anomaly was Belgium. Her participation in the Antarctic leg of the
IGY rested on national prestige. In Sweden on the contrary there was no
champion who came forward. Ahlmann, for example, definitely disapproved of




 Cf. Lewander 2002, and also Elzinga 2004.
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the kind of patriotic overtones that had surrounded Swedish polar research in
an earlier era dominated by A.E. Nordenskiöld, Torell and Nathorst. He and
Rossby belonged to a new generation that emphasized science and interna-
tional cooperation. In the 1960s and early 1970s Ahlmann expressed explicit
concern over neo-colonialism and worked actively to help plan development aid
to Third World countries. This was in line with a Social Democratic tradition in
which internationalism was consciously advocated to replace the old-time con-
servative ideology of nationalism and patriotism. Internationalism had indeed
become a substitute (ersatz) for the oldtime nationalism that was associated
with conservatism and what some scholars nowadays refer to as reactionary
modernism57. It would have required different political and ideological as well as
institutional scientific and personal circumstances and interests in Stockholm for
Sweden to try to play her cards differently at the diplomatic table prior to the
Washington conference.
It took 25 years before momentum picked up again, eventually leading to con-
sultative party membership in the Treaty System and SCAR membership, both
in September 1988. Since the late 1980s Sweden has been cooperating logisti-
cally with Norway and Finland, so that the three countries take turns on an
annual basis in organizing transportation to Dronning Maud Land. Usually
scientists and equipment came by ship. Nowadays however scientists fly in via
Cape Town and Blue Ice One near a Russian research station to continue on
by Twin Otter to their respective countries’ bases. For the new international
Polar Year Sweden is planning a joint operation with the Japanese, a traverse
to leave the Kohnen EPICA58 ice coring site to meet up with a Japanese trav-
erse coming to Dome Fuji.
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11 Antarctica in the 1980s: subject of international politics




This article gives an overview of the developments in the most complex and
dynamic period in the history of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), the inter-
national governmental regime based on the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The article
is the result of extensive literature research and interviewing of relevant actors.
Four parallel developments were characteristic of the ATS in the 1980s. These
developments were: the intensifying debate among the Consultative Parties
within the ATS; the attack on the ATS by a group of developing countries which
were outside the ATS; the increasing support for the ATS from countries outside
and inside the ATS; and the growing concern about the conservation of Antarc-
tica in the ATS, initiated by the environmental movement. The catalyst of these
four developments was the prospect of mining in the Antarctic region. It made
politicians, policymakers and environmentalists aware of Antarctica. It is not
unlikely that the political debate about Antarctica will revive in the near future, in
which the arguments of the 1980s will be heard again.
11.1 Introduction
“…Antarctica exists on the margins of popular perceptions. It is simply there,
and is treated generally as a remote and obscure region to be viewed from
afar…”1 As the historian Peter J. Beck aptly put it in the above quotation, Ant-
arctica is not an important issue for politicians and policymakers. This was not
always the case. During the period between the two World Wars, more and
more countries were interested in the Antarctic region2. These countries had
whaling interests and they had a strategic or historic stake in the exploration
and development of Antarctica. It was the intention of the governments of these
nations to claim parts of Antarctica. In the 1950s seven countries had claims in
Antarctica. These were Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New-Zealand, Nor-
way and the United Kingdom. The claims of Argentina, Chile and the United
Kingdom overlapped, which gave rise to a potentially discordant situation.
However, in 1959 twelve countries signed the Antarctic Treaty: Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.3 Among them were
the seven claimant states, as well as the two superpowers of the Cold War. By
means of the Antarctic Treaty territorial claims were frozen, the problems of
sovereignty were neutralised. But, as a matter of fact, the claims of the seven
claimant states remained up to this very day – including the overlapping claims
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of Argentina, Chile, and United Kingdom . The signatories have agreed to use
Antarctica only for peaceful purposes, especially for international scientific
cooperation. So Antarctica stood aloof from international affairs for twenty
years. International politics were dominated by the Cold War, decolonisation
and conflicts in the Middle East.
In the 1980s Antarctica became an important topic again in international poli-
tics. This period was the most dynamic period in the history of the Antarctic
Treaty System (ATS). The number of countries which had signed the Antarctic
Treaty of 1959 had reached 22 in 1980 and almost doubled to 40 in the sub-
sequent ten years4. Antarctica attracted the personal attention of world leaders,
George Bush Sr., Mikhail Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher. What happened in
that period?
In the 1980s there were four parallel developments which were related to the
ATS. The first development was the intensifying debate among the countries
which were Consultative Party at the Antarctic Treaty (the CP’s).This debate
was to a large extent about a future minerals regime in the Antarctic region. The
second development was the attack from the outside on the ATS. The attack
was spearheaded by countries which wanted either to replace the ATS or to
reform it drastically. The third development was the increasing support for the
ATS, which took shape in the rapid increase in ATS membership. The fourth
development was the growing concern about the conservation of Antarctica.
International environmental organizations lobbied for Antarctica to be declared
a “world park”.  How can these developments be explained? Why did these
developments take place in the 1980s? Do these developments interrelate and,
if so, how?
Much has been published about the developments in the 1980s. However, the
bulk of these publications and the most influential ones were published in the
same period, and thus miss the total perspective.5 More recent publications are
devoted to either Antarctic science or the juridical aspects of the ATS; the
historical and political dimension is often neglected. This article will focus on
these dimensions.
The first section of this article is devoted to the ATS: genesis, method of work-
ing and development until the 1980s. This section gives the background infor-
mation needed to understand the developments in the 1980s. The second
section is about the intensifying debate within the ATS. The third section deals
with the attack on the ATS, while the fourth section deals with the increasing
support for the ATS. The subsequent section is devoted to the growing concern
about the conservation of Antarctica. The final section consists of concluding
remarks.
It is not unlikely that Antarctica will be in the spotlight again in the near future,
just as it was during the 1980s. The International Polar Year, to be held in 2007-
2008, will attract a renewed attention of politicians and policymakers for the
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Antarctic region.6 For example, the phenomena of climate change – a topic
which is re-entering policy agendas – can be studied best in the Antarctic
region. Current booming oil prices might provoke a renewed interest in the oil
resources of the Antarctic region. This article will provide a comprehensive
historical insight of the major developments in the 1980s, which makes it easier
to place possible future developments in a historical context.
11.2 The Antarctic Treaty System
The cornerstone of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is the Treaty of Wash-
ington, which came to be known as the Antarctic Treaty (AT).7 The key ele-
ments of this treaty are: the exclusively peaceful use of the Antarctic region;
scientific cooperation; the neutralization of territorial claims. The Antarctic
Treaty was signed in 1959 by the twelve countries mentioned before. These
countries are the ‘original signatories’. After the ratification processes in the
individual countries, the treaty entered into force in 1961. These countries were
involved in Antarctic science during the third International Geophysical Year
(IGY) of 1957-1958. The IGY was a major scientific and political success. The
twelve countries wanted to prolong the fruitful cooperation by means of the
Antarctic Treaty. These countries are the original signatories.
The Antarctic Treaty is essentially a disarmament treaty.8 The seven claimant
states agreed not to uphold their territorial claims in Antarctica by military
means. Although the Antarctic Treaty did not solve the conflict of sovereignty
(especially of Chile, Argentina and the UK), the treaty took the sting out of it by
neutralising the issue. There is another important thing: the Antarctic Treaty was
drafted and signed in the midst of the Cold War by the United States and the
Soviet Union. A complete continent became isolated from the worldwide arms
race during the Cold War.
There is a section of the Antarctic Treaty which is relevant for the developments
in the 1980s: section XII.9 Subsection a of this section stated that thirty years
after the entering into force of the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty might be re-
viewed if one or more of the twelve original signatories wanted to do so. In that
case a conference would be organized to review the treaty. Many policymakers
and politicians thought that the Antarctic Treaty would expire after thirty years,
which was not true.10
How does the ATS work? The ATS consists of different types of member
countries: Consultative Parties (CP’s) and non-Consultative Parties (NCP’s)11.
The CP’s lay down the law. They decide on a regular basis about the manage-
ment of Antarctica at so called Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings
(ATCM’s). ATCM’s are closed meetings. Until 1983 even non-Consultative
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Parties were not allowed to attend those meetings. Decisions are made by
consensus. The group of CP’s can be subdivided into two groups: the ‘original
signatories’ and the ‘new Consultative Parties’. The ‘original signatories’ have
an unconditional Consultative Status. The Consultative Status for other coun-
tries is subject to certain conditions. Such a country has to ‘demonstrate […] its
interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there,
such as the establishment of a scientific station or the despatch of a scientific
expedition’ (Antarctic Treaty, article IX). What is meant by ‘substantial scientific
research’ is not clearly defined, although a poor reference is made to a scientific
station and a scientific expedition. Important is that the CP’s decide together, on
the basis of consensus, behind closed doors, whether a country fulfils this
condition.
Non-Consultative Parties are countries which have signed the Antarctic Treaty,
but they do not have any influence in the management of Antarctica. Every
member state of the United Nations may sign the Antarctic Treaty, without any
conditions. Until 1983, NCP’s did not have any rights in the ATS. Since that
year they have observer status at ATCM’s. Countries that did not sign the Ant-
arctic Treaty do not play a role in the ATS: they are shut out completely. For
example, no Arab country and no African country except South Africa have any
role in the ATS, because they have never signed the Antarctic Treaty.
In the period prior to the 1980s the ATS developed gradually. In 1976 – fifteen
years after the entering into force of the Antarctic Treaty – Poland was the first
country which became Consultative Party12. So at the beginning of the 1980s
there were 13 CP’s. In the time span of 1961-1979 nine countries became
NCP13. However, the ATS is not only a group of consultative and non-consul-
tative parties. The ATS evolved in that period into an interlinked network of
agreements, agreed recommendations, agreed measures and additional instru-
ments which have been concluded pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty.14 The CP’s
signed the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna
(1964) and the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972). The
Agreed Measures and the Seals Convention were meant to fill gaps in the Ant-
arctic Treaty. They are both characteristic for the pre-emptive management of
the CP’s with regard to Antarctica; the Antarctic flora and fauna and the Antarc-
tic seals were thought to be not threatened in 1964 and 1972 respectively.
In the same sense of pre-emptive management, the CP’s started negotiating
about the conservation of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources, especially krill,
in 197515. Krill is a shrimp, which has a central position in the fragile Antarctic
ecosystem. Krill is very protein rich. In the 1970s and 1980s the general as-
sumption was that krill might play an important role in solving the global food
problem. Japan and the Soviet Union already fished commercially for krill. The
negotiations resulted in 1980 in the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), also known as the Krill-convention.
                                                
12
 Beck 1986: 195.
13
 Poland excluded, which was not a NCP anymore in 1980. Antarctic Treaty Secretariat web-
site.
14
 Chaturvedi 1996: 10.
15
 Orrego Vicuña 1991: 25-36.
B.P. Abbink: Antarctica in the 1980s
167
CCAMLR, which was meant to prevent damage to the Antarctic ecosystem from
krill catching, came into force in 1982. Although CCAMLR deals with all living
resources in the Antarctic region, whaling is primarily discussed in another
forum: the International Whaling Commission. CCAMLR provides for a close
monitoring system of krill catches. A commission and a permanent secretariat
oversee compliance with the convention. The fishery of krill has always been far
below the catch limits defined by CCAMLR: there are technical, environmental
and economical factors which limits the catch16. The production of krill is expen-
sive and it competes with other products with greater revenues.
Despite shortcomings of the system, such as the closed decision making pro-
cess, the merely ‘neutralising’ of the sovereignty conflict and the non-involve-
ment of many countries, the ATS can be considered a major success. It worked
well. The peace on a whole continent was maintained because the CP’s com-
plied with the Antarctic Treaty. Antarctica was exclusively used for peaceful
purposes. The success of the ATS, however, depended heavily on the willing-
ness of the CP’s to cooperate with each other. Every single CP could frustrate
the decision-making process if it considered that to be in its interest. However,
every CP felt that the cooperation in the ATS was the best way to serve their
interests in the remote Antarctic region. Who would benefit from a very expen-
sive competition while economic and/or strategic profits are expected to be very
low? In the 1980s the ATS faced new challenges.
11.3 Intensifying debate within ATS
In the period from 1961 till now (October 2005), there were 28 sessions of spe-
cial ATCM’s17. These special meetings of the Consultative Parties were meant
either to discuss topics more deeply then on the regular ATCM’s, or to give
states Consultative Status. A considerable majority of these sessions – 19 of
the 28 – were held in the 1980s. The bulk of the 1980s sessions of the special
meetings took place in the period of 1982-1988 and they were devoted to
negotiations about a minerals regime in the Antarctic region. The prospect of
mining in the Antarctic region was the catalyst of the intensifying debate.
Mining in the Antarctic region was repeatedly on the agenda of the ATCM’s in
the 1970s, but was not discussed thoroughly. Negotiations on a minerals re-
gime only began in June 1982. Why didn’t this happen before 1982? On the
face of it, this is quite surprising. In 1972, ten years before the official negotia-
tions started, the American research vessel USS Glomar Challenger discovered
traces of natural gas under the Ross Sea in the Antarctic region18. In the same
year, the Club of Rome reminded the world of the exhaustibility of our natural
resources19. In 1973-74 the Oil Crisis exposed the dependency of Western
economies on oil. From then on, oil prices accelerated rapidly. New mineral
resources – especially oil resources – were very welcome. In 1974 a U.S.
Geological Survey Report came out which stated that there were large oil
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reserves in the Antarctic region20. This report was on front page news, all over
the world. However, this report was based on thin air: it was extremely specula-
tive.
One of the two main reasons why a minerals regime was not discussed earlier
was the fact that there were no large reserves found. The other reason was that
the CP’s were afraid that this very touchy subject might regenerate sovereignty
disputes. The CP’s were only too aware of the risks of future mining in the Ant-
arctic region. However, in the late 1970’s and early 1980s there were increased
efforts by countries and some enterprises to find mineral resources in the Ant-
arctic region. They operated in a vacuum in the ATS. The CP’s realized that
action was needed. The CP’s had taken the first step on resource management
in 1980 by signing CCAMLR, which regulated exploitation of living resources.
The CP’s realized that the time was ripe to discuss a minerals regime21.
Discussions between CP-delegates took place behind closed doors, like all
ATCM’s, despite attempts of outsiders to get involved in the discussions22. The
CP-delegates felt it was easier to reach consensus about the minerals regime in
their own circle. They were inclined to discuss in private even more, given the
sensitivity of the topic. It was clear to the negotiators that economic profits were
uncertain, but that mining in that area could pose serious political and environ-
mental threats. Mining could pose a threat for the political stability in the region.
In 1982, the year that the negotiations about a mineral regime started, two
consultative parties, Argentina and the UK, fought against each other in the
sub-Antarctic region in the Falklands/Malvinas23. Although this war was fought
essentially for military strategic considerations, it would not be illogical if there
were also links with a future exploitation of minerals in the Antarctic region.
There are also environmental risks involved in mining in the Antarctic region24.
The Antarctic ecosystem is very fragile, given the harsh climatic circumstances.
Oil spills would hit the flora and fauna very hard. Moreover, the chance of envi-
ronmental disasters is very high in the Antarctic region, due to storms and the
risk that icebergs could collide with ships or drilling platforms. A very important
issue was the liability aspect. Who should be held responsible for environmental
damage? Who should pay for the damage: the oil companies, the insurance
companies, or the governments?
The exploitation of minerals in the Antarctic region could also be a threat to the
ATS itself. Due to internal as well as external pressures, the system could col-
lapse like a house of cards. For example, the seven “claimant states” felt they
should have more rights in the minerals regime than the other CP’s without
territorial claims in Antarctica, the “non-claimant states ”. Because of this, it was
already difficult for the CP’s to conclude a minerals regime in their own small
circle. They had to create, on the one hand, a regime with adequate
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environmental safeguards (i.e. regulations), but, on the other hand, a regime
which would not put off commercial enterprises because of these regulations.
The regime had to compromise on the positions of both claimant and non-
claimant CP’s.
Despite all these difficulties, after six years of negotiations the CP-delegates
concluded the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities (CRAMRA) on the 2nd of June 198825. All issues – except the very
important issue of liability, which was to be postponed for later discussions –
were addressed in the convention. CRAMRA was open for signature and rati-
fication. However, CRAMRA was vetoed by Australia in May 1989, soon fol-
lowed by a French veto in June 1989. Other countries joined the veto. The
Australian veto can be partly explained by concerns of the Australian govern-
ment that other states’ exploration or exploitation activities in the vast Australian
Antarctic Territory would undermine the Australian claim. The growing concern
for protection of the Antarctic environment was the most important explanation,
which will be discussed in section five.
11.4 Attack on the Antarctic Treaty System
In December 1982, six months after the start of the private CP-negotiations on a
minerals regime, the third United Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS-III) was
concluded about the use of the oceans and ocean bed.26 UNCLOS-III was a
major victory for developing countries because of the central position of the
principle of common heritage of humankind in the final text27. The objective of
this principle of international law is that unclaimed areas should be managed in
the interest of all human beings. UNCLOS-III defined the interest of all human
beings as equal sharing between poor and rich countries in the economic profits
of these unclaimed areas. Inspired by the success of UNCLOS-III, the Malay-
sian Prime Minister, Mr. Mahathir Bin Mohamad, pleaded to enlarge the scope
of the common heritage principle to include Antarctica. This heralded the start of
an attack on the ATS.
Just after UNCLOS-III, during the 38th session of the General Assembly of the
United Nations (UN) in 1983, Malaysia and other developing countries launched
the attack on the ATS28. The Malaysian government and like-minded govern-
ments criticised the ATS for its closed, in their view elitist, character. In their
view the ATS was an outdated, colonialist system. They also criticised the ATS
because South-Africa, with its apartheid regime, was a member and was even a
Consultative Party. The attackers wanted to replace or at least to open up the
ATS; they wanted an Antarctic regime under the umbrella of the UN. The at-
tackers wanted to participate in the management of Antarctica.
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Malaysia and other developing countries argued in the General Assembly at the
UN Headquarters, New York, that the common heritage principle did not only
apply to the ocean and ocean bed, but also to Antarctica29. However, this group
of countries was not only referring to the principle for economic profit: they
wanted an Antarctic regime to be meticulous about the Antarctic environment.
They considered that careful management of the Antarctic environment was in
the interest of humankind. At that very time, the CP’s were negotiating behind
closed doors about a minerals regime, and Malaysia and other countries were
suspicious. These countries were not primarily driven by commercial interest,
but by ‘political’ motives to open up a closed system. The ATS was never under
attack by a primarily commercial driven government – neither of Malaysia and
other developing countries nor of any other, economically stronger country.
Nevertheless, the critique on the ATS was harsh and fundamental. However,
the CP’s of the ATS had strong defensive arguments30- They pointed out that
the Antarctic Treaty had always been open for signature by every member state
of the UN. The ATS served international law and order by preserving the peace
on a whole continent since it came into being. The ATS had proven to be a
dynamic and practical arrangement, designed to avoid conflicts. It was very
doubtful if a UN-based regime for Antarctica would do better.
The annual debates since 1983 in the United Nations General Assembly result-
ed in resolutions about Antarctica and the ATS31. The resolutions of 1983 and
1984 were adopted by consensus. In the resolution of 1983 the Secretary
General (SG) of the UN, Javier Perez de Cuellar, was asked to write a report
about Antarctica. It was finished just before the next session of the General
Assembly in 1984, so it was resolved to discuss the report the next year. The
heated discussions in 1985 and the subsequent years led to questioning the
advantages and disadvantages of the ATS. New resolutions were adopted
concerning: an update of the report of the SG; informing the SG about the
negotiations on a minerals regime; excluding South-Africa from the ATCM’s; a
moratorium on the negotiations about a minerals regime. Since 1988 onwards a
resolution was adopted about a moratorium on mining itself.
These resolutions were adopted by vote, but the countries which supported the
ATS boycotted  the vote. The average voting pattern of the resolutions since
1985 was as follows: 95 states were in favour; none were against; 12 were
neutral; 40 were absent in the vote. Such a large boycott was unprecedented in
the history of the United Nations.
However, the attack by resolutions of the General Assembly of the UN was
actually toothless: unlike resolutions of the UN Security Council, these resolu-
tions are not binding. The supporters of the ATS could ignore the resolutions
with impunity and they did so. There was no replacement or fundamental
change of the ATS which resulted in more influence of the attackers in the
management of Antarctica.
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Nevertheless, the countries which supported the ATS, especially the NCP’s,
obtained observer status in the ATCM’s in 1983, and since 1985 they may even
attend the meetings on the minerals regime, also as observers32. There was
also an increasing willingness by the CP’s to give Consultative Status to NCP’s.
In some cases there was even an erosion of the price tag for Consultative Sta-
tus, namely substantial Antarctic research.33 While West-Germany had to build
a wintering station in Antarctica to become CP in 1981, India only had to build a
summer station in Antarctica to become CP in 1983. The ATS opened up, but
only for its supporters.
The attack of Malaysia and other developing countries on the ATS is still going
on; from 1983 to 1996 the ‘question of Antarctica’ was a yearly agenda point at
the meetings of the UN General Assembly. Since 1996 the question of
Antarctica is a triennial agenda point34. However, there is no real progress in
the discussions. Both the attackers and the defenders have used essentially the
same arguments for twenty-two years. Antarctica drifted back to the margins of
international affairs in the past decade.
11.5 Growing support for the Antarctic Treaty System
The growing support for the ATS manifested itself in the clearest way by the
increasing membership of the ATS (Fig. 11-1). This development weakened the
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The inclusion of the large and populous developing countries Brazil and India in
1983 and of China in 1985 as CP’s made the accusation that the ATS was an
elitist, colonialist and closed system very hollow35. In the dynamic decade of the
1980s, the number of signatory countries, as well as the number of CP’s, almost
doubled.
Why did countries want to obtain Consultative Status in the ATS, despite the
considerable cost of the prerequisite of this status, substantial Antarctic re-
search? Partly, they wanted influence on the minerals regime negotiations to
defend their interests36. Similar to the intensifying debate in the ATS and the
attack on the ATS, the most important catalyst for the increasing support for the
ATS was the prospect of mining in the Antarctic region. Politicians and policy-
makers were beginning to take note of Antarctica. Some of them had economic
motives: if mining claims in the Antarctic region were to be distributed in the
future, they didn’t want to be sidelined37. Others wanted to express their con-
cerns about the risks involved in mining in the Antarctic region. Countries which
wanted to become CP also wanted influence on a possible review process of
the ATS in 1991. Other motives to become CP were: to prevent the break-up of
the ATS due to the attack in UN-circles; to conduct Antarctic research to find
answers for policy issues. In this respect, finding answers for environmental
issues became increasingly important. For example, the Netherlands were (and
still are) very interested in research on the rise of the sea level38.
11.6 Growing concern about the Antarctic environment
In the 1970s Antarctica came to the attention of the environmental movement,
although Antarctica was not yet a major issue. In 1972 the International Union
for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), the world’s
largest and most important conservation network, had pleaded for Antarctica as
a natural reserve.39 In 1977, environmental organisations from all over the world
founded the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC).40 This umbrella
organisation had the task of coordinating actions of its member organisations
with regard to the Antarctic region. ASOC was founded at the time that the CP’s
were negotiating about a regime on living resources.
In the 1980s the environmental groups  intensified their activities with regard to
Antarctica. In 1980 the IUCN adopted the World Conservation Strategy, with the
assistance of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the United Nations
Environmental Program (UNEP)41. Antarctica was one of the major issues in
this most important policy document for the international environmental move-
ment. Environmentalists were very concerned about future mining in the Ant-
arctic region, especially when the CP’s started to discuss a minerals regime in
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1982. The aim of the environmental organisations was to reach a ban on mining
in the Antarctic region; they wanted a protected status of Antarctica.
There was also an increasing concern for the Antarctic environment among
large sections of the population all over the world, including politicians, as a
result of a general increase in environmental awareness. This increasing envi-
ronmental awareness is typical of the 1980s. In 1985 Antarctica was in the
centre of interest: the gap in the ozone layer was discovered. The gap was for a
large part caused by human activities, such as the development of chlorofluo-
rocarbons (CFC’s)42. This global environmental problem manifested itself above
Antarctica.
However, during the meetings of the CP’s the gap in the ozone layer was not on
the agenda. They discussed this topic in other broader forums, such as the
United Nations.43 The debate in the 1980s was to a large extent devoted to a
minerals regime. In this debate, environmental concerns played an important
role. As a result, CRAMRA stated that no Antarctic mineral resource activity
should take place until it is judged that this activity would not cause damage to
Antarctica’s environment44. However, CRAMRA did open the way for mining in
the Antarctic region.
The signing of CRAMRA was a major setback for the environmental move-
ment.45 Environmental organisations had lobbied for years to prevent mining in
the Antarctic region. All their efforts seemed to be in vain after the signing of
CRAMRA. However, some environmental organisations like Greenpeace
worked to influence the ratification processes of CRAMRA in the individual
countries; this tactic worked well.
Australia vetoed CRAMRA in May 198946. In Australia the environmental move-
ment had a very strong position. The country’s public opinion was strongly in
favour of the conservation of Antarctica and strongly against mining. Just before
the Australian veto two dramatic events took place. In January 1989 the Argen-
tinean supply vessel Bahia Paraiso crashed into the coast of the Antarctic Pen-
insula, resulting in oil spills47 .The second event was the accident of the oil
tanker Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound in Alaska. This was one of the
biggest ever eco-catastrophes. These two events were exactly what environ-
mentalists had warned about. In the world press the two events were widely
accepted as relevant projections of the Antarctic in a CRAMRA future48. The
Australian veto was not only motivated by the environmentalist minded public
opinion, but also because the Australian industry showed little interest in mining
in the Antarctic region, and by the political concerns of the Australian govern-
ment mentioned in section two.
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The lack of interest of the Australian industry in mining in the Antarctic region
was not unique: world-wide there were only a few companies interested in
mining in the Antarctic region. The market leader Shell was not interested49.
Exploitation in the Antarctic was (and still is) very expensive, risky and the
profits were very uncertain. More important: there were still no exploitable
reserves found in the Antarctic region. The oil and mining companies had many
other cheaper, easier accessible reserves at their disposal. In other words,
mining in the Antarctic region was economically unprofitable. The disinterested
oil and mining industry kept the road open for the environmental lobby.
In June 1989 France sided with Australia by vetoing CRAMRA too. The French
veto was quite remarkable, given the country’s bad record on environmentalist
issues those days50. There were three issues. The first issue was that France
began to build an air strip in Antarctica in 1983. They used explosives  and this
killed some penguins and destroyed eggs. The photos of the dead penguins
were widely publicized by Greenpeace. The second issue is that there were
rumours of possible French nuclear testing in the Sub-Antarctic region in the
future. The last issue was the bomb attack conducted by the French Secret
Service on the Greenpeace ship, the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland, New Zea-
land, on 10 July 1985. The French veto was a charm offensive, especially
directed to Australia. However, this was not the only explanation of the French
veto: as in Australia, there was a strong environmentalist lobby in France.
The growing concern about the Antarctic environment had an enormous impact
on the ATS, blocking a minerals regime. In 1991 the CP’s signed the Protocol
on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. According to this protocol
the CP’s agreed on a mining moratorium for fifty years. The protocol designates
Antarctica as a “natural reserve devoted to peace and science”.
11.7 Conclusion
Four developments made the 1980s the most dynamic decade in the history of
the ATS. These developments were: the intensifying debate among the CP’s
within the ATS; the attack on the ATS; the increasing support for the ATS; and
the growing concern about the conservation of Antarctica.
The prospect of mining in the Antarctic region was the catalyst development of
all four developments. The CP’s realized that they had to discuss this touchy
issue. Countries with no Consultative Status in the ATS, as well as environmen-
tal organisations wanted to have influence in the management of Antarctica. To
obtain this goal, some countries attacked the ATS, while others supported the
ATS aiming for Consultative Status. Environmental organisations lobbied to
achieve their objective: a ban on mining in the Antarctic region.
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The attackers of the ATS were unsuccessful; they did not obtain more influence
in the management of Antarctica. On the other hand, supporters of the ATS
succeeded in obtaining more influence: many of them became CP. The big
winner was the environmental movement. CRAMRA, the document that opened
the way for mining in the Antarctic, was blocked in 1989 and the CP’s estab-
lished a mining moratorium in 1991 instead. Since that moment, the ATS is
back in smooth waters.
Today, the observer may wonder if CRAMRA is dead indeed, or if it has only
been put on ice. Technology has continued to develop since the late 1980s. For
the time being, all CP’s respect the mining. However, mining in the Antarctic
region could be economically profitable one day, although in the more distant
future. The discovery of large exploitable mineral reserves in the Antarctic
region would be a major challenge for the ATS. In that case, it could revive the
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12 Dutch involvement in Antarctic research




Dutch involvement in Antarctic research is relatively recent. After some words
about Dutch discoveries in the seveteenth century and Dutch whaling expedi-
tions after World War II, the deliberations which led to the start and the end of
Belgian-Dutch cooperation at the King Baudouin Base from 1963 to1967 are
described.
In the 1980's interest of some Dutch scientists increased and a lobbying cam-
paign with much support from the International Union for the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and other organizations for the conser-
vation of nature and from influential politicians succeeded in 1985 to earmark a
small budget for pilot Antarctic projects in ecology, glaciology, geology and
oceanography. The support of many countries, notably (West)Germany, but
also Australia, United States, France and the United Kingdom was essential in
the pilot phase.
The Committee for Antarctic Research, under the umbrella of the Council for
Sea Research, succeeded to increase the budget manifold. In 1989 the Nether-
lands applied for Consultative Status, which was granted a year later. There are
no plans to establish a Dutch base on Antarctica. The variety of the Dutch sci-
entific programs needs flexibility and is better served by paying for the use of
logistics from other countries.
12.1 Introduction
During the preparation of the first workshop on the history of Antarctic research,
the organizers asked the participants to concentrate their talks on how and why
different countries became engaged in research programs in this remote area;
how and why it continued (or was discontinued). Elaborations on the leading
persons who secured earmarked funding were also asked. In my paper I will
comply with this set-up and give a narrative on the multiple starts of Antarctic
research by Dutchmen, rather than on the scientific results. The consequence
of such a choice is that the attention mainly goes to science organizers, meet-
ing each other without the hardships endured by the people actually working in
the hash climate of Antarctica.
12.2 Discoveries
In the seventeenth century two Dutch expeditions appreciably reduced the mag-
nitude of the then postulated Antarctic continent, the Terra Australis nondum
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cognita (not yet known Southern Continent). The first expedition was by Willem
Schouten and Jakob Lemaire in 1616, the second by of Abel Tasman in 1642.
Discoveries were not the most important purpose of these endeavours; estab-
lishing trading relationships was more important to the financiers.
Figure 12-1: The voyage in 1616 by Schouten and Lemaire around Cape Hoorn, reconstructed
by R. van den Bos. In Hazelhoff Roelfzema 2001.
Schouten and Lemaire circumnavigated the real southern tip of South America,
which they named Cape Hoorn after the city of Hoorn, the home port of their
ships. Figure 12-1 gives a reconstruction of the itinerary1. Previously it was
thought that Tierra del Fuego was part of the supposed southern continent.
Jacob's father, the merchant Isaac Lemaire had a conflict with the then almighty
"Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC)" (Dutch East India Company) and
sought alternative shipping routes to avoid the monopoly of the VOC.
Tasman circumnavigated the continent that was later named Australia, made
landfall at the island that now bears his name, and sighted New Zealand. He
named this land "Statenland" after the "Staten-Generaal ", the Government of
the Republic of the Seven United Provinces. Interestingly, the name "Staten-
land" had also been given to the land - now Staten Island - sighted by Schouten
and Lemaire. Apparently, Schouten, Lemaire, and Tasman still had a firm belief
that a vast southern continent existed. In fact, the main purpose of Tasman's
expedition, supported by the VOC, was to discover the unknown southern con-
tinent. Shortly afterwards, Tasmans´ Statenland was renamed "Nieuw Zeeland",
after Zeeland, together with Holland, the most important of the seven united
provinces.The Z in New Zealand still shows the Dutch origin of its present
name.
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12.3 Antarctic Whaling
For more than ten years, starting in the season 1946/1947 a Dutch company
took part in Antarctic whaling. They bought the Swedish tanker Pan Gothia and
converted the ship into a whale processing factory, named Willem Barendsz.
The underfed Dutch population, starved during the last year of the German
occupation (1940-45) welcomed the fat from the big butter dish from the deep
south. Press coverage was enormous, stressing the new initiative, in line with
the glorious past of Dutch expeditions to many remote regions. The results were
somewhat disappointing; after 1950 the catch diminished.
In itself this is no reason for including this episode in this paper about research,
but several scientists were employed by the Whaling Company and got some
facilities on board during the first two seasons. Vervoort published several
papers on copepods from the Southern Ocean, while more in line with fisheries
the chemist Feltman and the biologists published on the fat content of blue and
fin whales2.
12.4 Belgian-Dutch cooperation in research at the King Baudouin Base
From 1964 to 1967 three teams of Dutch scientists and technicians over win-
tered at the King Baudouin Base, 70° 26´ S; 23° 19´ E, on the Princess Ragn-
hild Coast half way between the Japanese base Siowa and the Russian base
Novolazarevskaya. Belgium had operated the King Baudouin base from 1958 to
1960, afterwards it had been deserted. Reopening (and rebuilding) the base
was proposed especially through activities of Gaston de Gerlache de Gomary,
son of the famous explorer Adrien de Gerlache. To lighten the burden of the
maintenance cost, cooperation was sought from other nations, notably the
Netherlands but also Italy. Early in 1962, a formal request was sent through
diplomatic channels, asking if the Netherlands could in any case bear one third
of the money necessary for the expedition 1963/64, and hopefully for two more
years. This would mean Dfl 600,000 for the first year just for transportation and
maintenance of the base. Six Dutchmen would be part of the over wintering
crew; because of financial setbacks, only four actually went. It was also made
clear, that if the Netherlands refused, there would be no Belgian expedition.
The total expenditure would mean a rather large amount of money. With respect
to cost effectiveness Antarctic research is expensive, because of the logistics
involved. Much more results could be obtained in less remote and hostile envi-
ronments. Nevertheless, the Netherlands Organisation for the Advancement of
Pure Research (ZWO) made a preliminary reservation for Dfl 650,000, the
requested sum plus 50,000 for preparations, on the condition that the Royal
Dutch Academy of Sciences (KNAW) would give a positive advice on the sci-
ence to be carried out.
Three conditions were formulated:
1. A possible Dutch contribution should be of great scientific interest.
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2. The Dutch contribution(s) should be recognizable as independent
parts of the program.
3. Emphasis should be on geophysics.
The question posed by the Dutch government whether or not the Netherlands
should strive for membership of the Antarctic Treaty was also considered by the
KNAW. The answer was negative; an interesting argument was that all results
of Antarctic investigations would be freely available to all nations, so there was
no advantage to be gained. Moreover, there was hardly any "polar research tra-
dition" in the Netherlands, but there was a strong interest in global observations
on geo- and astrophysics. Belgium, as one of the founding nations of the Ant-
arctic Treaty did have a polar tradition, but less so in astrophysics.
This inequality hampered the Belgian-Dutch cooperation. Despite this fact and
despite the failure to start scientific discussions on equal footing, the board of
the KNAW made a step forward by establishing in March 1963 a Dutch Antarc-
tic Committee for Antarctic Research within the Academy. It consisted of Cor-
nelis Jacobus Warners, general director of the Royal Dutch Meteorological
Institute (KNMI) as chairman, Wijnand Langeraar, chief hydrographer of the
Navy as secretary, and members the meteorologist Wouter Bleeker, the geo-
physicist Jan Veldkamp (both at KNMI) and the astronomer C. de Jager. Blee-
ker, Veldkamp, and Cees De Jager were professor at Utrecht University. Time
was pressing but who would set the ball rolling. According to De Jager3, War-
ners played a key role in breaking the stalemate, while also Langeraar was
active in the preparation of logistics.
It is noteworthy that science administrators and not active scientists took this
decision. Both, Warners and Langeraar were very keen on seeking Dutch mem-
bership of international organizations and SCAR was their target, rather than
membership of the Antarctic Treaty. Bleeker had visited a SCAR meeting and
was told that assisting for a year in programs of a Treaty member, even with an
independent program would not be considered as sufficient to be admitted to
SCAR. Between the lines it could be read that a long-term commitment was
what mattered.
The results of the Belgian-Dutch expeditions in the 1960s were useful, but they
were mainly routine observations, published in meteorological yearbooks. A full
list is given in SOZ (1989); a different example is the study of ozone4. This
paper showed the seasonality of the ozone inventory of Antarctic air, with a
minimum in early austral spring. In those days this phenomenon was studied as
a tracer for atmospheric circulation, while the reason for the variability was
thought to arise from natural processes. Twenty years later the minimum (the
"ozone hole") was more pronounced and related to the increasing use of chloro-
fluorocarbons.
After three years of over wintering, the scientists and the members of the Aca-
demy Committee felt, that if the cooperation was to continue, more emphasis
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should be put on science. Again there were difficulties to start cooperation with
the appropriate Belgian Committees. The Dutch committee members had to
conclude that there were differences in opinion between De Gerlache and his
co-workers on one hand, and the "official" bodies in Belgium, like the SCAR
committee and the Academy of Sciences. When the members of the 2nd and
3rd expeditions were not happy with the cooperation on the base, the difficult
decision not to continue Antarctic research in this framework was a logical one5.
As a kind of afterthought, the Netherlands acceded to the Antarctic Treaty in
1967.
However, the Dutch (Academy) Committee for Antarctic Research was dis-
banded. The Committee for Sea Research, also accommodated at the KNAW
agreed to serve as a "lookout" for Antarctic matters. The chairman of this Com-
mittee was Jenne Johan  Zijlstra (Fig. 12-2), director of the Netherlands Institute
for Sea Research (NIOZ) at Texel. He greatly stimulated participation of NIOZ
scientists in ocean-going research programs.
Figure 12-2: J.J. Zijlstra (1926-1989). Director of the Netherlands Institute for Sea Research,
showing a plankton torpedo, one of the important tools in biological oceanography
12.5 A new - this time multidisciplinary - start
A possibility came into view of the lookout in 1980, when Gotthilf Hempel, direc-
tor of the newly established Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar Research (AWI)
in Bremerhaven, West Germany, told Zijlstra that a Dutch scientist would be
welcome on board an upcoming expedition to Antarctic waters. Besides ex-
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tending a friendly gesture - Hempel and Zijlstra knew each other quite well; in
previous jobs they both had worked on herring in the North Sea - Hempel also
hoped to arouse interest among the Dutch scientific community to renew in-
volvement in Antarctic research. He assumed that involvement by the Nether-
lands would be science-oriented and he thought that in the upcoming renewal
of the Antarctic Treaty, scientific matters should be decisive.
Hempel´s invitation was passed on to me and I was eager to accept. My re-
search subject was the silica cycle (in which the Southern Ocean plays a key
role) and I was also interested in the concentration of aluminium in sea water.
For this element a new sensitive method had become available and virtually
nothing was known about Aluminium in the Southern Ocean.
The voyage to the western Weddell Sea with the research vessel Meteor and
visits to the British base at Signy Island and the Argentine base Esperanza
were an unforgettable experience. The lectures on board, organized by Hempel
as chief scientist and as director of the AWI, gave me a quick introduction to the
fascinating possibilities of the southern part of the world ocean, for natural
science and as a geopolitical playground. Being in the Antarctic environment,
both on land and at sea is addicting, many people underwent this experience
and I was no exception. So I did want to go again, of course mainly for scientific
reasons but there were other factors: the grandiose environment and working in
an international team, to name some important considerations. Hempel´s plea
for a renewal of Dutch interest into Antarctic research asked for reconnaissance
of the political attitude towards Antarctica.
Soon, I discovered that a keen interest in Antarctica existed. The Dutch division
of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(IUCN) - the world’s largest and most important conservation network - hosted a
Working Group since 1980 with politicians, scientists of different disciplines and
members from various international conservationist organisations. Conservatio-
nist organisations had a strong position in the Netherlands. Antarctica had been
a prime target in IUCN´s world conservation strategy6.
An invaluable contribution to "Antarctica-awareness" was made by Wim Tho-
massen (Fig. 12-3), an influential Member of Parliament. He was not a scientist
but had an encyclopaedic knowledge of the history of Antarctica and of the
functioning of the Antarctic Treaty. Repeatedly he had addressed the Dutch
Government with pleas that the Netherlands should aim for consultative mem-
bership7. In 1982 he joined the IUCN Working Group and we realized that if our
country had Consultative Status in the Antarctic Treaty, problems would be a lot
easier. The voice of nature conservation would be heard at the right tables, the
nation would gain some prestige and last but not least, there would be ear-
marked money for research.
Although the Antarctic Treaty was subject to change (Abbink, this volume) and
the criteria to obtain Consultative Status became less strict, a Dutch application
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for Consultative Status was of course not yet possible. Anyhow the Netherlands
Committee for Sea Research commissioned a reconnaissance study about the
scientific interests in relation to the financial consequences8. The study con-
cluded that there was enough support to start a small research group, with an
annual budget of Dfl 900,000 (about 400,000 €) earmarked for Antarctic
research.
The search for money was rather disappointing; only three Ministries, Science
and Education, Agriculture (through its nature conservation division) and Eco-
nomic Affairs (through its interest in the negotiations about mineral exploitation,
however remote) were willing to contribute a total of Dfl 300,000 annually for a
period of three years.
Nevertheless, the director-general for science policy of the ministry of science
and education, E. van Spiegel, thought it wise to accept these commitments.
Otherwise, the momentum created by Thomassen and others would be lost and
the offers by other nations, notably West-Germany to host Dutch scientists
might be withdrawn. In the autumn of 1984 van Spiegel commissioned a trium-
virate of directors from the research institutes, managed by the three paying
ministries to draw outlines of a limited scientific program. Zijlstra from the NIOZ
was chairman, the National Geological Survey (under Economic Affairs) and the
Institute of Ecology were members.
Figure 12-3: W. Thomassen (1909-2001). An indefatigable advocate of Antarctica, who played a
decisive role in the mid 1980´s, when the Netherlands embarked on the road towards Consulta-
tive Status.
In the meantime, the IUCN  Antarctic Committee thought it timely to organize a
symposium, where politicians and scientists would present their plans. At this
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symposium, November 1, 1984 Van Spiegel announced the above result. The
small amount of money was less than expected, but all Committee members
were happy with this breakthrough: An important hurdle had been taken: the
lobbying had secured at least a budget and we expected the budget to stay and
to grow. The choice for contributions by different Ministries had the advantage
of earmarked money, but the money involved in all meetings during this period
and its preparations might well be similar to the budget for science.
Subsequently it was decided that a managing committee of Antarctic projects
would be established at the Stichting Onderzoek der Zee (SOZ)9. There were
few organisations with experience in managing multidisciplinary research, and
the SOZ had successfully organized the logistics of the Snellius II expedition in
Indonesia. In 1985 SOZ Antarctic Committee started its work; many difficulties
were met, but its members succeeded in increasing the budget manifold. In the
pilot phase, implementation of the projects heavily depended on the hospitality
of many countries, notably (West) Germany, but also Australia, USA, France
and the UK.
Regularly symposia were held to report about the results. In 1991 the internatio-
nal cooperation, typical for Antarctic research, was stressed to honour our for-
eign hosts. Fig. 12-4 shows some of  organizers of this symposium.
Figure 12-4: Some of the lobbyists for Dutch Antarctic Research in. From left to right: A. Bijlsma
(SOZ)  L. van Brederode (secretary of the IUCN  Antarctic Committee); J.H. Stel (secretary of
the SOZ Antarctic Committee) and the author in 1991.
                                                
9
 Foundation for Sea Research, see SOZ 1989.
Steps of Foundation – Proceedings of the 1st Workshop of the SCAR History Action Group
186
12.6 Epilogue
In 1989 an application for Consultative Status of the Netherlands was submitted
to the ATS meeting in Paris and was not accepted unanimously. This had never
happened before in the history of the Antarctic Treaty. Some delegates argued
that cooperation with other countries was not sufficient to comply with art IX(2),
requiring "demonstration of interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial
scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station
or the despatch of a scientific expedition". So, a crash program was organized;
in the 1989/1990 season the Polish base Arctowski was rented for a Dutch
expedition. As a result Consultative Status was obtained at a special ATS meet-
ing in 1990 in Santiago de Chile.
Nevertheless, the Dutch position remains that the quality of the science is more
important than the presence in a region where already many stations exist. The
multidisciplinary nature of the Dutch research projects requires flexibility rather
than a permanent station.
Why was the Belgian-Dutch cooperation in the 1960´s not continued and why
did the pilot program in the 1980´s lead to a long-term presence in Antarctica?
Many factors contribute; in my opinion the globalization of many scientific and
political issues make Antarctica an important part of the planet, rather than a
remote playground. Moreover, in this 20 years period, many Dutch research
institutions became more and more interested in global issues. The network of
international organizations for the conservation of nature could ensure press
coverage and hence a political basis. It should not be forgotten that chance
factors plays a role; the combination of the right people at the right time.
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13 The History of Astrophysics in Antarctica




Astronomy, in the early days of Antarctic exploration, has played a negligible
role apart from its use as a navigational aid. Although the first proposal for an
Antarctic telescope was made as early as 1912 by Admiral R.E. Peary, the
beginnings were of a much simpler nature: A meteorite was discovered by
Mawson in 1912, laying on top of the ice, initiating the Era of Astrogeology. As
the foundations were laid for cosmic ray science, Geiger counters were brought
to Antarctica, and the Era of High Energy Astrophysics emerged in the 1950’s.
Yet again decades later in the 1970’s-1990’s, the advantages of the high and
exceedingly dry climate of the Antarctic Plateau were established and a number
of projects exploring the sky in the infrared and sub millimetre ranges of the
electromagnetic spectrum provided spectacular results, giving birth to the Era of
Photon Astrophysics. Science results in all astronomical specialties keep com-
ing in from Antarctica. A number of large scale projects are in progress today,
bringing in spectacular results, and many more are planned1.
13.2 The Dawn, and into Astrogeology
The Australasian Antarctic Expedition, led by Sir Douglas Mawson and lasting
from 1911 until 1914, was investigating the stretch of Antarctic coast between
the then known boundaries in the west of “Terra Nova”, which was mapped by
Scott’s British Antarctic Expedition in 1910, and “Gauss” to the east, which was
charted by the German Antarctic Expedition in 1902 (Mawson 1915). A base
camp had been set up at Cape Denison in Commonwealth Bay, Adelie Land. It
included a transit telescope and hut, whose purpose was for determining the
longitude of Cape Denison through measurement of the transit times of stars
across the local meridian. However no astronomy appears to have been done
with the telescope. From the base camp, field trips spanning several weeks and
extending significant distances were executed. On one of these excursions,
Frank Bickerton led a sledging party and on the third day of the expedition, they
found a black object partially buried in the snow (see Fig. 13-1).
This chance find, discovered at 12:35 on 1912 December 5, turned out to be a
stony meteorite, about 5 inches long by 3 inches (13×7 cm) across2. It was the
first meteorite to be discovered in Antarctica, and the first astronomical obser-
vation of significance on the new continent. Bickerton’s diary entry for the day
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gives a detailed description of the appearance of the meteorite, and makes it
clear that they immediately recognised it for what it was:
Figure 13-1: The Adelie Land Meteorite. Picture: Michael Burton 2002, with acknowledgment to
the Australian Museum, Sydney.
“...meteorite ... covered with a black scale, internally of a crystalline
structure, most of its surface rounded except in one place which looks
like a fracture, iron is evidently present in it.”3
It had been speculated since the Amundsen and Scott expeditions to the South
Pole in 1911 that the dry and high altitude climate on the Antarctic plateau might
be of advantage to astronomical observations. The U.S.Navy’s Rear Admiral
Robert E. Peary, who had led the first successful expedition to the North Pole in
1909, addressed his ideas in a letter to the director of Yerkes Observatory, Ed-
win B. Frost, suggesting that continuous observations during the course of a
year could yield valuable results4. Frost however was not enthused and denied
feasibility, mainly based on the argument that precise enough timing would not
be available to provide useful observations.
Almost half a century later, the next significant astronomical discovery was
made by Russian geologists operating out of the Lazarev Station (called Novo-
lazarevskaya today), with a number of meteorites found and collected from the
Lazarev region in 19615. The astrogeological importance of Antarctica, how-
ever, did not become evident until 1969, after a Japanese group of geologists
established the first formal meteorite search programmes based on geological
and glaciological evidence. They successfully retrieved many different kinds of
meteorites including enstatite chondrites, hypersthene achondrites, type III
carbonaceous chondrites, and bronzite chondrite in the Yamato region6. It was
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improbable that this accumulation of different meteorite types in the same
location happened by chance, thus driving the development of theories ex-
plaining how meteorites falling in Antarctica could be transported by the moving
ice sheets so as to be accumulated in a few particular locations — ablation
zones in blue ice fields—where they could be easily found7.
13.3 High Energy in Antarctica
Modern astrophysics was not practiced in Antarctica until the 1950s. The first
astronomical research programme was conducted by Australian scientists and
developed from cosmic ray experiments carried out by the Physics department
of the University of Melbourne, initiated by Professor Leslie Martin8. In 1947 and
1948, stations were constructed on Heard and Macquarie Islands and ion
chambers installed by way of sea transport with the ship Wyatt Earp, which
continued to Antarctica. Measurements were made using the third ion chamber
that remained on the boat, sometimes in the most difficult of circumstances
given the frequent storms of the Southern Ocean. While not actually taking
place on the continent, this was the first experiment explicitly designed for
astrophysical purposes to be conducted in Antarctica.
In 1954, Mawson Station, Australia's first Antarctic station, was established and
a cosmic ray observatory built in 1955. This was the first Astrophysical experi-
ment to take place on the continent, and they heralded the start of the Mawson
cosmic ray programme which still continues today. The IGY of 1957/58 finally
saw another cosmic ray detector installed at McMurdo by the USA team around
Martin A. Pomerantz, followed by South Pole in 1964. A number of projects
were initiated in the 1980’s among them SPASE and SPASE-II (South Pole Air
Shower Experiment), GASP (Gamma Astronomy at the South Pole) and last but
not least, AMANDA (Antarctic Muon and Neutrino Detector Array), the largest
Cherenkov radiation detector on earth, built into the clear ice in the Dark Sector
at South Pole. Eventually, AMANDA will be superseded by ICE (IceCube), a 1
cubic kilometre detector currently under construction.
13.4 Photon Astronomy
In 1979 the first optical research programme was undertaken at the South Pole.
Eric Fossat, Gerard Grec (both of the Observatoire de Nice), and Martin Pome-
rantz (Bartol Institute) coupled a sodium vapour cell to a small telescope and
obtained an unbroken run of over 120h of observations measuring solar oscil-
lations (Fig. 13-2).
These data allowed about 80 harmonics of solar eigenmodes to be discovered,
with periods ranging from about 3 to 8 min9. In the 1981-82 summer an array
detector was added to provide increased angular resolution for the solar
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observations, allowing features as small as 10 arcsec to be resolved10. The
careful measurements from all these experiments of the oscillations caused by
resonating sound waves within the Sun have directly lead to the detailed knowl-
edge we now have of the temperature, composition, and motions in the Sun's
interior, a first truly spectacular result only possible by observing from Antarc-
tica.
Figure 13-2: The solar telescope used at the South Pole in December 1979. Picture: Gerard
Grec.
In the 1980s, the first projects were envisaged with an initial goal of observing
the galactic infrared emission. Measurements of water vapour content in the
atmosphere made with a site-testing meter in the summer of 1974 had shown
that it was lower than at Mauna Kea, the world's premier infrared observatory11.
The first experiment to attempt to take advantage of this characteristic was a
US-France collaboration that took place in 1984 - 198512. They used a 45-cm
sub millimetre telescope named EMILIE (Emission Millimetrique, see Fig,.13-3),
which had been designed to work on the 3.6-m Canada-France-Hawaii Tele-
scope on Mauna Kea, Hawaii.
It was by far the most ambitious and logistically difficult astronomical prog-
ramme then undertaken in Antarctica, as it required the transport of liquid
helium to Antarctica all the way from the USA. This essentially was the first in a
series of Cosmic Microwave Background Experiments that ultimately would lead
to the Boomerang experiment, which combined with the earlier South Pole data,
provided the best evidence at the time that the geometry of the Universe was
indeed flat (i.e. Euclidean). As with the DASI (Degree Angular Scale Interfero-
meter) result two years later, these measurements also made the front cover of
Nature, in April of 2000.
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In 1986, a year-round observatory at the South Pole was established by CARA
(Center for Astronomical Research in Antarctica), with telescopes planned to
operate in the infrared, sub millimetre, and microwave bands. A special “Dark
Sector”, where anthropogenic interference was to be kept minimal, was set
aside 1 km away from the Pole. These have been centred around the MAPO
Building (Martin A Pomerantz Observatory (Fig. 13-4), named in honour of
Pomerantz's many pioneering contribution to the development of astrophysics in
Antarctica. In addition to supporting several telescopes, MAPO also contains a
fully-equipped workshop, which has proved to be invaluable in maintaining the
observatory.
Figure 13-3: EMILIE, the first Millimetre wavelength telescope in Antarctica. Picture Glenn
Grant.
Figure 13-4: The MAPO Building. SPIREX and later DASI to the left, to the right is the Viper
telescope, a 2.1-m off-axis telescope which hosted the ACBAR and SPARO instruments, used
for CMBR studies and for mapping polarization at sub millimetre wavelengths, respectively.
Image provided by the Office of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation.
A programme was also begun to evaluate the transparency, darkness, water
vapour content, and stability of the Antarctic sky from infrared to millimetre
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wavelengths, for comparison with astronomical sites at temperate latitudes. As
expected, Antarctica was found to be far superior to any temperate latitude site.
13.5 SCAR and Antarctic Astrophysics
At the 21st General Assembly of the International Astronomical Union (IAU),
held in Buenos Aires in 1991, a working group chaired by Peter Gillingham was
established to the development of Antarctic Astronomy. Seventeen papers were
encourage presented at the meeting13 and a resolution encouraging internatio-
nal collaboration in Antarctic astronomy was drafted and adopted by the Gener-
al Assembly. At the 1994 IAU General Assembly in the Hague, a full-day ses-
sion was held on the topic, with the chair of the working group passing to
Michael Burton. A couple of weeks later in Rome a special session on Antarctic
Astronomy was held at the 22nd SCAR (Scientific Committee for Antarctic
Research) meeting. This meeting was organized under the auspices of STAR,
the Solar Terrestrial and Astrophysical Research working group of SCAR, with
John Storey (also of the University of New South Wales) becoming the vice-
chair with responsibility for astrophysics within STAR. SCAR also passed a
resolution recognising the scientific value of Antarctic astronomy and calling for
the development of the field. Antarctic astronomy meetings have been regular
features of IAU and SCAR meetings ever since. STAR has since been reorgan-
ized as the Standing Scientific Group on Physical Sciences (SSG/PS), with both
an expert group (AAA - Antarctic Astronomy & Astrophysics) and an action
group (PASTA - Plateau Astronomy Site Testing in Antarctica), providing it with
input.
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14 Karl Maria Herrligkoffer’s private „German South Pole Expedition“
1957/58: A failed initiative
Cornelia Lüdecke, Centre for the History of Science, Mathematics and Tech-
nology, University of Hamburg, Germany
Email: C.Luedecke@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
Abstract
When the medical doctor Karl Maria Herrligkoffer (1916-1991), already well-
known for his famous expedition to Nanga Parbat (1953), planned a German
South Pole Expedition to take place during the International Geophysical Year
(IGY,1957-58), his attempt deviated from the governmental decision not to par-
ticipate with any expedition to Antarctica due to unfavourable financial condi-
tions. Instead an expansion of routine measurements was planned. A negative
recommendation of the German Geographer’s Day at Hamburg in August 1955
not to support the highly disputed Herrligkoffer served as an excommunication.
Herrligkoffer asked the leader of the second German Antarctic expedition (1911
-1912) Wilhelm Filchner (1877-1957) to take over the scientific leadership or at
least the patronage. The nearly 79 years old Filchner had already been warned
and received instructions to prevent Herrligkoffer from inserting his expedition in
the official frame of the IGY. However, Herrligkoffer argued that Germany with
its long tradition in Antarctic research had to be included amongst other nations.
He expected America and Russia were preparing to make territorial claims after
the IGY, therewith dividing supposed rich mineral resources like uranium among
themselves. In the end, political and scientific decisions in Germany prevented
him from realising his private contribution to the IGY. He was definitely the
wrong man at the wrong time to promote a German Antarctic expedition. Never-
theless, in retrospect it is interesting to note how many of his items were later
fulfilled by the establishment of the German Georg von Neumayer Station at
Atka Bay east of the Weddell Sea and the construction of the research ice-
breaker Polarstern.
14.1 Introduction
In the early twenteth century Antarctica became the focus of the international
geographical community, which initiated its exploration in several periods. Erich
von Drygalski (1865-1949), leader of the first German South Polar Expedition
(SPE, 1901-1903) aboard “Gauss”, wanted to answer the questions, whether
Antarctica was an atoll or a continent or whether there was an ocean current
connecting East Antarctica at 90 °E with the Weddell Sea 1. At the same time,
when the race to the South Pole took place, Wilhelm Filchner (1877-1957)
aboard Deutschland wanted to investigate whether East and West Antarctica
were divided by an inlet filled with ice during the second German Antarctic
Expedition (GAE 1911-12). The task of the third German Antarctic Expedition
(GAE 1938/39) under the leadership of Alfred Ritscher (1879-1963) aboard
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Schwabenland mapped an unknown area east of the Greenwich meridian using
aerial photogrammetry. The region later became known as Neu-Schwabenland.
Richard Evelyn Byrd's (1888-1957) proof of the existence of uranium during his
third Antarctic expedition (1939-1941) triggered a new race to Antarctica. After
World War II, he trained 4700 soldiers during his “Highjump campaign (1946-
1947) for later operations in the Arctic in context of the Cold War. Due to investi-
gation of the mountain region of Neu-Schwabenland by the Norwegian-British-
Swedish Antarctic Expedition (1949-52), Antarctica became visible again in
headlines of German newspapers. Articles, for instance written by Johannes
Georgi (1888-1972), leader of Station “Ice Centre” during the Alfred Wegener
expedition to Greenland (1930-31), focussed on the valuable German results,
which became a base for Herrligkoffer’s new enterprise2.
In 1951, when the proposal of a third International Polar Year was accepted by
the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), the Comité Speciale de
l’Année Geophysique Internationale (CSAGI) was established to plan the sci-
entific program for the so-called “International Geophysical Year” (IGY)3. Dead-
line for submissions of proposals for various projects was May 1954.
Referring to this initiative, the German Foreign Ministry officially published a list
of 84 new place names in the Bundesanzeiger (Federal Advertiser) of 12 July
1952. It provided a summary of the new names introduced onto the map in con-
nection with the discovery of “Neu-Schwabenland” during the 3rd GAE 1938/394.
More and more information was disseminated and picked up by journalists. On
31 January 1953 a German magazine took up arguments about the South Pole
and the political interests in Antarctica under the headline “Dispute about the
South Pole“5. It also described political interests in Antarctica and possible Ger-
man territorial claims, based on the already mentioned three expeditions. These
claims were seen as very important with respect to whaling and global fat pro-
duction, an argument originally given for the 3rd GAE6. The discussion of the
IGY might have influenced Karl Maria Herrligkoffer (1916-1991), who was just
organising an expedition to Nanga Parbat in the same year.
14.2 Karl Maria Herrligkoffer
Karl Maria Herrligkoffer was a medical doctor and specialist of anatomy in
Munich (Germany), when he started his career as mountaineer. In 1953, he led
his first expedition to Nanga Parbat (Himalayas – at 8125 m)7. Although his
expedition was successful in reaching the top, nasty rumours were spread in
German newspapers about Herrligkoffer before and after his expedition por-
traying him as a bad leader.”8
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After a failed attempt to climb the Broad Peak (Himalayas – 8047 m) in 19549,
Herliggkoffer was looking for a new challenge. He planned an Antarctic expedi-
tion which would coincide with the IGY. In 1954, the IGY was already widely
discussed in the German media, although the event would start three years
later10. Antarctica was gaining strategic interest and attention, not least because
the shortest flight route between Australia, South Africa, and South America
crosses the sixth continent, see figure 14-1. Furthermore there seemed to be
promise of rich mineral resources, although the practicality of their actual exploi-
tation was still highly problematic11.
Figure 14-1: Map of Antarctica depicting Neu-Schwabenland in comparison with the area of the
Federal Republic of Germany (Sponsel 1954).
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14.3 Plans for IGY
Plans for IGY included a network of scientific stations in Antarctica for meteoro-
logical, magnetic, and cosmic observations as well as geodetical, glaciological,
and oceanographical investigations at a period, when the solar activity would be
culminating13. As no official polar expedition could be planned in Germany, be-
cause the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German science foundation)
only had a limited amount of money at its disposal, various observations were to
be intensified and performed at different German institutions and universities.
Only two German research vessels Anton Dohrn (27 February – 22 April and 4
August – 27 September 1958) and Gauss II (6 March – 7 May and 29 July – 25
September 1958) took part in the investigation of the polar front in the Northern
Atlantic Ocean14.
In this context Georgi explained Germany’s non-participation in the “Antarctic
co-operation” with reference to Alfred Wegener’s death on the ice cap of Green-
land due to which all interest in scientific polar research was lost15. Later he
reported from the International Antarctic Conference in Paris (6-10 July 1955)16.
Besides a description of the most important topics, he mentioned a recommen-
dation that the Antarctic Conference strictly dis-associated itself from all non-
scientific enterprises. “The collaboration in the frame of the IGY must be suffi-
cient for the highest scientific standard far removed from any sensational or
other secondary intention.”17 In effect this entailed Herrligkoffer’s future excom-
munication from the polar community.
In the meantime Herrligkoffer had founded a “Deutsches Auslandsinstitut” (Ger-
man Institute of Foreign Affairs) to facilitate sponsorships and the organisation
of his expeditions alongside his job as physician. His idea was to continue the
German investigation of Neu-Schwabenland, which had been interrupted by
World War II. All his arguments neglected totally the fact that the Norwegian-
British-Swedish expedition (1949-52) already had worked in Neu-Schwaben-
land.
14.4 Searching for support
By 1955 Herrligkoffer had managed to establish a committee consisting of politi-
cians, scientists, and the leader of the last German Antarctic expedition (1938/-
39) Alfred Ritscher (1879-1963) to support his new German South Pole Expe-
dition. His next move was to start a letter campaign to obtain financial support.
The first argument for his expedition to Princess Martha Coast in the Norwegian
sector of Antarctica was that the Norwegian government had already given
permission for his undertaking18. Curiously he also in his letter mentioned that
the equipment had to be tested on the icefields of the Karakorum west of the
Himalayas during in the coming year (1956). If he had chosen Alpine glaciers
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for this purpose probably no one would immediately have become suspicious of
his plans.
His proposal definitely deviated from the governmental decision not to send any
German expedition to Antarctica, but to concentrate on an IGY at home. Strictly
following the recommendation of the Antarctic Conference concerning the parti-
cipation  of non-scientific expeditions, the 30th German Geographers Day at
Hamburg (1-5 August 1955) warned  against  Herrligkoffer  and  his  plan  to
set  up a German Antarctic expedition in the framework of the IGY19. The scien-
tific community saw his efforts as driven by a need for admiration and obsession
with the setting of sporty records. This became apparent during the examination
of his proposal by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the German IGY
Commission for . They concluded that Herrligkoffer lacked specialised knowl-
edge for such an expensive enterprise and that his expedition would harm the
reputation of German science. He was already infamous due to earlier news-
paper reports regarding personal troubles after the Nanga Parbat expedition; he
certainly did not stand out as an exemplar for good leadership, on the contrary.
The ban issued by the two official committees discouraged other scientists from
lending him further support.
At a press conference Herrligkoffer maintained that he still stuck to his plan, and
went on to explain his ideas to the journalists21: His argument was that, for him,
it was important that at least one German expedition participate  in the “scien-
tific large-scale attack of the South Pole region”. Otherwise no future political or
economic claims could be made regarding vast mineral resources. He also
gave the first detailed information of what he intended: 30 scientists were to
establish several stations along a distance of 500 km towards the Pole, while a
permanent base station should established and maintained even after the IGY.
The expedition was expected to cost 2 - 3 Million D-Mark. This sum excluded
coverage for the ice-breaker, helicopters and long-range aircraft that he wanted
to charter.
Further information was provided in a newsletter of 10 September22. Scientific
tasks were to include geodetic, geological, geophysical, and chemical pro-
grammes, meteorological and oceanographic measurements, as well as
biological, zoological, and physiological investigations. The results of these
investigations, he said, would prove to be of economic and political significance.
Still further detail was provided in a press release ten days later. This time he
published the co-ordinates of the planned base camp to be located at 100 °W
and 71,5 °S, where a magnetic station would also be i nstalled23. Then he went
on to name all those that he saw as his opponents, German professors who
wanted to block his efforts. They were Julius Bartels (1899-1964), director of the
Geophysical Institute at the University of Göttingen and chair of the German
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IGY commission, Max Kneißl (1907-1973, president of the German National
Committee of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG), and
the professors of geography Erich Otremba (1910-1984), Carl Troll (1899-
1975), and Herbert Wilhelmy (1910-2003). Herrligkoffer also felt hurt by the
negative behaviour by Max Grotewahl (1894-1958), the director of the Archive
of Polar Research at Kiel. For Herrligkoffer himself the expedition symbolised a
national enterprise, since he was sure that after the IGY all participating  nations
would divide Antarctica among themselves. If Germany were absent, the first
three historical expeditions would have been in vain. In his view “it would be
national blindness if the importance of the present moment were overlooked
due to internal German quarrels about competence.”26
At the same time it must be noted that Herrligkoffer also had his fans and sup-
porters. Herbert Bruns (born 1908), a former electro-engineer of the 3rd GAE
(1938/39)  who also lived in Munich said he could not understand why the Deut-
sche Forschungsgemeinschaft did not support Herrligkoffer’s plan to continue
German polar research after World War II, a venture he himself also wished to
endorse28.
A memorandum to all representatives of the German Bundestag from 22 Octo-
ber repeated the main facts regarding the expedition as presented in the news-
letter of the 20th September29. It turned out that the president of the German
Bundestag Dr Eugen Gerstenmaier (1906-1986) and professor for ethnology Dr
Martin Heydrich (1889-1969) in the meantime had withdrawn their names from
the original committee since they no longer appeared on the letterhead. This
was an indication that the warning issued during the Geographers Day in Ham-
burg was already having an effect.
Early in January 1956 a regional German newspaper described a large-scale
attack of Great Britain, the United States and Russia on the South Pole31 Four
months later the same newspaper contained a report about the “first villages at
the South Pole”. The article included a map showing the locations of two British
and one American station in the neighbourhood of Vahsel Bay in the southern
Weddell Sea, the area originally discovered by Filchner32. A dynamic chart
depicted military-like advance of various nations towards the South Pole (see
figure 14-2).
In his survey article on the IGY, published in a newspaper in June 1956, Georgi
once more explained why Germany did not participate in this huge scientific
enterprise33. As Bartels of the German IGY commission had stated, the estab-
lishment of an Antarctic station would cost several million D-Mark. This could
not be afforded at a time when German science still had to recover from World
War II. Georgi also argued that a less costly operation would not do either.
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Figure 14-2: Advance to the South Pole during the IGY 1957/58 (Neue Post 1956).
A lesson from Alfred Wegener’s (1880-1930) last expedition to Greenland had
already shown how attempts to economise might endanger and even be fatal
for expeditions members34.
14.5 Wilhelm Filchner’s role
Seeing increasing resistance pitted against his plan, Herrligkoffer desperately
looked around for authoritative support. Perhaps he was in panic when he
asked the nearly 79 year old Wilhelm Filchner to take over the scientific leader-
ship. The idea was to continue research at Neu-Schwabenland, east of the
Weddell Sea, where Filchner had overwintered 1911-1236. Filchner apparently
did not respond. Four months later, on the 1st of May 1956, Herrligkoffer’s
friend, the retired ministry official Dr Friedrich Fetzer, contacted Filchner and
asked him to take over patronage of the new German Antarctic expedition 1957,
saying that his good reputation in Germany and among the international sci-
entific community would help the organisation.38. When nothing happened,
Herrligkoffer himself again approached Filchner, now asking him to write a
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foreword or at least a congratulatory address that might be included in a promo-
tional brochure for a German South Pole Expedition39. He also wanted to in-
clude portraits of Drygalski, Filchner, and Ritscher in his ancestral portrait
gallery of German Antarctic researchers. Both letters came back to their sen-
ders, because Filchner’s address in Zürich had been wrong, so Fetzer sent the
letters off again. This time Filchner wrote a friendly answer, which prompted
Herrligkoffer to propose to visit him in Zürich together with Fetzer40.
Filchner was not sure what to do, so he consulted his colleague professor C.F.
Baeschlin, president of the Swiss National Committee of the IUGG. The latter in
turn informed professor Kneißl in Munich about Herrligkoffer’s intentions. After
Kneißl’s answer, Baeschlin urgently warned against supporting Herrligkoffer‘s
expedition, since it was not an official IGY contribution. Baeschlin wrote that the
expedition had already been rejected by German scientific organisations41.
Before he got Baeschlin’s letter, Filchner had already written a long letter to
Herrligkoffer outlining his bad experiences during the course of his own Ant-
arctic expedition (1911-12), adding that he would prefer not to get involved in
any polar matter again42. Consequently he could not take over a patronage or
write anything for the advertising brochure. At the same time he excused his
harsh answer regarding Herrligkoffer’s kind offer, saying he did not want to
offend him personally. Instead he suggested he might work for him behind the
scene. How this might best be done would have to be discussed later.
When Filchner learnt that Baeschlin recommended to do nothing without con-
sulting Bartels and him and that professor Kneißl in Munich would also back him
up in this decision, he aligned himself with the IUGG and Filchner replied nega-
tively to Fetzer43. He had thought that Herrligkoffer’s expedition would be an
independent undertaking. If Fetzer or Herrligkoffer wanted more information he
suggested they turn to professor Kneißl in Munich. In effect Filchner withdrew
his earlier suggestion because he did not want to interfere with the business of
the  and German  IUGG committees44. Herrligkoffer was disappointed but neve-
rtheless tried to arrange a meeting with Filchner, finding it crucial to get Filchner
on his side45. The meeting was to take place between Zürich and Munich at on
Schloß Moos close to Lindau/Lake of Konstanz, where Dr. Fetzer lived46. After
the meeting Filchner reported to Baeschlin that the outcome was a declaration
that Herrligkoffer would refrain from undertaking his expedition in the name of
the IGY. 48
Filchner expected that Herrligkoffer would withdraw his plan of a new Antarctic
expedition. However, this was not the case. Fetzer hoped that the declaration
was already underway, because Herrligkoffer wanted to start off on another
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expedition to the Himalayas (on 27 July 1956).50 In the meantime governmental
offices tried to intervene in his plans of an Antarctic expedition51. Obviously
Herrligkoffer must have changed his plans and did not travel, because his de-
claration was not dispatched from Munich until 14 August53. When he got it in
his hands, Filchner saw it did not match his expectations; Herrligkoffer only
admitted to not promoting an expedition in the name of the IGY, but he did not
terminate his plans54.
When Filchner did not respond Herrligkoffer became very uncertain55. He wrote
to Filchner once more to explain how he on a short notice had to postpone his
expedition to the Himalayas to next year. When they had met at Lindau the
brochure, which he included in his letter, was already in print, but he could
change the things having to do with the declaration over the phone. Filchner
should not attach too much importance to it, he said, since the whole thing was
only meant to instil public understanding  of  the  importance  of  a  German
Antarctic  expedition.  In  the  end  he emphasised that everything depended on
what Filchner and his friends could do for the cause. He still hoped that Filchner
might come around.
14.6 Promotional brochures
Herrligkoffer was supported by Bruns of the “Schwabenland” expedition, who in
May 1956 published a serious brochure on the demand for a “Deutsche Südpol-
Expedition 1956/58” to promote national claims56. On the basis of the 3rd GAE
(1938/39)  he outlined the scientific programme and listed needed equipment
like an ice-breaker, which had to be built and caterpillars. The name of the
expedition leader was not mentioned at all.
In his own promotional brochure distributed August 1956, Herrligkoffer recalled
German pioneering work and the need to continue during the International
Geophysical Year 1957/58. Then he addressed strategic gaps in a possible
future war, Antarctica as potential base for missiles, and expected American
and Russian territorial claims after the IGY. Antarctica would serve as resource
of raw material for the future, among which uranium would be the most
important. Referring to a paper published in the Czechoslovakian journal “New
Technology” (1956) he described a Russian experiment in Antarctica, where an
atomic explosion went off in October 1955 to melt snow and to raise the air
temperature. This new method could be used to remove the icecap for pro-
sperous mining of the supposed rich mineral resources among which uranium
was the most interesting. Then he outlined the tasks of the planned German
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expedition with thirty scientists involved in a framework with other participating
nations.
The expected results, he emphasised, would be of great economic and political
importance. He listed seven general questions and problems to be solved by
the expeditions going south.
1. Does Antarctica influence the climate change?
2. Is there a connection with the melting pack ice in the Russian sector of the
Arctic?
3. Are the warm oases in Antarctica caused by volcanoes or by uranium?
4. Will it be possible to exploit coal, oil and minerals?
5. Is Antarctica the land of uranium of the future?
6. Will Antarctica be of strategic importance in the future - as aircraft base,
missile base, or control area for the southern oceans?
7. Can Antarctica serve as a gigantic refrigerator for conserving the U.S.
American food surplus?
Finally, Herrligkoffer argued that Germany with its long tradition in Antarctic
research had to be included amongst the nations making Antarctic claims, when
different parts of the sixth continent were to be portioned out. He repeated his
view that if his expedition would not be financially supported the first three
German Antarctic expeditions would have been totally worthless.
The promotional brochure was widely disseminated and considered by various
journalists. Herrligkoffer’s plan was very positively reviewed in a newspaper on
6 September 195657. In contrast to economic and strategic oriented expeditions
of about twelve other participating nations Herrligkoffer’s expedition would only
focus on pure scientific tasks (see map in Figure 14-3). In summary the article
portrayed his expedition as an official German official contribution to the IGY. It
would be a „legitimate right“ to be considered in connection with the partition of
Antarctica. At that time a dispute about the ice-cream gateau filled the German
newspapers.
Hermann Pörzgen’s article of 18 September reacted negatively explaining that
Herrligkoffer in correspondence with scientific bodies created the impression
that most of the organisational work relating to his expedition had already been
done58. What was in doubt was his scientific aptitude. The journalist’s
conclusion was:
“Misplaced bustle with political ulterior motives might not be useful for
trustworthy joint ventures of other states with the Federal Republic.”59
Still without any reaction from Filchner, Herrligkoffer supposed that the latter
might have changed his attitude due to the brochure60. Due to the importance of
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Figure 14-3: Herrligkoffer’s map of planned stations during the IGY (Herrligkoffer 1956: 4).
Filchner, he offered to meet him in Zürich. Now Filchner answered with the help
of Baeschlin that he indeed had changed his mind since the brochure broadcast
political programmes at the South Pole, which according to him would harm
German interests62. He also underlined that Pörzgen’s article made the reader
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 Filchner 20.10.1956. Baeschlin had given him material to answer Herligkoffer, which Filchner
used partly word for word (Baeschlin 20.10.1956).
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aware of the imminent dangers of the expedition. In the end he was against a
new face to face discussion.
Ultimately Herrligkoffer’s non-governmental expedition never got off the ground.
Financial support for such a venture was not forthcoming, neither during the
IGY nor in the early sixties. This was a direct consequence of the political and
scientific decisions already taken in 1955.
14.7 New agendas
In February 1978 the German Minister for Research Hans Matthöfer explained
to journalists why the German government wanted to join the “Antarctic Club” as
soon as possible, when territorial claims were still frozen64. He described the
importance of joining the Antarctic Treaty in connection with the race for mineral
resources in Antarctica. 90 Mio D-Mark were needed for a permanent station
and a polar research vessel, which was a huge amount of money. A view to the
German Democratic Republic showed that in eastern Germany a first step to
become a member of the Antarctic Treaty had been already made in 1975 (see
table 14-1).
Table 14-1: Single steps of joining the Antarctic Treaty. GDR: German Demo-
cratic Republic, FRG: Federal Republic of Germany.
Time Action
1975 GDR acceded to the Antarctic Treaty
1978 FRG admitted as a member of SCAR
1980 FRG Foundation of the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar Research
1981 FRG admitted Consultative Status
1981 GDR admitted as a member of SCAR
1987 GDR admitted to Consultative Status
In 1981 Matthöfer’s plan was finally realised with the establishment of the per-
manent German  station  Georg  von  Neumayer at  Atka  Bay  and  the  con-
struction  of  the research ice-breaker  “Polarstern”. In principle these were
goals already included on the agenda outlined by Bruns and Herrligkoffer in
1956.
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14.9 Appendix
List of Herrligkoffer’s expeditions (1953-1986), after Herrligkoffer (1989).
1953 Nanga Parbat: Hermann Buhl reached the summit at 8125 m on 3
July.
1954 Broad Peak: return at Camp III in 6500 m on 6 November. One
death.
1961 Nanga Parbat: reached .Diamir flank at 7500 m on 22 June.
1962 Nanga Parbat via Diamir flank: reached the summit at 8125 m on
23 June.
1963 Exploration of the Rupal flank of Nanga Parbat in June/July.
1964 Nanga Parbat winter expedition up to 6000 m at the end of
March.
1966 Climb of 34 summits in NE Greenland in July/August.
1968 Nanga Parbat: return at 7100 m on 9 July.
1970 Nanga Parbat: Reinhold and Günther Messner reached the sum-
mit on 27 June as well as Felix Kuen and Peter Scholz on 28
June. One death (Günther Messner).
1971 Rakaposhi (7788 m): return at camp III in 6000 m on 21 Sept-
ember.
1972 Mount Everest: return at camp VI in 8350 m.
1973 Rakaposhi (7786 m): return at camp IV in 6500 m at the end of
September.
1974 Unsuccessful attempt of mountaineering in the Watkins-Bjergen
(East Greenland) in August.
1976 Several climbs of summits in the Staunings Alps in East Green-
land in August/September.
1977 Several climbs in the Klosterbjergen (East Greenland) in August.
1978 German-French expedition to Mount Everest: sixteen expedition
members reached the summit on 14 and 15 October.
1980 Kanchenjunga: Schorsch Ritter and three Sherpas reached the
summit on 15 May.
1981 Nanga Parbat south west ridge: return at camp IV in 7450 m in
June.
1982 East pillar of Nanga Parbat (8042 m) reached by Ueli Bühler on
17 August:
1986 Broad Peak climbed by seven expeditions members in June.
K2 climbed by four expedition members in July. One death.
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15 Appendices
15.1 Agenda of the 1st SCAR Workshop on the History of Antarctic
Research
Thursday    2 June 2005
8: 30-9:00     Registrat ion
09:00-09:15 Workshop Welcome and Opening
Ludwig Braun, Commission of Glaciology, Bayerische Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Munich
Cornelia Lüdecke, President of SCAR Action Group History of Antarctic
Research, Munich
Aant Elzinga, Department of History of Ideas and Theory of Science,
Göteborg, Sweden
09:15-13:00 Session I
09:15-10:15 The dawn of Antarctic scientific consciousness
Jorge Berguño, Chilean Antarctic Institute, Santiago, Chile
10:15-10:30 Poster Presentation
Changes to Antarctic Identity Rhetoric
Jason Davis, The Ohio State University, USA
History of Antarctic Research: The Australian Context
David Michael Dodd, Royal Society of Victoria / University of Melbourne,
Melbourne, Australia
10:30-11:00 Coffee Break - Poster Session
11:00-12:00 Argentine Scientific Interests in Antarctica, 1946-1959
Adrian Howkins, University of Texas at Austin, USA
12:00-13:00 The U.S. Antarctic Oversnow Geophysical-Glaciological Research
Program of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) 1957-58 from the
View of a Research Scientist Participant




14:00-15:00 The Political Dimensions of the NSB - Expedition to Antarctica 1949-
52
Lisbeth Lewander, Department of Gender Studies, Göteborg, Sweden
15:00-16:00 The Swedish non-participation in the Antarctic leg of the IGY
Aant Elzinga, Department of History of Ideas and Theory of Science,
Göteborg, Sweden
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16:00-16:30 Coffee Break - Poster Session
16:30-17:30 Russia in the Antarctic
V.M. Kotlyakov, Maxim Yu. Moskalevsky,Institute of Geography
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
V.V. Lukin, and A. V. Klepikov, Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute of
the Roshydromet, St. Petersburg, Russia
cancelled
17:30-18:00 Discussion on next SCAR workshop
19:00 Optional dinner on private expenses
Friday         3 June 2005
9:00-12:30 Session II I
09:00-9:10 Welcome by Horst Hagedorn Chairman of the Commission on
Glaciology, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Munich
09:10-10:00 Antarctica in the 1980s: increasing interest in the remote continent
Peter Abbink, Arctic Centre, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
10:00-11:00 The start of Dutch involvement in Antarctic research
Johan van Bennekom, retired from Royal Netherlands Institute for Sea 
Research, Texel, The Netherlands
11:00-11:30 Coffee Break - Poster Session
11:30-12:30 The History of Astrophysics in Antarctica
Balthasar Indermuehle, University of New South Wales, Australia
12:30-13:30 Lunch
13:30-15:30 Session IV
13:30-14:30 Karl Maria Herrligkoffer’s private „German South Pole Expedition“
1957/58 – a failed initiative
Cornelia Lüdecke, Centre for the History of Science, University of
Hamburg, Germany
14:30-15:30 Final discussion
End of Workshop 15:30
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15.2 List of Participants of the 1st SCAR History Workshop in Munich,
Germany
Speakers:
Peter Abbink (b.p.abbink@rug.nl), Arctic Centre, University of Groningen, The
Netherlands
John C. Behrendt (John.Behrendt@colorado.edu), Institute of Arctic and Alpine
Research, University of Colorado, USA
Johan van Bennekom (bennekom@kwarteel.nl), retired from Royal Nether-
lands Institute for Sea Research, Texel, The Netherlands
Jorge Berguño (jberguno@inach.cl), Chilenian Antarctic Institute, Santiago,
Chile
Ludwig Braun (Ludwig.Braun@lrz.badw-muenchen.de), Commission on Gla-
ciology, Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Munich, Germany
Jason Davis (davis.1937@osu.edu), The Ohio State University, USA
Aant Elzinga (Aant.Elzinga@theorysc.gu.se), Göteborg, Sweden
Horst Hagedorn (horst.hagedorn@web.de), Chairman of the Commission on
Glaciology, Würzburg, Germany
Adrian Howkins (adrianhowkins@mail.utexas.edu), University of Texas at
Austin, USA
Balthasar Indermuehle (bindermuehle@gmail.com), University of New South
Wales, Australia
Reinhard Krause (rkrause@awi-bremerhaven.de), Alfred Wegener Institute for
Polar and Marine Research, Bremerhaven, Germany
Cornelia Lüdecke (C.Luedecke@lrz.uni-muenchen.de), Centre for the History
of Science, University of Hamburg, Germany
Speakers, who could not participate
D M Dodd (daviddodd@optusnet.com.au), Royal Society of Victoria / University
of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
Helmut Hornik (hornik@dgfi.badw.de), Filchner Archive, Bavarian Academy of
Sciences and Humanities, Munich, Germany
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Lisbeth Lewander (lisbeth.lewander@wmst.gu.se), Department of Gender Stu-
dies, Göteborg, Sweden
V.V. Lukin, and A. V. Klepikov, Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute of the
Roshydromet, St. Petersburg, Russia
Maxim Yu. Moskalevsky and V.M. Kotlyakov, (moskalevsky@mail.ru), Insti-
tute of Geography, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
Further participants
Bernhard Ebneth (ebneth@ndb.badw.de), Neue Deutsche Biographie, Bava-
rian Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Munich, Germany
Heidi Escher-Vetter (Heidi.Escher@lrz.badw-muenchen.de), Commission on
Glaciology, Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Munich, Germany
Erich Heucke (Erich.Heucke@lrz.badw-muenchen.de), Commission on Glacio-
logy, Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Munich, Germany
Wolfgang Karg (wolfgang.karg@web.de), journalist, Berlin, Germany
Christoph Mayer (Christoph.Mayer@lrz.badw-muenchen.de), Commission on
Glaciology, Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Munich, Germany
Katrin Müller (Kathrin.Mueller@semphil.badw.de), Commission on Semitic
Philology, Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Munich, Germany
Oskar Reinwarth (Oskar.Reinwarth@lrz.badw-muenchen.de), retired form





The workshop was sponsored by the Institut für Geschichte der Naturwissen-
schaften, Mathematik und Technik (Universität Hamburg), Deutsche Gesell-
schaft für Polarforschung, Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (Ober-
pfaffenhofen/Wessling), Spaten-Löwenbräu Gruppe (München), and the Sci-
entific Committee on Antarctic Research. It is also supported by the Kommis-
sion für Glaziologie der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (München).
The SCAR Action Group on the Institutionalisiation of Antarctic Research wants
to thank the Editor in Charge of “Reports on Polar and Marine Research” Dr.
habil. Franz Riemann of the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar und Marine Re-
search (Bremerhaven) very much for his advice and for publishing our proceed-
ings.
Each paper went through a peer review process whereby two persons selected
from the roster of participating speakers were asked in each case to scrutinize
and provide critical comments. Aant Elzinga contributed by suggesting further
corrections and revisions in the final round, while Cornelia Lüdecke is respon-
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